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 Why are party systems less institutionalized in the Philippines and 
South Korea while they are more institutionalized in Japan and Taiwan? 
Under what circumstances or conditions do party systems become 
institutionalized? These two questions are the main focus of this research. 
This thesis explains why we see a difference in the levels of party system 
institutionalization across Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea. 
The existing literature on party politics argue that party system 
institutionalization is one of the crucial components of a democratic 
consolidation. However, there are few cross-comparison studies exploring 
why party systems institutionalize differently.  
 Building on from Randall and Svåsand (1999, 2002) four 
dimensions of party system institutionalization, this study examines how 
changes in conditional factors bring changes to party system 
institutionalization across Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea. 
The main argument of this thesis is that it is the variations in social 
cleavage, factionalism, and the way democratic transitions have occurred 
explains why Japan and Taiwan’s party systems are institutionalized while 
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 This thesis examines the concept of party system 
institutionalization, which essentially analyses how and why inter-party 
interactions consolidate over time. Though there seems to be general 
expectations that party system institutionalization can be found in most 
democratic countries, not all democracies have stable party systems. In 
some settings, there exists volatilities and irregularities in some of them. 
Thus, this study seeks to explain why some political party systems 
consolidate at a predictable pattern while some fail to do so. It particularly 
looks at the varying levels of institutionalization among the party systems 
in Asia to assess the reasons behind this political reality.  
 This concept of institutionalization can be credited to Samuel 
Huntington’s study from almost half a century ago. He defined 
institutionalization as “the process by which organizations and procedures 
acquire value and stability” (Huntington 1968: 12). Interpreting 
institutionalization as equivalent to political development, he claimed that 
it was a necessary component of modernization. His argument was that 
“political development and decay were possible outcomes of institutional 
change and that different qualities of institutionalization could emerge as 
a result of the interplay between economic and political modernization and 
the strength of political institutions (Huntington, 1965: 393-194). 
 Since the pioneering study of Huntington, his argument generated 
a number of compelling questions such as “why are some political systems 
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more stable than others?” and “how do political and economic changes in 
a nation affect the stability of its political institutions? And because of 
these questions, scholars of political parties have refined the concept and 
applied it to the party systems in various countries (Sartori, 1974; Janda, 
1980; Panebianco, 1988; Levisky, 1998; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; 
Hicken, 2009; Hicken and Kuhonta, 2011; Ufen, 2012, to name a few). 
 With the expansion of the Third Wave of democratization in post-
1989 1 , there have been a revitalized discussion on the concept of 
institutionalization in the 1990s. Scholars such as Mainwaring and Scully 
(1995) used it to classify the development of political institutions in new 
democracies and to understand how similar or different they were 
compared to the more established ones. Following Mainwaring and 
Scully’s study, various scholars have applied the concept of 
institutionalization to compare party systems in Third Wave democracies 
in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Post-Communist Europe, and Asia 
(Mainwaring, 1998; Mainwaring, 1999; Keunzi and Lambright, 2001; 
Linbdberg, 2007; Casal Bertoa and Enyedi, 2010, among others). 
 In particular, the studies that focused on the party systems in Asia 
reveal a deviation from the general expectations regarding 
institutionalization and democracy. While other party systems in the region 
have institutionalized, there are those that remain under institutionalized 
despite more than thirty years since their democratization. For instance, 
party system in South Korea undergo changes every four years on average 
since the country’s democratization in 1987. It normally experiences party 
mergers before elections and then parties split after. In the Philippines, 
party switching is common and ‘turncoat-ism’ (i.e., politics without 
principles) has become a system in itself. However, in Japan and Taiwan, 
                                                      
1 The third wave meaning the democratic transitions in Latin America in the 1980s, 
Asia Pacific countries and regions (Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan) from 1986 
to 1988, Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and sub-Saharan 
African beginning in 1989. See Huntington (1991) for more details.  
 13 
the same parties continue to compete for more than eight years on average 
and party switching occur at a lesser rate. 
Such assessment is expected to enrich academic discussions on 
party system institutionalization in particular and comparative politics in 
general. This is regarded as crucial because it influences the political 
participation of the electorate and the performance of party organizations 
in their domestic politics. Moreover, it provides party organizations a 
system or framework that regulates or shapes the behaviour of parties. 
Without such institutionalization, the party system in a country may be 
deemed volatile. The result of which will lessen the effectiveness of party 
organizations and their performances as vital institutions in a democracy 
(for example, policy implementations) that may consequently weaken 
party-to-citizen linkage.  
 
1.1  Research Question 
 
 This study primarily analyses two related themes: the degree of 
party system institutionalization and its variations across countries. The 
first part of this study measures the degree of party system 
institutionalization in different countries, while the second part explains 
the reasons behind their varying degrees of institutionalization. In 
analyzing such differences in institutionalization, this study focuses on the 
party systems in Japan, Taiwan, Philippines and South Korea as case 
studies to addresses the following research questions: 
 
1. How is the institutionalization of party system measured to 
determine the variations across the four countries?  




 To answer the first question, this thesis uses Randall and Svåsand’s 
(1999, 2002) four dimensions of party system institutionalization in 
combination with other indicators suggested by Janda (1990), Mainwaring 
and Scully (1995), and Hicken and Kuhonta (2011). Generally, party 
system institutionalization is measured based on both the structural and 
attitudinal dimensions using national party systems as units of analysis. In 
determining party system institutionalization, this thesis utilizes the 
quantitative method, which will draw on the statistical data on the lower 
house elections of the four countries from 1986 to 2016. As will be further 
explained in Chapter Three, Randall and Svåsand’s four dimensions (1999, 
2002) includes the following: (1) continuity and stability among party 
system; (2) the level of political parties accepting each other as legitimate 
partners; (3) party-to-state relationship; (4) public’s trust in electoral 
institutions. These will be used, along with other complementary indicators, 
to measure the degree of institutionalization of each country’s party system.  
 After which, this thesis subsequently addresses the second question 
why there are differences in the degree of institutionalization. It presents 
three main explanatory factors namely: social cleavage, institutionalized 
factions, and the mode of democratic transitions. As will be further 
expounded in Chapters Five and Six, this study argues that a variation in 
these three main factors influences the degree of party system 
institutionalization across the countries.  
 
1.2  Significance of the study 
 
 Though there are several scholarly literatures on party system 
institutionalization, this study also offers various contributions in the field. First, it 
provides a scientific way of determining the degree of institutionalization of party 
systems based on empirical observation and numerical data. Doing so presents a 
new measurement for institutionalization by including the development of inter-
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party competition (i.e., from non-system to system), which provides a more 
elaborate comprehension of the development and consolidation of party systems 
over time. Second, this study provides explanations on the variations in the 
institutionalization of party systems. Though there exist several literatures 
regarding the causes of institutionalization, they rarely provide the reasons why 
party system institutionalization varies. Lastly, this study supplements the existing 
conceptualization of party system institutionalization by utilizing a comparative 
analysis across democracies in Asia. In particular, it provides an empirical data for 
party systems in the region, which are relatively few compared to the voluminous 
studies of party systems in Latin America and post-Communist Europe (for 
example, see wibbels, 1999; Tavits, 2005; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005; 
Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007).  
 
1.3  Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis comprises the following chapters: 
 
 Chapter Two presents the literature review featuring various 
studies related to party system institutionalization. It starts with a 
discussion on Huntington’s (1965; 1968) original typology of different 
qualities of institutionalization that gave rise to subsequent studies on party 
system institutionalization that have developed since then. The chapter 
also discusses related studies in party system institutionalization in various 
countries located in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Post-Communist 
Europe, and East and Southeast Asia. It pays particular attention to the 
party systems in East and Southeast Asia since the focus on the region is 
the basis of this thesis. Aside from providing a summary of the existing 
and relevant research, this chapter also clarifies important concepts and 
ideas regarding party system institutionalization.  
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 Chapter Three features the theory and methods employed in this 
study. It explains the dependent and independent variables and their 
relationships with each other that significantly influence party system 
institutionalization. This chapter also discusses how these variables are 
operationalized in this study.  
 Chapter Four discusses how party system institutionalization is 
measured. It provides a quantitative analysis on the party system 
institutionalization level of Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea. 
After measuring the party system institutionalization of the four countries, 
this chapter concludes that Japan and Taiwan have institutionalized party 
system, while the Philippines and South Korea have under- 
institutionalized party systems.  
 Chapter Five examines the reasons behind the institutionalized 
party systems in Japan and Taiwan. These reasons are based on three 
explanatory factors: (a) salient social cleavage; (b) institutionalized party 
factions; and (c) top-down (i.e., authoritarian led) democratic transitions. 
 Chapter Six explains why the party systems in the Philippines and 
South Korea are under-institutionalized. The explanations are also based 
on the three factors: (a) no salient social cleavage, (b) no institutionalized 
party factions, and (c) bottom-up (i.e., people-led) democratic transitions.  
 Chapter Seven highlights the empirical findings of this study and 



















 This chapter builds on previous studies in party system 
institutionalization. However, we restrict our review to the available 
scholarly literature to those that are most relevant. This literature review 
focuses on previous studies in the party system institutionalization across 
countries, particularly across Third-wave democratic countries. The 
chapter, therefore, is organized with the particular question in mind—how 
previous literature can guide the study conducted in this research; and 
assess the strengths and weaknesses of the previous literature on party 
system institutionalization across the countries. Based on these discussion, 
it suggests the ways to improve the current literature in party system 
institutionalization and how our research can contribute to advance the 
scholarly debate in cross-country comparison of party system 
institutionalization. Here is how this chapter is organized.  
  This chapter begins by reviewing the literature that are relevant to 
party system institutionalization, particularly the studies that examines 
party system institutionalization across countries. Here, the discussion 
starts by introducing traditions in the literature: (a) those literature that 
conceptualize party system institutionalization using a single-dimensional 
concept; and (b) those that conceptualize party system institutionalization 
using multi-dimensional concepts. By explaining and comparing the 
limitations in both traditions, the author provides reasons why this study 
pays attention to those literatures attempting to explain/determine party 
system institutionalization as multi-dimensional concept. 
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 It then discusses studies in party system institutionalization across 
different regions focusing on the East and Southeast Asia. This will 
highlight the limitations in the previous studies in party system 
institutionalization that this research builds on.  
 
2.1  Party System Institutionalization 
 
 In party literature, the term ‘institutionalization’ carries three broad 
meanings. The first one is given by Samuel Huntington. 
“Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures 
acquire value and stability”, (Huntington, 1968: 12). Secondly, for 
Kenneth Janda (1980), political party’s external relations should constitute 
a measurement for institutionalization. Thus, according to Janda, an 
institutionalized party consists of a party which is ‘reified in the public’s 
mind’ and a party organization must be viewed as legitimate by its 
constituent members and publics. 
 Thirdly, for Angelo Panebianco (1988), ‘institutionalization’ is the “way 
the organization solidifies by losing its character as a tool and become “value in and 
of itself,” (Panebianco, 1988:4). Thus, for Panebianco, the survival of the party 
organization (i.e., party organization becoming a system) is a critical condition in 
determining if it is institutionalized. For example, if a party organization survives 
for many years after putting its avowed candidate into an office, the party is 
considered institutionalized because that particular party is thought to be running 
under a system, not just on individual charismatic leadership.  
 Following those initial studies, political party institutionalization 
disappeared from academic debate. However, with the beginning of the 
Third Wave democratization the interest in party and party system 
institutionalization re-emerged. The new series of studies were initiated by 
the work of Mainwaring and Scully (1995) in Building Democratic 
Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. They contested the existing 
models of party system analysis and proposed a new framework, arguing 
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that the institutionalization should be the main criterion for classifying 
party system. Following Mainwaring and Scully, subsequent studies have 
sought to measure the degree of institutionalization of party systems across 
countries. However, this thesis finds there is still some conceptual 
ambiguities remain in the study of party system institutionalization that 
needs to be addressed. For example, there is still debates on what kind of 
aspects (i.e., value, routinization, or external relations) should be part of a 
measure of institutionalization and how are these characteristics related to 
each other.  
 Therefore, the next two sections of this chapter summarize these 
ambiguities in relation to the literature: one section will lay out those studies that 
have evolved on utilizing only one aspect of institutionalization while the other 
section lays out those studies that have evolved on combining multiple aspects of 
institutionalization.  
 
 2.1.1  Party System Institutionalization as one-dimensional 
  approach. 
 
 The scholarship in party politics credits Samuel Huntington 
(1965,1968) for his contribution of introducing ‘institutionalization’. 
When it was introduced by Huntington, he intended to be a 
multidimensional concept. Several scholars have since approached 
‘institutionalization’ as a single dimensional concept for more conceptual 
clarity. For example, Mair’s (1996) study of party system stabilization in 
Western Europe takes ‘stability’ as a replacement for institutionalization 
and focuses on how ‘party competition’ develops. Mair then distinguishes 
alternation of government, governing formula, and access to government 
to measure the level of structural stabilization (please see Mair 1996 for 
more detailed explanation of these variables). 
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 Levitsky (1998) who took both Huntington’s and Panebianco’s 
conceptualization of institutionalization and challenge them with the case 
of Argentina’s Peronist Party— (Partido Justicialista, PJ). For Levitsky, 
routinization of the PJ party in Argentina suggests that the party has had 
strong ‘value-infusion’ (i.e., what Huntington conceptualized to measure 
institutionalization) but with lower degree of organizational routinization.’ 
In fact, it is the low level of institutionalization of internal rules and 
procedures, often viewed by more traditional party scholars as inefficient 
and disorder, that provided organizational flexibility to the PJ. Therefore, 
it is not the system-ness of internal rules and procedures, as Panebianco 
suggested, but it is the adaptability of the PJ combined with deep links to 
society making the party winning stable support from electorate. Thus, for 
Levitsky, an institutionalized party must have higher degree of ‘stability’ 
and ‘adaptability’. While there is still a continuing debate regarding, what 
constitute ‘institutionalization’, majority of contemporary party system 
literature uses Levitsky’s conceptualization— ‘routinization’. 
 The succeeding studies of Mair (1996) and Levitsky (1998) and 
other scholars such as Bertoa and Enyedi (2010) have all develop 
indicators to measure the conceptualization of institutionalization (i.e., 
stability). Building upon the same principle, Lindberg (2007) measured the 
degree of party system institutionalization of 21 African electoral 
democracies using ten indicators that affect legislative instability (see 
Lindberg 2007 for more detail).  
 These one-dimensional approaches in party system 
institutionalization focus on providing clear measurement criteria for 
institutionalization. In doing so, studies that follow one-dimensional 
approach forfeits providing comprehensive explanation for party system 
institutionalization over parsimonious explanations.  
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 2.1.2  Party System Institutionalization as a multi-dimensional 
  concept  
 
 However, it was Mainwaring and Scully’s contribution in 1995 
which brought a paradigm shift to the existing model of party system 
analysis. The authors suggested that the level of institutionalization as the 
foremost criterion to understand differences in the party system 
development in Third-Wave democracies. 2  Prior to Mainwaring and 
Scully’s contribution, studies on party system institutionalization used the 
‘number of parties’ or ‘ideological distance’ as the basic element for the 
classification of party systems (Duverger 1959; Rae 1967; Laakso and 
Tagepera 1979; Sartori 1976). 
 Mainwaring and Scully, argued that the ‘degree of 
institutionalization’ need to be incorporated to advance our understanding 
of the party system. Majority of the contemporary party system literature 
developed from Mainwaring and Scully’s contributions that were used by 
Mainwaring and Torcal (2005); Kuenzi and Lambright (2001); Basedau 
(2007); Riedl (2008); Lewis (2008); Crosissant and Volkel (2010) in their 
studies. Other scholarly works however have drawn inspirations from 
different studies. For example, Meleshevich (2007) looks at autonomy and 
stability to measure the party system institutionalization in Baltic States, 
Russia, and Ukraine. Rose and Munro (2009) and Rose and Mishler (2010) 
proposed an interactive model of institutionalization that uses the 
following four criteria: (1) stability of election laws; (2) elite commitments; 
(3) voter demands; and (4) learning.  
                                                      
2 The Third-Wave democracies include the countries that have made their transitions 
to democracy beginning in 1974. This includes the historic democratic transitions in 
Latin America in the 1980s, Asia Pacific countries (Philippines, South Korea, and 
Taiwan) from 1980-1988, East Europe after the Collapse of the Soviet Union and 
Sub-Saharan Africa beginning in 1989. See Samuel Huntington “The Third Wave 
Democratization in the late Twentieth Century. 
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 In sum, the multi-dimensional approach to party system 
institutionalization has more complexity and well-versed themes that 
scholars can refer to. However, this sometimes creates a convoluted 
understanding of party system institutionalization that results in more 
recent studies generating more questions than answers regarding party 
system institutionalization. Given such complexity, most studies in party 
system institutionalization focus on one-dimensional approach. 
 Conceptualizing and explaining party system institutionalization 
using one dimensional approach is more approachable and concise. 
However, by doing so, we might not be able to capture the full 
understanding of party system institutionalization. For example, country 
A’s party system could have institutionalized with regard to ‘system-ness’ 
and show lower electoral volatility rate compared to country B’s electoral 
volatility. However, what if country B’s party system could be more 
institutionalized in terms of value in which party organizations in country 
B have survive longer than parties in country A. In this case, can we 
confidently say country A’s party system more institutionalized than 
country B?  
 Therefore, to understand more about party system 
institutionalization, we must strive to make an effort to incorporate 
‘attitudinal’ as well as the ‘system-ness’ version of ‘institutionalization’ 
when measuring party system institutionalization to expand our knowledge 
of party system institutionalization.  
 
 In short, explaining why levels of party systems institutionalization 
varies across countries must start from measuring institutionalization of 




2.2  Party System Institutionalization in Cross-Country 
 Comparison 
 
 Given the relevance of the multi-dimensional approach in this 
study, the succeeding sections highlights party system institutionalization 
in various regions with cross-country comparison. 
 
 2.2.1 Party System Institutionalization in Latin America 
 
 Any discussion of study in party system institutionalization across 
countries normally mentions the Latin American example from the 
contributions made by Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) in Latin America. 
Originally, the authors aimed at comparing Party Systems in Latin 
America. However, they concluded that current concepts (number of 
parties, ideological distance between them) are insufficient to explain the 
differences in their party systems. Thus, they conceptualized the 
institutionalization of party systems as a way to compare party systems 
across Latin American countries. For them, institutionalization means (a) 
political system possess stability in rules/nature of interparty competition; 
(b) major parties have stable roots in the society; (c) major political actors 
regard parties and electoral process as legitimate; and (d) party 
organizations are subordinate to the interests of its leaders. 
 Mainwaring and Scully’s most important contribution to the 
literature essentially provides a paradigm shift in the study of party systems. 
For them, rules are important for parties and party system but they are not 
the only thing that matters. Thus, the authors argue that normative qualities 
such as ‘institutionalization’ also matters in the study of political parties  
and party systems because in the Latin American democracies, party 
systems are much more fluid and the methods to distinguish 
institutionalized party system from a non-institutionalized party system 
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require different tools. For example, the traditional studies that looked at 
the European party systems have only relied on concrete measurements for 
party system—the number of parties for example (see for example, Sartori, 
1975). However, such concrete measurement alone is inadequate to 
measure party system institutionalization in Latin America.  
 In short, the criterion ‘number of parties’, as a measurement tool 
can be applicable to Western European party systems, where countries in 
the region have already achieved democratization and enjoyed stabilized 
party system. But this does not fit in the case for Latin American countries, 
where majority has achieved their democracy only years later as third wave 
democracies as Huntington described. Thus, their party systems were not 
yet stable then. According to Mainwaring and Scully, these countries’ 
party system institutionalization can vary depending on different factors.  
 Their contributions in the study of party system provide following 
inspirations to the author. First, the individual chapters in Mainwaring and 
Scully’s book provide discussions on a variety of political parties and party 
systems. Second, their research first incorporated the Latin American 
experience with political parties into the broader theoretical and 
comparative literature in political science. In addition, the authors utilized 
empirical evidence to advance understanding into the party system in Latin 
America.  
 In sum, the Mainwaring and Scully’s framework has five principal 
themes: (1) political parties and their role influence how democracies 
function; (2) criteria for party system institutionalization; (3) the 
differences in the degree of institutionalization; (4) the relationship 
between party system institutionalization and democratic consolidation; 
and (5) the impact of variation in the number of parties and the ideological 
distance between them. This chapter, however, focus on the second and 
third themes that fit into the cross-country comparison study. This is 
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because the second and the third principal themes are most relevant to the 
research questions in Chapter One.  
 
 2.2.2  Party System Institutionalization in Africa 
 
 The works of Lindberg (2007) and Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) 
are perhaps two of the most well-known and widely cited literature when 
studying the party systems across Africa’s democratic states. Lindberg 
analyses the evolution of party system particularly on the stability and 
fluidity of legislative party configurations in Africa’s democratic states. 
Meanwhile, Kuenzi and Lambright apply Mainwaring and Scully’s 
framework directly to assess the level of party system institutionalization 
in thirty African countries.  
 Using legislative volatility, the average age of parties, and the 
effective number of parliamentary parties, Kuenzi and Lambright have 
explored the relationship between institutionalization and democratization 
in 33 African regimes. Basedau (2007) also identifies an association 
between higher levels of party system institutionalization and democracy. 
Furthermore, Lindberg (2007), Boggards (2008), all contribute to the 
debate on the relationship between party system institutionalization and 
the levels of democracy. On the one hand, Lindberg compares the degree 
of legislative instability in 21 African countries and delivers a typology of 
stable-fluid- destabilized party systems. On the other hand, Boggard’s 
study is more concerned with the varying degrees of electoral volatility in 
dominant party systems. All of these studies find inconsistent relationship 
between democracies and levels of institutionalization. For example, 
Kuenzi and Lambright found that higher levels of institutionalization in 
older democracies (e.g., Botswana and Mauritius), while Bogaards 
discovered no such relationship between institutionalization and age of 
democracy.  
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 These studies in African democracies provide a useful guide for 
this thesis. First, the contribution by the authors eliminate the democracy-
institutionalization for consideration in this study. With the inconsistent 
link between party system institutionalization and the age of democracy, 
this study opts to remove this factor in the analysis. This is because both 
African democracies and the three countries considered in this study—
namely, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan—are all Third Wave 
democracies, which roughly share similar democratic experience.  
 Second, studies by Kuenzi and Lambright, Bogaard, Lindberg, and 
Basedu shed some light on the operationalizing indicators for the party 
system institutionalization. Particularly, Kuenzi and Lambright’s indicator 
for party system institutionalization—the average age of parties—serve a 
useful guide (more will be explained in forthcoming chapters). In addition, 
Linbdberg’s typology of stable/fluid/destabilized party systems provides 
insights this research on how to conceptualize party system 
institutionalization when developing a theoretical framework for this study.  
 Nevertheless, since the thesis is not concerned about the 
relationship of party system institutionalization to democratic 
consolidation, studies by Kuenzi, Bogaard, Lindberg, and Basedu are not 
fully applied as the thesis is more concerned about explaining why the level 
of party system institutionalization varies across the countries.  
 
 2.2.3 Party System Institutionalization in post-communist 
  countries 
 
Those who study party system institutionalization in post-communist 
countries focus their attention on discovering and refining the measures (or 
sources, as they call it) of party system institutioanlization more than 
explaining why the systems end up differently. For example, studies by 
Bertoa (2011) and Bertoa and Enyedi (2010) mainly focuses on 
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determining what causes institutionalization in post-communist East 
Central Europe. These studies are only briefly mentioned here as majority 
of these studies do not concern about explaining why party systems 
institutionalize differently.  
 However, like the studies in Africa, studies in post-communist 
countries serve a good reference to this thesis: the various independent 
variables determining the sources of party system institutionalization. 
Bertoa (2011) lists and categorizes various independent factors (p. 22) that 
this research can benefit from. For example, the social cleavage, previous 
democratization, time of transition, and party system formats are all useful 
factors for consideration, which will be explained in the following chapters 
in this thesis.  
 
2.3  Party System Institutionalization variation in Asia  
  
 The literature dealing with party system institutionalization in Asia 
is the major literature we focus on. Scholarly works in party system 
institutionalization in Asia have mainly revolved around two questions: (a) 
how institutionalized are party systems across the country; and (b) to what 
extent can the degree of party system institutionalization predict higher 
level of democratic performance (for example, Stockton, 2001). However, 
no studies have yet attempted to explain why the level of party system 
institutionalization vary across countries in the region. Some claim they do 
(for example studies by Weatherall, 2011 and Hicken and Kuhonta, 2011). 
However, they come short in presenting only the level of party system 
institutionalization and largely made some impressionistic observations 
and general assumptions on why party system institutionalization level 
varies across their case selections.  
 In general, recent studies reveal there are several aspects in the 
study of party system institutionalization in Asia. On the one hand, 
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scholars have been pre-occupied with how many dimensions, indicators, 
and elements that are considered necessary to empirically measure ‘party 
system institutionalization’. Aurel Croissant and Philip Volke (2012) is 
good example. They have analysed the level of party system 
institutionalization in seven democracies in East and Southeast Asia. They 
found that party systems in Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea are 
under-institutionalized, while those in Indonesia, Mongolia, and Taiwan 
are considered well institutionalized. However, their study stops there 
without providing reasons why party systems in these countries are 
different.  
 On the other hand, there are attempts to explain why party systems 
vary across countries in Asia. For example, Andreas Ufen (2012) 
compared the different levels and types of party system institutionalization 
in Southeast Asia. He found that the early organizational consolidation of 
social cleavages such as in Indonesia, enhances party system 
institutionalization. Furthermore, the relation between central and local 
elites appear to be essential with strong bosses or political cliques 
undermining institutionalization in the Philippines.  
 Furthermore, Mark Weatherall (2012), Hicken and Kuhonta (2011) 
both argue that the key explanatory variable causing party system 
institutionalization is the legacies of authoritarian rule. These authors 
argued, that other explanatory factors frequently cited are insufficient to 
explain the causes of party system institutionalization.3  
 Other studies highlight some interesting explanatory factors for the 
causes of party system institutionalization in Asia. For example, Shin 
(1999), Steinberg and Shin (2006) have highlighted the role of culture 
while a study by Kohno (1992) highlights the role of institutions. However, 
                                                      
3 These factors are: the passage of time, timing of competitive elections relative to 
the expansion of suffrage, economic developments, the electoral system and political 
culture. 
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the big limitation of these studies is that they are inclined to one 
dimensional approach and show preferences for ‘structural elements’ (i.e., 
stability of inter-party competition) when measuring ‘party system 
institutionalization’. This forced previous studies to limit their 
conceptualization of the party system institutionalization with only one or 
two indicators—namely electoral volatility and led them to make 
questionable assumptions in why party systems vary in countries. The 
following sections discuss Hicken (2009), Hicken and Kuhonta (2011), 
and Weatherall (2012) in depth to highlight the claim made in the previous 
sentence.  
 Hicken’s (2009) work comparing the development of nationalized 
parties in the Philippines and Thailand provides an insightful addition to 
the study of party system institutionalization. He convincingly explained 
that why some developing democracies have less nationalized parties than 
others. He argues that, in the Philippines and Thailand, there is less party 
aggregation at cross-district level, which means that its parties remain 
mostly local. This is because political elites choose to cooperate or not to 
cooperate across district base on this ‘aggregation incentives’. Thus, the 
more resources to share at the central government, the more incentives for 
political elites to cooperate and vice versa. Hicken examines three 
independent factors: (1) the presence of a second chamber in the legislature; 
(2) the degree of party internal cohesion; and (3) the presence of reserve 
domains—institutional or policy domains controlled by actors who are not 
directly accountable to elected officials (Hicken, 2009: 30-34).  
 For Hicken, since political candidates calculate the expected 
payoffs from gaining power at the national level by looking at both 
‘distribution of resources across the central government’ and the 
distribution of ‘resources at the local government’. These factors such as 
bicameral/unicameral legislature, the existence of reserve domain at the 
central government level will likely reduce the payoff (i.e., more people 
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means less to share). Therefore, the more the presence of the independent 
factors (i.e., presence of second chamber, party internal cohesion, the 
reserve domain), the less it is for political candidate to aggregate across the 
district to form nationalized political parties.  
 While Hicken provides a convincing argument, his framework 
implicitly assumes that all political actors are office-driven-and are 
allocated with the same type of power and resources. However, in reality, 
politicians often have followed divergent goals (such as votes or policy) 
and utilizes very different sets of resources to mobilize voters (for example, 
ideas or charisma) (Strøm 1990). Hicken’s framework improves our 
understanding of the politicians’ nature to coordinate across electoral 
districts so long as we ‘assume’ that all political actors are interested in 
just gaining the offices (‘bigger piece of pie’ according to Hicken and 
Kuhonta’s analogy) and compete in elections (as in the case of Philippine 
and Thailand). However, once we drop these assumptions, coordination 
incentives lose its explanatory power. A pie can be very simple to divide. 
For example, if through vote-buying politicians can prove how much they 
can contribute towards winning the offices, conflict over resources could 
be solved by simply math. However, if politicians pursue different goals 
and contribute to different resources, conflict becomes more difficult to 
manage. While politics is mostly about who gets what and how, it is not 
always about winning offices for all. A conflict can be over non-
materialistic values such as working to reduce the regional difference as 
former president Roh Mu-hyun did try in Pusan for three years.4 Moreover, 
Hicken’s framework does not account for voters as voters’ choice is kept 
at the periphery. We argue that how voters choose to elect their 
                                                      
4 Roh ran for both Mayoral and Legislative candidate in Pusan under Democratic 
Party from 1995-1998. Pusan at the time was a constituency for the conservative 
party.  
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representatives and parties, however, has implications in the way party 
systems institutionalize.  
 Another work by Hicken, this time with Eric Kuhonta (2011) offers 
a new insight on the causes of party system institutionalization in Asian 
Third Wave democracies. They claim that the apparent paradox of “many 
Asian democracies, such as Singapore and Malaysia, as well as until 
recently, Taiwan are not fully democratic, although they have a 
competitive party system…and these party systems…are also the most 
institutionalized in the region” (p.5). This apparent anomaly led them to a 
systematic re-assessment of five major factors in relation to the causes of 
party system institutionalization in previous studies: (1) the effect of the 
passage of time; (2) the effect of suffrage expansion and transition to 
democracy; (3) the nature of the pre-democracy political regime; (4) 
political institutions; and (5) political cleavages.  
 According to their study, the passage of time does not have a 
systematic impact, neither positive nor negative, on the party system 
institutionalization of Asian party system. “Passage of more elections does 
not appear to be inexorably linked with greater institutionalization” 
(Hicken and Kuhonta, 2011:16). Political institutions and social cleavage 
also do not support the party system institutionalization in countries they 
have selected.  
 However, the impact of pre-democratic political regime, has an 
impact on party system institutionalization. Hicken and Kuhonta (2011) 
make three significant claims about the Asian experience of party system 
institutionalization. First, the presence of an institutionalized authoritarian 
party prior to democratization led to lower levels of electoral volatility in 
post-transition period (such as, Taiwan, Cambodia, and Indonesia). Second, 
the highest levels of institutionalization are found in those states that have 
not made a transition to a full democracy (i.e., Singapore and Malaysia 
after 1969). Third, the length of the authoritarian interlude also matter as 
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it has a negative effect. Simply, the longer the authoritarian interlude, the 
higher the volatility after the transition to democracy. By contrast, the 
shorter and less severe the authoritarian interludes, the less disruption there 
is to the existing party system (Hicken and Kuhonta, 2011:18).  
 While Hicken and Kuhonta (2011) provides an interesting way of 
studying party system institutionalization, the claims by the authors raises 
important questions. First, this thesis finds the selection of Singapore and 
Malaysia as case studies for party system institutionalization as 
problematic. Singapore is still an authoritarian state where the People’s 
Action Party (PAP) dominate its politics. Thus, elections are not 
competitive as the authors’ have claimed. In Malaysia, its party system is 
nowhere near competitive. Although the country is listed as having a 
multiparty system, the elections also reflect sustained and deliberate efforts 
to skew elections in favour of the incumbent Barisan Naisional (BN) 
coalition government led by Prime Minister Najib Razak’s United Malays 
National Organization Party.  
 The causal relationships between the three independent variables 
and party system institutionalization are questionable as well. First, Hicken 
and Kuhonta (2011) definition of an institutionalized authoritarian party is 
conceptually ambiguous. The authors point to Taiwan as an 
institutionalized authoritarian party but did not clarify. Secondly, its use of 
Singapore and Malaysia as case studies reflect the obvious electoral 
volatility that is lower where party competition is largely skewed toward 
the governing PAP and BN coalition respectively. Lastly, the claim that 
authoritarianism has played an important role in the origins of 
institutionalized party system is tricky. And their argument that the concept 
of institutionalization needs to be strictly separated from the concept of 
democracy is really perplexing.  
 Overall, this thesis finds Hicken and Kuhonta’s explanation for the 
institutionalization of party system in Asia limited for the following 
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reasons. First, the authors conceptualize party system institutionalization 
based on one indicator—electoral volatility. As argued earlier in this 
chapter, relying on a single indicator like electoral volatility may not give 
a full picture of party system institutionalization across the countries they 
have studied. For example, while Singapore has low electoral volatility, 
the PAP’s inter-party relationship with other major and minor parties have 
not been consistent like in Taiwan since 1986. In addition, since PAP is a 
dominant party, there is a question of ‘level playing field’ between the 
government and the opposition.  
 Second, the causal direction between the low electoral volatility 
and the authoritarian legacies seem way too obvious because when 
authoritarianism is still integral in the elections, the field is so farcically 
uneven that elections in Singapore and Malaysia looks more like a hunting 
game rather than a fair field of play. So, does authoritarian legacy cause 
party system institutionalization? Maybe authoritarianism helps bring 
down electoral volatility but it does not cause party systems to 
institutionalize. Because of this, they are susceptible to accusations of 
making case selection bias by choosing countries that fit with the 
dependent variable without empirical observations.  
 Meanwhile, Mark Weatherall (2013)’s work compared the party 
system institutionalization of Taiwan and South Korea. He argues that 
other key variables explaining the variation in the party system 
institutionalization is the contrasting legacies of the authoritarian regimes 
in the two countries. The main argument of Weatherall is that, on the one 
hand, the dominance of the KMT party-state in Taiwan and its refusal to 
compromise on the one China principle may have paved the way for the 
development of an institutionalized party system following 
democratization. On the other hand, the military authoritarian regime in 
South Korea did not allow the development of an institutionalized ruling 
party. He also points to the regional cleavage in South Korea and argues 
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that an absence of any clear ideological or class-based cleavages has 
become the defining feature of the country’s politics in post-
democratization setting (Weatherall, 2013). Weatherall also contradicts his 
argument by pointing to social cleavage and its influence while also 
claiming that “the complex and multifaceted legacies of authoritarian rule 
is necessary to explain political development after democratization” (p.2).  
 Despite the confusion, this thesis applauds Weatherall’s attempt to 
apply the multi-dimensional approach and develop an index of party and 
party system institutionalization (p.11). Weatherall’s framework considers 
two dimensions: Linkages between parties and voters; and organization 
development of parties. The linkages between parties and voters index is 
indicated by electoral volatility and party identification, while organization 
development of parties is based on nation-wide organization and party 
membership. He also used data to measure electoral volatility, party 
identification, membership numbers in the major parties in Taiwan and 
South Korea, and lastly presence of a nationwide organization.  
 In sum, Weatherall finds that Taiwan has a higher level of party 
system institutionalization compared to South Korea. However, the 
question on whether authoritarian legacies fit in his assessment is left 
unanswered. What he presented is a list of measurements that he claims 
would explain how party system institutionalization is different between 
the two countries. Furthermore, it is also unclear if he is measuring the 
party system or party institutionalization. While Weatherall’s attempt in 
bringing multi-dimensional way to measure party system 
institutionalization and compare it across Taiwan and South Korea is 
commendable, his analysis is limited as he does not attempt to explain why 
the party system institutionalization is different between South Korea and 
Taiwan based on their authoritarian legacies. 
 The literature in party system institutionalization in Asia has not 
yet advanced into asking the question why they are different. It remains 
 35 
concerned about its institutionalization or stabilization. However, this 
produces an interesting research inquiry to determine the reasons behind 
the varying degrees of party system institutionalization in the region. In 
fact, historical legacies (Hicken and Kuhonta, 2001; Weatherall, 2011), 
and social cleavage (Ufen, 2012) have all been cited, at some point, to 
explain Asia’s party system institutionalization. In this sense, even though 
only a handful of studies have focused on explaining party system 
institutionalization across Asian countries, there is a wide literature that 
can be referenced to which can explain variations in party system 
institutionalization across Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, South Korea (as will 
be described more in Chapter Three).  
  
2.4 Limitations on the current literature in party system
 institutionalization.       
 
 Building on the discussions in this chapter, this study finds that 
there are two limitations. First, there is a problem of measurement of party 
system institutionalization; and second, there is lack of explanation in the 
variations of party system institutionalization.  
  
 2.4.1 Problem of Measurement 
 
 First, there is confusion on what to focus in measuring party system 
institutionalization. Is it individual versus systematic level of party 
organization, or on structural versus attitudinal behaviours of the system? 
Some studies, as discussed, proposes a multi-dimensional framework for 
the analysis of party system institutionalization (i.e., Mainwaring and 
Scully, 1995; Weatherall, 2011) while others attempt reducing the 
complexity by equating party system institutionalization with one that 
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creates stability (Casal Bertoa, 2010, 2011; Hicken and Kuhonta 2011, 
Basedu 2007; Lindberg 2007).  
 One the one hand, those that follow a one-dimensional approach 
equate institutionalization with the stabilization or routinization of certain 
rules (Barely and Tolbert, 1997). On the other hand, those who prefer the 
multi-dimensional approach tend to lump up both the ‘individual versus 
systematic level of party organization’ and ‘structural versus attitudinal 
behaviours’ (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, Mainwaring 1998; Weatherall, 
2011) without providing clear explanation on how they may individually 
vary. Probably this is because the way ‘attitudinal elements’ have been 
operationalized brought more confusion. Indicators to measure ‘attitudinal 
elements’ in the current literature vary widely from ‘sympathy towards and 
trust in political parties’, to ‘citizen’s value of democracy and of political 
parties’, and analysis on whether political parties accepted the electoral 
results or boycotted the election. Wilnetsz (2006) has argued that some of 
these indicators say more about the attitudes toward democracy than about 
the party system institutionalization. Thus, we must address the issue of 
measuring ‘attitudinal’ element to make the measurement of party system 
institutionalization more complete.  
 
 2.4.2 Direction of the Research  
 
 The second problem this research finds is the direction of research. 
As we have discussed in sections 2.2 to 2.3, majority of party system 
institutionalization literature in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
Asia have focused on how party system institutionalization predicts 
democratic performance across the countries or cause of party system 




 2.4.3  Addressing the two issues  
 
 In this section, the thesis attempts to address the two problems 
mentioned in 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. Regarding the first (i.e., problems 
measurement) this thesis seeks to provide a more comprehensive 
framework for the analysis of the variation in the party system 
institutionalization across Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea. 
Randall and Svåsand (1999,2002) have developed a framework to 
explain several relationships in the elements of party system 
institutionalization that are useful in understanding and measuring the 
levels of party system institutionalization. Briefly, they proposed four 
criteria: system-ness, value infusion, decisional autonomy, and reification. 
System-ness means the “increasing scope, density and regularity of the 
interactions that constitute the party as a structure” (Randall and Svåsand, 
2002:14). Value infusion denotes identifying party support with and 
commitment to the party. Decisional autonomy is the result of freedom 
from interference. Lastly, reification describes the establishment of a party 
in the publics’ imagination. Chapter Three will discuss these criteria in 
depth and how they are related in producing four dimensions of party 
system institutionalization measurement in detail. In general, Randall and 
Svåsand see party system institutionalization as an outcome of inter-party 
competition regulated by the state’s role in providing them with variant 
forms of support through the nature of the electoral system (i.e., 
institutions) over time.  
 Building on from Randall and Svåsand’s framework can overcome 
the two limitations in the previous literatures for the following reasons. 
First, unlike the previous studies that conceptualized party system 
institutionalization with only one elements (i.e., system-ness) Randall and 
Svåsand framework incorporates all of the four elements. This will 
generate more comprehensive measurement of party system 
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institutionalization. Second, by focusing on the ways inter-party 
competitions being regulated across countries, we might be able to explain 
why party systems institutionalize differently. This is because a variation 
in way inter-party competition being regulated explains a variation in party 
system institutionalization.  
 With regards to the second problem, this thesis treats party system 
institutionalization as a dependent variable. Since there is no systematic 
study about why party system institutionalization level varies at a cross-
country level of analysis, this study attempts to systematically investigate 
the varying degrees of institutionalization on a cross-sectional perspective; 
requiring this thesis to treat party system institutionalization as a dependent 
variable.  
 
2.5  Summary of Chapter  
 
 This chapter began by discussing traditions in the subject of 
‘institutionalization’ in party literature. First, the chapter discussed how 
‘institutionalization’ in political science developed from Huntington and 
expanded its scope of study by Janda, Panebianco, and Levitsky. Each 
author added different nuances to ‘institutionalization’ and later 
Mainwaring and Scully took those conceptualizations further by applying 
it into studying the party system institutionalization in Latin American 
countries.  
 The chapter then discussed how authors applied Mainwaring and 
Scully’s conceptualization of party system institutionalization to different 
regions in the world. Volumes have been compiled already in relations to 
Latin American, Sub-Saharan African, and post-Soviet Eastern European 
countries, and Asian countries. Nevertheless, there seem to be lack in the 
literature explaining the variations in party system institutionalization, 
especially across the Asian countries mainly for one reason. That there 
 39 
seem to be less scholarly attempt to understand and measure party system 
institutionalization in multi-dimension.  
 The main argument of the chapter was that to understand why party 
system institutionalization vary one must first understand that 
institutionalization of party system can vary in scopes. For example, 
Singapore and Taiwan both has low electoral volatility but are different in 
its party-to-party scope where Singapore is lower because the ‘level 
playing field’ is heavily favouring the dominant PAP. Therefore, on the 
one hand, both Taiwan and Singapore has institutionalized party system in 
the ‘system-ness’ aspect while on the other hand, Singapore has less 
institutionalized party system in relation to ‘structural and external’ aspect. 
Knowing where countries’ party system is different is the first step in 
explaining why party system institutionalization varies across countries.  
 This chapter then finished off by introducing Randall and Svåsand 
as a possible remedy as their framework implies several relationships in 
the elements of party system institutionalization. Understanding how these 
different elements interact to produce measurements for party system 
institutionalization and how they relate to the independent factors are 













Chapter Three  
 




 The previous chapter, provided an analytical survey on various 
studies regarding party system institutionalization across different 
geographical areas—Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, post-communist 
Europe, and Asia. From this literature review, one interesting question 
emerged—why is there variations in the level of party system 
institutionalization across different countries? As previously mentioned, 
while there is a lot of accumulated knowledge on the levels of party system 
institutionalization and the effect it has on the nature of democratic 
performance, no studies have yet attempted to study the reasons behind the 
different degrees of party system institutionalization across Japan, Taiwan, 
Philippines, and South Korea. 
The two minor issues the literature review identified are: (a) 
limitation in which different units and levels to which the indicators have 
been applied to measure degree of party system institutionalization; (b) 
limitation in using party system institutionalization as independent 
variable. This thesis argues that these two limitations must be addressed 
prior to discussing the answer of this study’s research question. This 
chapter attempts to overcome the two limitation and proposes a better 
framework to study party system institutionalization at a cross-country 
level.  
As discussed in Chapter One, the main purpose of this thesis is to 
explore and investigate the main research question in the context of four 
Asian democratic countries: Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South 
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Korea. This chapter details how this research is developed. It identifies the 
dependent and independent variables and provides definitions to each term 
while providing justifications for the choices of the factors in this study.  
Then, this chapter discusses how these variables are related. 
Moreover, hypothesis statements will follow each relationship to give 
more clarifications in this research. Lastly, this chapter deals with methods 
and data, and provides operationalization of both the dependent and the 
independent variables. 
 
3.1  The Variables Explained: The Dependent and the Independent 
 Variables  
 
 3.1.1 Dependent Variable: Party System Institutionalization 
  
 The dependent variables are essential factors in explaining and 
measuring the party system institutionalization level across Japan, Taiwan, 
Philippines, and South Korea. The discussion focuses on highlighting the 
measurement of the party system institutionalization in this research that 
improves on the measurements used by previous studies. It develops 
Randall and Svåsand’s (2002) indexes of party system institutionalization 
and uses it as the measurement for the party system institutionalization 
level across the four countries in focus. This is because studies that follow 
one dimension—stability approach equates institutionalization or certain 
rules (i.e., Hicken and Kuhonta’s study equating institutionalization with 
electoral volatility) cannot capture the full scale of institutionalization. To 
solve this dilemma, the approach by Randall and Svåsand (2002) will thus 
be used in this study. 
 Randall and Svåsand define institutionalization as having both a 
structural and an attitudinal component, which, in turn, encompasses an 
internal and external dimension. The structural component refers to the 
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relationship between parties themselves (system-ness), while the 
attitudinal component suggests that parties accept each other as legitimate 
competitors (value-infusion). Regarding the party system’s external 
relationships with other parts of the polity, the structural component is 
especially concerned with the interaction of the party system with the state 
(decisional autonomy), and the attitudinal component relates to the public 
attitude towards the party system, including the degree of trust in parties 
as institutions and its commitment to the electoral process (reification) 
(Randall and Svåsand, 2002: 7-12). 
 More specifically, the internal dimension refers to the relationship 
between parties themselves, and includes both: (1) continuity and stability 
of inter-party interactions and the electoral support for political parties; (2) 
mutual acceptance (attitudinal), which requires that the different political 
parties or groups see one another as legitimate; (3) party organizations 
must be autonomous from the state in relation to general party activities 
such as party funding, candidate and membership recruitments; and (4) the 
electorate must see party organizations as legitimate.  
When all four dimensions are added, the level of party system 
institutionalization for a country can be determined. This framework can 
also be used to compare the number of countries and their party system 
institutionalization levels. These indexes are summarised and represented 
in the table below.  
 
 













Figure 1 Party system institutionalization index (Randall and Svasand, 2002) 
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First, in an institutionalised party system, there is continuity and 
stability among party alternatives (structural/internal). Continuity in a 
party system means the extent to which a given set of parties are competing 
over several elections. Stability, implies that the electoral support for the 
individual parties are not fluctuating from one election to the other 
(Randall and Svåsand, 1999: 23). Second, a party system is 
institutionalized if the system is composed of parties that accept each other 
as legitimate (attitudinal/internal). Third, party-state relationship 
(structural/external) is also a vital component for party system 
institutionalisation. The third-dimension measures extent to which 
political system regulates party organisations. In effect, the more party 
organisations and their activities are supported and encouraged by political 
systems—such as constitution or laws—the more the party system is 
considered institutionalised (p. 24). Lastly, in an institutionalised party 
system, the electorate must express some trust in parties; and electoral 
process must be perceived as the only legitimate way to select political 
leadership (attitudinal/external), (p.25). 
 This thesis uses Randall and Svåsand’s comprehensive definition 
of party system institutionalization, which can account for the 
development of inter-party competition. Most importantly, it addresses the 
problem of ‘attitudinal’ measurement problems discussed in chapter Two 
(section 2.4.1). To advance the knowledge on party system 
institutionalization variations across the countries, it is necessary to study 
party systems from its inception to its institutionalization. This thesis see 
party system institutionalization as an outcome of party-interactions being 
shaped or regulated by some conditional factors in relation to social 
structural, history, and institutions over time.  
 Randall and Svåsand’s definition of party system 
institutionalization also argue that it is an outcome of inter-party 
competition regulated by the state’s role, which provides it with variant 
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forms of support through the nature of the electoral system over time. 
Moreover, their definition of party system institutionalization has not been 
thoroughly challenged in previous literature. Based on these three 
observations, this thesis develops Randall and Svåsand’s definition of 
party system institutionalization further and uses it as the measure for the 
dependent variables to examine the variations in the levels of party system 
institutionalization across Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea.  
 
 3.1.2  Independent Variables  
 
 This section discusses the independent variables that provide 
explanations on the variations of party system institutionalization levels 
across Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea.  
 
  3.1.2.1 Social Structure: Social Cleavage 
 
 Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) hypothesis is considered the most 
widely referenced explanation for party system institutionalization. 
According to them, most social conflicts (for example, conflicts arising 
from ethnic, linguistic, or religious differences) taken up by political 
parties originated from the deep social divisions at a critical point in 
European history. Briefly the Reformation and counter-reformation 
periods gave rise to a deep divide between the state and the church—what 
Lipset and Rokkan call the ‘centre and periphery’. Meanwhile, the 
Industrial Revolution gave rise to two further forms of social divisions: (a) 
rural to urban; and (b) workers versus owners. Eventually, individuals have 
developed attachments to these divisions and political parties began 
representing the social divide—their religions, class, residence (urban-
rural) and culture (core versus minority culture).  
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 Other scholars have stressed the importance of these social 
divisions in the formation and maintenance of a party system. They argue: 
“First, a cleavage involves a social division that separates people who can 
be distinguished from one another in terms of key social characteristics 
such as occupation, status, religions or ethnicity. Second, the groups 
involved in the division must become conscious of their collective identity, 
for example as workers or employers, and willing to act on this basis. Third, 
a cleavage must be expressed in organizational term. This is typically 
achieved as a result of the activities of a trade union, a church, a political 
party, or some other organization that gives formal institutional expression 
to the interest of those on the side of the division” (Gallagher et al., 1992:9; 
see also Bartolini and Mair, 1990, and Mair, 1997). For these authors, 
social divisions (hereafter simply social cleavage) have the tendency to 
become organized into formal institutional expressions and those ‘three 
characteristics’ are used as ‘rulers’ to compare a social cleavage versus a 
non-social cleavage.  
 However, authors like Rae and Taylor (1970) offer an alternative 
view on social cleavage, which differ from Gallagher et al., Bartolini and 
Mair. Both scholars argue that “cleavages are the criteria which divide the 
members of the community or sub-community into groups, and the 
relevant cleavages are those that divide groups with important political 
difference at specific times and places” (Rae and Taylor, 1970:1). They 
argue that not all social cleavages are fixed like what Lipset and Rokkan 
have described. Rather, social divisions change over time and members of 
a community or sub-community are able to transform their political 
differences.  
 Thus, for Rae and Taylor (1970), there are three principal types of 
cleavages: (1) inscriptive, or traits cleavage such as race or caste; (2) 
attitudinal, or opinion cleavages such as ideology or preferences; and (3) 
behavioural, or action cleavages manifested by such activities as voting or 
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joining organizations. Both scholars, therefore, see neither conflicts nor 
organization as a necessary condition for the existence of a cleavage; and 
see social cleavage as not something which is fixed permanently.  
 However, Bartolini and Mair, counters Rae and Taylor’s definition. 
For them, the three types of cleavages Rae and Taylor conceptualized are 
simply the different aspects of social cleavages. Therefore, “the term 
[social] cleavage should be restricted to the indication of a dividing line in 
a polity which refers to and combines all three aspects (i.e., the ‘three 
characteristics’), and alternative terms should be adopted when referring 
to social distinction or to an ideological, political and organizational 
divisions per se” (Bartolini and Mair, 1990:216).  
 In this study, social cleavages indicate a more permanent dividing 
line in a polity, and is expressed in an institutional and organizational term 
like what Lipset and Rokkan; Bartolini and Mair have explained. Those 
cleavages without any collective actions are not considered as such, but is 
referred as social distinctions. This thesis demonstrates, in later chapters, 
that in Japan and Taiwan, social cleavages fit closely to what Lipset and 
Rokkan and Bartolini and Mair have explained. Meanwhile, in the 
Philippines and South Korea, social distinctions did not organize into 
institutional and organizational expressions falling short of becoming a 
social cleavage. On the one hand, in Japan and Taiwan, the deep social 
divisions have been mobilized as a focal point for political mobilizations, 
leading to political representations. On the other hand, social cleavages in 
the Philippines and South Korea are more transient and temporary, making 
political parties rely more on ‘attitudinal/opinion’ social distinctions.  
 
  3.1.2.2 Institutional Design: Institutional Factionalism 
 
 Previous researches have relied mostly on the formal political 
institutions where findings are non-conclusive. For example, researches 
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have argued the choice for presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary 
forms of government may affect the survival, but also the quality of the 
performance of democratic regime (Foweraker, 1998; Franklin, Mackei, 
and Valen, 2010; Hicken and Kuhonta, 2011, Casal Bértoa, 2010).  
 For example, Casal Bértoa finds that parliamentarism has no effect 
on the “patterns of partisan interactions” (p. 12). Nevertheless, he finds 
semi-presidentialism is more damaging to party system institutionalization. 
Nevertheless, Casal Bértoa finds components of the presidential system 
influence positively party system institutionalization. Using Poland as 
example, he argues that “the composition of the electoral alliances as well 
as governmental coalitions has been determined from the very beginning 
by the patterns of inter-party collaboration established at the time for 
presidential elections” (p.13).  
 The cases of Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea, 
however, are in direct contrast to what Casal Bértoa argued. For example, 
in Japan, the parliamentary system has free elections and a competitive 
multiparty system that lead to an “unbroken string of governments formed 
exclusively by the conservative Liberal Democratic party” (Pempel, 
1992:13). Semi-presidentialism in Taiwan also have produced sustainable 
and structured party competition leading to institutionalization in inter-
party interactions. The cases of the Philippines and South Korea directly 
contrast the Poland case. In both countries, inter-party collaborations 
clearly do not exist.  
 The literature suggests mixed findings too. For instance, Stepan 
and Skatch (1993, 17) argued that parliamentary systems are more virtuous 
for democracy as they support single-party coalition majorities, minimizes 
legislative impasse, and discourage society’s support for military coups; 
whereas presidential regimes are more promote to conflicts, discourage the 
formation of durable coalitions, maximize legislative impasse, and 
stimulate society to call periodically for a military coup. Lijphart (2004) 
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equally disfavors presidentialism as it inherently lists possibilities for 
power sharing. The findings are mixed for the semi-presidential regimes 
as well. Some authors such as Pasquino (1997) argue that it is positive to 
institutionalization, others sustain that it must be avoided in newly 
established democratic countries as the inherent potentials for conflict 
between the president and the prime minister may damage the prospects 
for successful democratization (Lijphart 2004; Valenzuela 2004). Lastly, 
Ferree (2010) studied the effect of presidentialism in her study of electoral 
volatility in African countries, she found no significant effects.  
 These previous studies all suggest that relationship between type 
of regime and party system institutionalization or democratization are 
inconclusive as different cases bring different results. Therefore, this thesis 
does not consider different regime types as an explanatory variable.  
  
 Instead, this thesis considers informal institution/s as one possible 
explanatory variable. If institutions are bound both by formality and 
informality as Hall and Taylor (1996) have argued, we should also give 
attention to the informal institutions and their association to party system 
institutionalization. In fact, personalism, clientelism, and factionalism (i.e., 
the web of informal institutions), are usually associated with politics in 
Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea as numerous studies have 
underlined those webs of informal networks as the foremost institutional 
legacy form the pre-transition authoritarian regimes (Hicken and Kuhonta, 
2011 for example). However, none ventured into study association of these 
informal structural with party system institutionalization.  
 This thesis attempt to fill such gap by studying a variation of an 
informal institution and its impact on the variation of party system 
institutionalization across Japan, Taiwan, Philippines and South Korea.  
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To explain how institutionalized faction influences party systems 
institutionalization, this thesis examines if institutionalized factions really 
do enhance the organizational survivability of political parties at their early 
phase.  
 
 3.1.2.3  Mode of Democratic  Transition  
 
 The way democratic transitions unfold could explain why countries 
have varying party system institutionalization, based on various studies in 
democratic transition literature (see for example, Rustow, 1970; 
Huntington 1991). This thesis argues that there is a relationship between a 
country’s democratic transition experience and its party system 
institutionalization. This is because the manner in which a transition has 
occurred is largely determined the way institutions, especially political 
institutions, are arranged in post-transition setting. For example, Rustow 
(1970), argued that democracy “is acquired by a process of conscious 
decision at least on the part of the top political leadership…A small circle 
of leaders is likely to play a disproportionate role”, (p.365). Huntington 
(1991) agrees and expand Rustow’s arguments: “Democratic regimes that 
last have seldom, if ever, been instituted by mass popular action. Almost 
always, democracy has come as much from the top down as from the 
bottom up; it is as likely to be the product of oligarchy as of protest against 
oligarchy” (p.212). Therefore, the way democratic transitions are 
unfolding could explain the way institutions are arranged; and this includes 
the composition of party system. 
 In Japan and Taiwan’s democratic transition, party organizations 
and its system from the pre-democratic transition (i.e., authoritarian period) 
undergo little change. Party systems in both countries achieve 
institutionalization in post-democratic transition; and democratic transition 
occurred from the top. In contrast, party organizations and its system in the 
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Philippines and South Korea undergo dramatic changes during their 
democratic transitions. Their political institutions pre-democratic period 
did continue into the post-transition period. Party systems continue to 
struggle to be institutionalized, even after more than thirty-years of being 
democratic. Contrary to Japan and Taiwan’s experience, democratic 
transitions in the Philippines and South Korea occur from the bottom-up. 
 Therefore, the way democratic transitions occur and how it affects 
the continuity of the political institutions from the pre-transitions to post-
transitions can largely explain the continuity and discontinuity of the 
political institutions across the four countries. Detailed explanations 
regarding how these factors actually fit into the theoretical framework of 
this thesis shall be discussed. It aims to produce a coherent argument to 
explain the variations in party system institutionalization across Japan, 
Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea. 
 
  3.1.2.4 Other alternative explanations from the literature  
 
 The thesis now examines other alternative explanations for the 
different levels of party system institutionalization that have appeared in 
the literature. It shall explain the reasons why these alternative 
explanations are limited in explaining party system institutionalization in 
Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea cases.  
 
   
   3.1.2.4.1 Previous Regime 
 
 There is a general assumption that if a democratic system is 
established before an imposition of an authoritarian regime, the party 
system is more likely to institutionalize in a post-authoritarian regime. 
According to Remmer (1985), the older the party system is, (previous to 
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the imposition of authoritarianism in a country), the more stable the party 
system will be at the time of re-democratization (see also, Rivera, 
1996:180). The logic is that if, during the pre-authoritarian period, political 
parties had an opportunity to take root in society and had enough time to 
establish a minimal level of interaction or cooperation, then party system 
will likely institutionalise when democracy returns.  
 Kitchelt et al., (1999), corroborates Remmer’s argument by 
explaining that the timing, which shaped the structure of communist 
authority, coupled with a distinct mode of transition has largely determined 
the party systems in post-communist countries. The argument is that the 
earlier the economic industrialisation, state formation, and democratisation 
are introduced prior to communism or authoritarianism, the more 
institutionalised the party system after transition. 
 Building on Remmer’s findings, Hamman and Sgouraski-Kinsey 
also maintain that “the longer the interruption to competitive party politics, 
the less is the expected party system continuity.” In addition, “the shorter 
the disruption, the more fixed the reputation of political parties for specific 
political position,” (1999:56, 70) and therefore, the higher the 
continuity/predictability of the patterns of partisan interaction (see also 
Bennett, 1998:190-191). In summary, party system institutionalisation is 
likely to be higher in countries with prior experiences in democratic forms 
of governance before authoritarianism (Mainwaring, 2007:163).  
 The ‘democratic experience’ prior to authoritarianism is not a good 
explanation to explain the variations in party system institutionalization 
across Japan, Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. For example, prior to 
the 1945 U.S. occupation of the Japan, political totalitarianism governed 
more than a decade in Japan (from 1933-1945). However, by 1948, Japan 
was able to transform itself to a full democracy with fairly stabilized inter-
party competition. 
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If we consider the Philippines’ case, the ‘democratic experience’ 
further loses its explanatory power because the country also had 
experiences with institutionalised two-party system prior to the 
authoritarian regime. But after the fall of authoritarianism, its party system 
has failed to return to its pre-authoritarian status. 
 
  3.1.2.4.2 Electoral System. 
 
 Since the publication of Maurice Duverger’s (1959) path breaking 
Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, the 
relationship between different types of electoral system and party system 
took centre stage in political science debates.  
 Duverger suggests that the use of proportional representation (PR) 
systems lead to multi-party system and coalition governments. This is 
because a PR system allows minor parties with lower vote shares to win 
seats in elections, while also encouraging voters to vote according to their 
preferences. Similar findings have since been made by a number of 
subsequent studies (Lijphart, 1994; Riker, 1982). Lijphart (1994) finds that 
the use of non-proportional voting system reduces the number of parties 
elected, and increases the chances of a single party winning a majority. But 
a proportional system increases the likelihood of more parties being 
elected and hence greater numbers of parties in coalition.  
Norris (2004) also finds similar results. Her study shows that 
countries using PR systems, in general, had greater number of parties in 
the parliaments, and are thus more likely to form coalition governments 
with a larger number of parties. This is supported by Blais and Bodet’s 
(2006) study, which finds a strong association between the proportionality 
of elections and the number of parties in government. In their study, 
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2007) find PR systems encouraging the 
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increase in party numbers in parliament and the likelihood of multiparty 
coalitions as well. 
Electoral rules, as an institution, thus have a big role in explaining 
the differences in the party system. However, the changes in electoral rules 
give little explanation to why party system continues to be under-
institutionalised in the Philippines and South Korea. For example, under 
president Roh Moo-hyun, South Korea has changed electoral rule from 
plurality-dominated proportional representation to the incorporation of the 
two-ballot list in 2004. The new voting rule, often referred to as mixed-
member majoritarian system (MMM), benefited nationally-based parties 
more than the regionally-based ones. In particular, during the 2006 
legislative election, both the United Liberal Democratic Party (ULDP) 
with support base in Chung-chong region, and the Millennium Democratic 
Party (MDP) in Honam (Cholla), suffered a great loss. Meanwhile, those 
parties with relatively wide national support, like the Democratic Liberal 
party and Uri Party, fared much better.  
However, soon after the election and near the end of president Roh 
Moo-hyun’s term, the governing Uri Party disintegrated and disappeared 
while many of the opposition parties change their names and new parties 
were created as a result of a split or merger. 
In the Philippine case, it also adopted an electoral system that 
consists of both single member district (SMD) first-past-the post approach 
and the PR components (i.e., MMM) with minimal modification on the 
percentage of party-list representation and party entry threshold (2.0 
percent) since 1998. Executive and legislative offices at the National, 
Provincial, Municipal/City, and Barangay (local) levels are determined 
through competitive elections. The election in the House of Representative 
held in 1998 gave similar expected outcome like the one in South Korea-- 
the result benefited national-based parties while rewarding smaller parties 
with some seats. The election results for 2001 and 2004 reveal the same 
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party organisations competing with one another (i.e., Lakas, NPC, and 
Liberal being the dominant parties with number of smaller 
parties/coalition).  
 The Lakas Party has successfully won three elections from 2004 to 
2007 but appeared as Lakas-KAMPI in 2010. The Lakas-KAMPI Party 
originated in 2009 with a merger of the original Lakas-CMD Party with 
the Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI). Furthermore, the 2010 
election saw the resurrection of the Nacionalistas Party. While the changes 
in the electoral rules did bring significant changes to the party system in 
the Philippines and South Korea, the impact lasted only for few elections. 
After these elections, things were back to normal. Party systems have 
returned to their previous state, where parties change frequently, after the 
electoral system change.  
Meanwhile, electoral system reforms occurred in Japan (1994) and 
Taiwan (2004) respectively. These brought changes in the political 
situation in both countries by forcing small parties to make electoral 
alliances with the bigger parties—Japan and Taiwan have also chosen the 
MMM system. While such electoral system change did bring party system 
institutionalization for Japan and Taiwan, it did not happen for the 
Philippines and South Korea. Since all the four countries have MMM 
system, electoral system is not a good independent factor to explain 
variation in party system institutionalization in the four countries because 
the independent variable remains constant.  
 
  3.1.2.4.3 Aggregation Incentives 
 
 Recent studies have also discussed the relationship between 
government institutions and party system institutionalization. Mainwaring 
(1999) argued that federalism has a negative impact on the party system 
institutionalisation as it fosters “party decentralisation and heterogeneity,” 
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(263-266). Chiibber and Kollman (2004) and Hicken (2009) expands on 
Mainwaring’s argument and explain how governing institutions affect 
party system. For them, the separation between federal, state, and the local 
powers explain the differences between the nationalised versus non-
nationalised party system. They believe that the degree of political and 
economic centralization can influence aggregation incentives. According 
to them, if power is centralized, there will be a greater incentive for 
political parties to become nationalized. A greater concentration of power 
at the national and government level therefore, works like a magnet to pull 
those political elites who want to gain access to power. And to gain more 
power, political elites tend to work in unity. Therefore, the more 
concentrated resources and power are at the national and government level, 
the higher the likelihood of political parties becoming nationalized because 
there is more incentive for political elites (or entrepreneurs) to stick to a 
bigger party, as nationalized party organizations advance their chances of 
nomination.  
Chhibber and Kollman (1998, 2004) believe that it is the changes 
in the national government’s share of total spending in their four country 
cases that bring variation in the aggregation incentives. In other words, if 
the national government’s share of total spending outweighs that of the 
sub-national spending, political entrepreneurs have an incentive to 
coordinate across districts to compete at the national level. But, if the sub-
national (local government) spending is higher, candidates and party 
leaders focus their attention on winning the sub-national seats in order to 
capture the resources. It has no incentive to aggregate at a cross-district 
level. Thus, Chhiber and Kollman’s work makes a lot of sense.  
However, Japan and South Korea’s cases contradict their argument. 
In Japan, the ratio of local government expenditure is high for government 
services that affect local residents more directly. The total ratio of 
government expenditure works out to be 58.4 percent for the local 
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government and 41.6 percent for the central (national) government (Atsuro, 
2014: 15). However, Japan’s party system is organized at a national level. 
In South Korea, the budget of the Korean local governments is 
prepared by the executive branches and determined by the legislature. 
However, party system is organized on a regional basis. Thus, aggregation 
incentives do not explain the variation in party system institutionalization 
for the selected cases in this study.  
 
3.2.  Summary of the section  
 
  As previously discussed, this study employs Randall and 
Svåsand’s party system institutionalization index, which can measure the 
institutionalization of party system across Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and 
South Korea. Moreover, the three independent factors will be used to 
explain the variations in the party system institutionalization level across 
the four countries. First, social cleavages suggest that political parties 
organize around a deep and clear-cut divide. Without them, political 
parties merely organize around ‘social distinctions’ such as political issues 
or personal charisma to organize competition.  
  Second, a variation in institutional design facilitate variations in 
the organizations of political and their institutionalization. If Personalism, 
clientelism, and factionalism (i.e., the web of informal institutions) are 
usually associated with politics across Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and 
South Korea. What are their association to party system institutionalization? 
Institutionalized factions may have allowed party members to unite under 
one party banner and to compete against much more organized and well 
financed parties such as those dominant parties for some c. Thus, 
institutionalized factions in both countries have been a vital component in 
prolonging the existence of minor parties until they become major parties. 
However, without institutionalized factions existing among political 
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parties such as in the Philippines and South Korea, their party system thus 
remains under-institutionalized.  
 
 Third and last, different paths to democratic transition is another 
interesting factor to consider in explaining variation in levels of party 
system institutionalization in Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea. 
Since the introduction of multiparty elections in the four countries, Japan 
and Taiwan’s polity has remained unchanged from country’s first 
democratic multiparty election while the Philippines and South Korea have 
experienced reversals in more recent years and/or have attempted to alter 
the nature of the regime. The way four countries have made their transition 
to democracy may explain why there is variation in institutionalization 
over time.  
 
Third, different types of democratic transition could explain the 
different levels of party system institutionalization across the four 
countries. In Japan and Taiwan, democratic transitions have occurred from 
top to bottom and little or no changes were made in political institutions. 
Political parties and the elites from the previous authoritarian regime 
continued in post-democratic transition period. In the Philippines and 
South Korea, the transitions have occurred through revolutionary struggles. 
Massive changes occurred in political institutions and among the political 
elites after the demise of the previous authoritarian regimes. Because of 
this, institutions from the previous authoritarian regime did not continue 
into the post-democratic transition period in the Philippines and South 
Korea. This made the establishment of elite consensus difficult to achieve. 
Lastly, this section examined the number of other alternative 
explanations in the literature and how these do not fit well with the 
discussion in this study.  
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3.3 Theoretical Approach: party system institutionalization in 
 Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea. 
 
 
 Based on the observation in the previous sections. in this chapter, 
this thesis argues that a more comprehensive explanation is needed to 
understand why party system institutionalization level varies across Japan, 
Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea. This accounts for the development 
of inter-party competition and their consolidation over time. This study 
presents a theoretical framework that seeks to address both objectives.  
 The view of this research is that ‘institutionalization’ is a political 
outcome that exhibits how much organizations, producers, or norms have 
become stable and valued over time. Historical institutionalism holds the 
premise that political processes are structured by collective actors such as 
political institutions and state structures, which bear their own history and 
expresses particular political interest. In this sense, “political institutions, 
political authorities, political culture and the structure of political 
opportunities not only crucially shape the mobilization and the [party] 
organization of interest, but also the individuals’ belief that certain lines of 
action are possible.” (Immergut, 1998:18-21; see also Hall and Taylor, 
1996; Hay and Wincott, 1998). 
 This thesis argues that the historical institutionalism suits the 
general purpose of this study for the following reasons. First, it allows an 
institutional approach to the study of party systems in Asia because the 
framework is flexible enough to accommodate both the formal and 
informal institutions—i.e., such as the concept of guanxi in Taiwan. In 
addition, historical institutionalism is able to combine the macro-
comparative approach and proves relevant when we examine the 
environmental and relational conditions affecting the different paths of 
institutionalization. 
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 Combining the dependent and independent factors with the 
historical institutional theoretical framework, the thesis presents the 
following party system institutionalization model for the purpose of this 
study.  
 
 Figure 2 Process of Party System Institutionalisation5 
  
The diagram above describes the discussions up to now. Starting 
from the left-hand side of the diagram, it presents a clockwise circled arrow 
in the middle inscribed with the “PSI” (party system institutionalization). 
The PSI consist of Randall and Svåsand’s four dimension of party system 
institutionalization: (a) continuity and stability of inter-party competition; 
(b) mutual-acceptance; (c) party to state relationship; and (d) appreciation 
by electorate.  
Surrounding the ‘PSI’ circle are the three rectangular boxes: social 
cleavage, party factions, and democratic transition. These are the 
conditional factors that influence and shape party systems across Japan, 
Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan (i.e., PSI). Here, the interactions 
between these conditional factors and the party system institutionalization 
(PSI) produce two different outcomes: (a) an institutionalized party system; 
and (b) an under-institutionalized party system. A party system 
institutionalizes over time if the conditional factors enable the inter-party 
interactions to continue. Factors such as social cleavage, party factions, 
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and democratic transitions bring marginal or no changes to the party 
system. On the contrary, a party system fails to institutionalize if the 
conditional factors change frequently and fails to provide consistent 
influence to inter-party interactions over time. This usually happens when 
social cleavage fails to mobilize into political movements and 
representation; party factions bring intra-party struggles instead of 
consensus towards common goals; and democratic transitions brings 
radical changes to institutions.  
 Lastly, the circled arrow surrounding ‘PSI’ and the line arrows 
connecting the three conditional factors indicate the time factor. This 
means that party interactions are influenced by the three conditional factors 
over time. 
 
 3.3.1 Relationship Among Factors and Hypotheses. 
 
The following section explains in depth how the factors in figure 1 are 
related to each other. After discussing the direction of relationship of the 
dependent and the independent variables, the thesis will raise three 
hypotheses that are to be tested in Chapter Five and Six. 
 
  3.3.1.1  Party System Institutionalization and Social cleavage. 
 
 Social cleavage is closely related to the development of party 
system and is one of the most widely studied factor used to explain party 
system institutionalization. The main idea is that social cleavages affect 
party system development because they determine the political preferences 
of voters and elites, who choose and elect among the different options in 
any given legislative body. Therefore, the continuity of clear and well 
organized social cleavage provides a basis of a steady support for parties 
that represent such division. The logic here is that since it is the social 
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cleavage that define and produce stable patterns of party system, an 
absence of social cleavage will then create an absence of conflict of 
divisions in which political parties can organize.  
 
   
Hypothesis 1 
1.1 Salient and continuous social cleavage leads to a higher 
level of party system institutionalization. 
1.2  Transient and changing social cleavages produce a lower 
level of party system institutionalization. 
 
 3.3.1.2 Party System Institutionalization and institutional design: 
  informal institution  
 
 Party theorists, in general, have paid less attention to informal 
institutions and their impact on the rules of the game (Helmke and Levitsky, 
2004). However, growing body of research on Asia suggest that many rules 
of that structure political life are informally created, communicated, and 
enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels (North, 1990; Knight, 
1992; O’Donnell 1996; Lauth, 2000). For example, in Japan, the strict but 
unwritten rule of Amakudari (descent from heaven), thorough which 
retiring state bureaucrats are awarded top positions in private corporations, 
have survived decades of administrative reform (Colignon and Usui, 2003). 
In South Korea, the same practice is called Jeon-gwan ye-u, which refers 
to an informal arrangement in legal system whereby retired judges and 
public prosecutors who go on to become lawyers in private practice receive 
special treatment from their incumbent former colleagues. In Taiwan, 
famous guanxi still important at work and business while in the Philippines, 
political cleientelism largely determines the appointments of the offices 
(Yoshikawa, 1987).  
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 Scholarly attention to informal institutions is not new in political 
science. We have records of earlier studies of “prismatic societies” (Riggs, 
1964), “moral economies” (Scott, 1976), “economies of affections” 
(Hyden, 1980), “clientelism” (Scott, 1972). However, informal rules have 
largely remained at the margins of the institutionalist researches in 
comparative politics. If informal institution is associated with political life 
in Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea then we can suspect 
that informal institution could also have influences institutionalizations of 
party and party system.  
 This thesis will closely examine the impact of party factions as one 
of many indicator of the informal institution. Factions, in general, are intra-
party grouping which exists for a certain period of time, possesses a 
minimum of organizations, exhibits a common group consciousness, 
actively pursues political goals, can be discerned as a bloc within the party. 
  
 Party theorists, in general, have paid less attention to factions. 
Sartori (1976:25), for example, dismisses impact of factions on party 
politics: “parties are instrumental to collective benefits…In short, parties 
are functional agencies—they serve purpose and fulfil roles—while 
factions are not”. 
 However, studies by Cox and Rosenbluth (1993) and McCubbins 
and Thies (1997) show that the Japanese case makes it clear that factional 
politics are central to understanding the choice of leaders and policy 
outcomes of a party organization. In addition, Morgenstern (2001) and 
Gonzalez (1991) all argue central role the party factions play in elections 
and policy-making. Thus, party factions in the previous studies has 
generated an interesting debate about whether or not factions enhance the 
performance of party organizations. Some believe factions have significant 
impact on electoral outcomes (Kollner and Basedau, 2005), while others 
are reluctant to count them as nothing more than tendencies (Rose, 1964). 
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 However, there are indications that institutionalized factions have 
helped parties to achieve organizational stability during their initial stages 




2.1 The higher the level of institutionalization of party factions, the 
more the party’s ability to politicize its conflicts. This leads to 
a highly-organized party competition and high party system 
institutionalization.  
2.2 The lower the level of institutionalization of party factions, the 
lower the party’s ability to politicize its conflicts. This leads a 
less-organized party competition and low party system 
institutionalization.  
 
 3.3.1.3 Party System Institutionalization and mode of  
  democratic transition 
 
 There is also a reason to suspect that different paths to 
democratization lead to different levels of party system institutionalization 
(Wakabayashi, 1997; Hsiao (eds.), 2008). The varying path to democratic 
transitions is also relevant for this analysis because in this critical moment 
of institutional crafting (i.e., strategies developed and the choices made) 
during this period are relevant for their institutional outlook of the 
upcoming regime.  
 The way democratic transitions unfold could explain why countries 
have varying party system institutionalization, based on various studies in 
democratic transition literature (see for example, Rustow, 1970; 
Huntington 1991). This thesis argues that there is a relationship between a 
country’s democratic transition experience and its party system 
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institutionalization. This is because the manner in which a transition has 
occurred is largely determined the way institutions, especially political 
institutions, are arranged in post-transition setting. For example, Rustow 
(1970), argued that democracy “is acquired by a process of conscious 
decision at least on the part of the top political leadership…A small circle 
of leaders is likely to play a disproportionate role”, (p.365). Huntington 
(1991) agrees and expand Rustow’s arguments: “Democratic regimes that 
last have seldom, if ever, been instituted by mass popular action. Almost 
always, democracy has come as much from the top down as from the 
bottom up; it is as likely to be the product of oligarchy as of protest against 
oligarchy” (p.212). Therefore, the way democratic transitions are 
unfolding could explain the way institutions are arranged; and this includes 
the composition of party system. 
   
 
Hypothesis 3 
3.1 The top-down democratic transitions allow previous political 
institutions to continue, leading to a higher the level of party 
system institutionalization. 
3.2 The bottom-up democratic transition hinders previous political 
institutions to continue, leading to a lower level of party system 
institutionalization. 
 
 These three sets of hypotheses are validated using a comparative 
historical analysis. The discussions will be presented in chapter Five 






3.4  Methods and Research Design: Comparative Method 
 
 In many instances, empirical social science studies face the 
dilemma of ‘too many variables and not enough cases’. This dilemma is 
shared by scholars such as Prezorwki (1987), Lijphart (1971, 1975), and 
King et al. (1994) and many other empirical researchers in political science. 
One solution to overcome the dilemma is by increasing the number of 
cases to draw a statistical inference. Studies by Kuenzi and Lambright 
(2001), Mainwaring and Scully (1995) demonstrate this approach to 
measure party system institutionalization across several countries. An 
alternative approach to a statistical inference is to match similar cases, 
which can identify the relevant explanatory variables explaining the 
variation in the dependent variable, in this case is the party system 
institutionalization. Such research method is called the ‘comparative 
method’; and there are two main approaches in this methodology. On the 
one hand, a researcher can control the effect of the omitted variables on 
the dependent variable by matching cases that are similar. This research 
method is most commonly known as the most similar systems design 
(MSSD) or Mill’s method of similarity. On the other hand, a researcher 
can focus on achieving external validity by “systematically eliminating 
irrelevant factors” (Pzeworski and Teune, 1970:39). Here, irrelevant 
factors are eliminated by selecting the cases that are most different; and 
the researcher’s job is to identify the most common factor which will 
explain the phenomenon we are interested in explaining. Hence the method 
is called most different system design (MDSD).  
 This research choses the MSSD since it enables the researcher to 
compare and contrast the development of party system institutionalization 
across Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea. These countries are 
selected based on their similarities in terms of their political history, and 
institutions, as well as their experiences in economic growth and electoral 
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systems. The MSSD may be able to control the influence of these similar 
variables by identifying the factors that are most different across the four 
countries.  
 MSSD according to Lijphart, is a “method of testing hypothesized 
relationship among variables using the same logic as many country 
comparisons, given that the differences among the countries are carefully 
selected to compensate for the inability to sample from a large population” 
(p.164). MSSD, therefore, makes it possible to generalize a theory and 
make it applicable to other cases using practical data.  
 
 3.4 1. Rationale behind the country selection as case studies 
 
 Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea were selected because 
of their difference in party system institutionalization while similarities in 
other aspects. These countries share similar political history, had 
experiences with authoritarian regimes/governments, foreign occupations, 
and national/industrial revolutions. Their party organizations, when 
compared to Western European mass-based parties, are considered less 
stable and more fluid. Political cronyism is also common among the 
political parties across these four countries.  
 Despites these similarities, party systems in the Philippines and 
South Korea are considered weaker and under institutionalized compared 
to Japan and Taiwan. On the one hand, political parties in the Philippines 
and South Korea appear and disappear frequently, splits and mergers occur 
regularly, and party switching by candidates are common especially 
around election seasons. Furthermore, frequent political retaliation by 
politicians has decreased the trust on parties’ as legitimate medium for 
political representations. On the other hand, party systems in Japan and 
Taiwan are more institutionalized and their inter-party competitions show 
predictable patterns, while party switching behaviour rarely happens in 
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both countries. In following section, the thesis provides a background 
information of the party systems in the four countries.  
 
  3.4.1.1 Party System in Japan  
 
 Japan has had, perhaps, the longest history of party politics in Asia. 
Political parties have emerged during the autocratic Meiji era. Despite a 
totalitarian military regime’s oppression of party politics during World 
War II, parties have quickly become a focal point of legislative politics 
during and after the U.S. Occupation (1945-1952), took on many of the 
characteristics of an organization. Moreover, inter-party competition has 
consolidated around urban-to-rural socio-economic division, which later 
had been politicized into an ideological divide.  
 Strong one party system has dominated Japanese politics from 
1955 to 1993. However, while the opposition Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) 
was a minor opposition party, the JSP could check the dominance of the 
LDP and sometimes stop the LDP’s nationalist policy. In addition, it was 
always possible for JSP to form coalition with other opposition parties to 
keep the LDP from achieving the two-third majority.  
 At present, party system in Japan is composed of five stable parties. 
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party (DP) are 
the two largest parties. The Komeito (Komei Party) is a middle-size party 
while the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) are smaller parties. Until 1993, the LDP and the Japanese 
Socialist Part (JSP) were Japan’s two major political parties. As of today, 
Democratic Party splintered into two parties:  Democratic party for the 
people and Democratic Constitutional Party. There is also a right-wing 
nationalist party called ‘Nippon ishin no kai’. The party was formed as a 
result from a split in Japan Innovation Party and become the third biggest 
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opposition party in the National Diet following the July 2016 House of 
Councillors election.   
   
  3.4.1.2 Party System in Taiwan 
 
 The establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 
1986 from the Tangwai movement presented a strong challenge to the 
ruling Kuomintang (KMT) Party (Yu, 2005). The KMT further lost its 
dominance when in 1993, some of its members left the party and formed 
the New party. Despite such loss, the KMT had performed strongly in 
electoral competition until the 1996 presidential election. However, this 
did not last long as growing internal struggles within the KMT resulted in 
a party split during the 2000 presidential election, leading to KMT’s 
historic defeat. With regards to the New Party (a splinter from KMT), it 
later became the People First Party (PFP) in 2001. Such developments, 
together with the establishment of the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), 
became the impetus behind Taiwan’s multi-party democracy. It 
emphasized a Taiwan based on a national identity social cleavage—the 
KMT with its pro-mainland China stance, and the DPP with its Taiwan 
independence stance.  
 The 2001 presidential election in Taiwan may serve as an example 
of a “critical election” (Key, 1955). In the 2001 Legislative Yuan election, 
the KMT lost its parliamentary majority, and the DPP became the largest 
party. This election also highlighted the People First Party (PFP) becoming 
the third party in the Legislative Yuan.6 Lee Teng-hui also left KMT and 
organized the Taiwan Solidarity Union in time to participate in the 2001 
election. Lee’s popularity has not diminished and voters gave 13 seats to 
Lee’s Taiwan Solidarity Union. In 2000, the DPP, KMT, PFP, TSU, and 
                                                      
6 James Soong, in 2000, left the KMT and formed PFP with a significant member of 
former KMT supporters 
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the NP along with some independent members were elected in the 
parliament, but no single party had the majority. Under this condition, fie 
parties began forming partnership. The TSU, under the leadership of Lee, 
maintained a close working relationship with the DPP. The KMT, PFP, 
and NP formed a legislative alliance in opposition to the DP and the TSU, 
while the other coalition was made up of the KMT, the NP, and the PFP. 
Thus the ‘pan-green’ and the ‘pan-blue’ divide consolidated.  
 
  3.4.1.3 Party System in the Philippines 
 
 Since the 1986 democratization, party switching and party split and 
merger became common among political elites in the Philippine national 
election. A shift in popular support form one party to the other, or, the 
expectation of such a shift, generally leads to changes of party allegiance 
by many politicians (Landé, 1996). In addition, intra-party solidarity is 
weak. Identified by Carl Landé (1996) as ‘rebel candidates’, these are 
opposition candidates run for elections against those candidates that the 
administration party has selected. Similar to South Korea as we will see 
shortly, inter-party competition is not organized around clear social 
cleavages. In general, observers point to two characteristics of the 
Philippines political party system. First, a shift in popular support from one 
party to the other, or the expectation of such a change, generally leads to 
the evolution of party allegiance by many professional politician’s 
eagerness to remain on the side of those in power. Second, the large 
number of “rebel candidates”, who run for public offices demonstrate this 
fact. These are party members who, having failed in their efforts to have 
themselves named official candidates in their own parties, run for office 
nonetheless. They do so despite the fact that their efforts will assure the 
defeat of their party’s official candidates.  
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 Patterns of interparty competition in the Philippines is volatile and 
the party system is organized around two prominent features that is 
distinctively different from Japan and Taiwan. On the one hand, is the 
presence of elite families controlling the politics through networks of 
patron-clientele relationship. Political parties in the Philippines are 
generally weak in meaningful party platforms and are notorious for having 
a very high frequency of candidates switching parties. In addition, 
coalitions last only for a short period. The high number of party splits and 
mergers, dissolutions, and re-emergence are just a few more addition to the 
list (Teehankee, 2002, 2006; Arlegue and Coronel, 2003).  
 On the other hand, in the Philippines, party law allows political 
elites to cross from one party to another, and this is one of the many reasons 
why the Philippine’s party system is regarded as volatile. The most 
prominent example of this could be the case of former president Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo, a founding member of the Kabalikat ng Malayang 
Pilipino (KAMPI), who was a candidate for Lakas-NUCD, and an 
honorary chairwoman of the Partido Liberalista, once the vehicle party of 
her father, the former president Diosdado P. Macapagal. The pork barrel 
(i.e., a special financial resource controlled by the president) is often 
blamed for party switching and the frequent shifts from one coalition to 
another (Arelgue and Coronel, 2003:225). Furthermore, most parties, 
except for few parties like the Partido Nacionalista and the Liberalista 
Party (LP), do not last for more than three consecutive elections.  
 
  3.4.1.4 Party system in South Korea 
 
 South Korea’s party system is one of the most fluid and dynamic 
because it is prone to changes. Years of authoritarianism under the military 
junta (i.e., under Park Chug-hee and Chun Doo-whan), source of a political 
conflict to the country. Those who opposed the authoritarian rule began to 
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form a coalition of anti-authoritarian movement in what Heo (2005) 
described as an authoritarian-to-democracy divide. Leaders of the 
opposition (i.e., Kim Young-sam, and Kim Dea-jung) fought to bring 
democratic rules to South Korea. However, the coalition broke down as 
soon as South Korea made transitioned to democracy. Faced with the 
prospect of becoming the 13th president, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-
jung broke away and formed parties of their own. This split the votes of 
the democratic camps into half and gave the presidency to Roh Tae-woo 
and the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) which was the ruling authoritarian 
party. As a consequence, people who supported the democratic movement 
also split into two camps. Those who support Kim Young-sam came 
largely from Yong-nam region (the Southwest of Korea) and the 
supporters of Kim Dae-jung came largely from the Ho-nam region (the 
Southeast of Korea). When Roh Tae-woo’s 6th Republic, faced a minority 
government. This led Roh to form a coalition with Kim Yong-sam and 
Kim Jong-pil; and this is the start of the infamous regionalism-based party 
system which opened up the era of the three Kims.7  
 Similar to the Philippines, South Korean parties are also an 
electoral vehicle for many elites. For example, Roh Tae-woo found the 
Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) in 1990 in order to clear off his image of 
the authoritarian era. This is when he reached out to Kim Yong-sam and 
Km Jong-pil, with the promise of guaranteeing the 14th presidential office, 
formed a grand coalition. First, Roh dissolved the former ruling 
Democratic Justice Party and renamed it as the DLP and formed a coalition 
government with the two opposition parties, the Reunification Democratic 
Party (RDP) and the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP). Another 
                                                      
7 Regionalism has been predominant in South Korea’s party politics over the past 25 
years. Major parties’ support base has been regionally organized. The current 
opposition parties (Liberty Korea Party and the Right Party) support base is Yongnam 
and Kangwon region (Southeast and East of Korea, respectively), while the governing 
party (The Democratic Party) has strong support from Seoul Metropolitan area and 
Yongnam (Southwestern of Korea) 
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example of the party being used as an electoral vehicle is when in 1995, 
the RDP split from the DPL coalition. The splinter of RDP resulted in the 
creation of the United Liberal Democratic (ULD) and the National 
Congress for New Politics (NCNP). Then, right before the 1997 
Presidential election, the UDP and NCNP re-merged again to form the 
Grand National Party under Lee Hoe-chang, to which Kim Yong-sam 
became a lame duck president.  
 A brief comparison of party system development across Japan, 
Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea highlights some interesting 
characteristics. Both Japan and Taiwan have relatively well-
institutionalized party system based on social cleavage. For more than a 
decade since 1955, policies in Japan show stable pattern of inter-party 
competition. In Taiwan, the firm presence of the DPP and a strong 
opposition party KMT has solidified the country’s party system wherein 
the DPP and the KMT are organized around the strong national identity 
cleavage. No such trend is visible in the Philippines and South Korea.  
 Second, similar parties in Japan and Taiwan have, on average 
competed for a longer period of time allowing for party-to-party legitimacy 
solidify. In the Philippines and South Korea, however, party changes and 
party switching occur frequently. Third and lastly, parties in the 
Philippines and South Korea parties are weakly organized compared to 
Japan and Taiwan. Patron-clientele and personal charisma still determine 
party leadership more than having an organizational vision for the party. 
Typically, in the Philippines and South Korea, leaders create their own 
party in their bid for presidency. Therefore, party members are more 
dependent on the leadership. In Japan and Taiwan, political parties are 
relatively independent from individual leaderships.  
  Based on above observations, this study groups the four countries 
into two distinctive groups on the basis of their party system 
institutionalized. On the one hand, we have Japan and Taiwan whose party 
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systems are highly institutionalized. On the other hand, we have the 
Philippines and South Korea where the countries’ party systems are under-
institutionalized.  
 
3.5  Operationalization of the Dependent and Independent factors 
 
 This section discusses the dependent and the independent factors 
and their relationships with each other in this research. It provides the 
operational meaning to the dependent and independent variables, which 
will be employed to examine the level of party system institutional across 
the Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea.  
 
 3.5.1  The Dependent Variable 
 
 The dependent variable is measured using the four party system 
institutionalization indexes developed by Randall and Svåsand: (a) Internal 
and Structural dimensions; (b) Internal and attitudinal dimension; (c) 
Structural and External dimension; and (d) Attitudinal/External dimension.  
   
  3.5.1.1  Structural and Internal Dimension  
 
 Internal and Structural dimension is indicated with the concept of 
‘continuity and stability among party system’ (please refer back to section 
3.2). On the one hand, continuity in party system means the extent to which 
a given set of parties are competing over several elections. Stability, on the 
other hand, implies that the electoral support for the individual parties are 
not fluctuating from one election to the other (Randall and Svåsand, 
1999:23). One way to measure party system continuity it is to measure 
party age and compare how long party organizations last across Japan, 
Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea. However, measuring only party 
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longevity over time leaves out an important part mentioned by Randall and 
Svåsand—the inter-party interactions. Thus, the challenge is to come up 
with a way to measure and compare political parties competing over 
several elections across the four countries.  
 One way to measure the length of political parties competing over 
time is to examine the parties’ dyadic interactions. This study borrows this 
concept from business and marketing studies as well as international 
relations.8 Dyadic interaction simply means an inter-relationship between 
the two entities. Applying the same logic to the political environment, 
requires substituting firms or national actors with party organizations. This 
define their dyadic interactions over time as “a given set of political parties 
competing over several elections”. 
 For example, political parties A, B, C, D compete in elections and 
the goal is to examine whether the same party dyadic interactions continue 
in next year’s election. Here, a party dyad for party A consists of Party A 
to Party B; Party A to Party C; and Party A to Party D and so on. Here, 
Party B to Party A is not treated as independent to the Party A to B dyad 
because it is recurring dyad. Therefore, this study treats Party A to Party B 
similar to the Party B to Party A dyad. 
 Once all party dyads are accounted for the analysis, we calculate 
the average years of each party dyad and their standard deviation across 
the four countries to compare the average longevity of party competition 
at an aggregate level. We study the legislative elections across Japan, 
Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea from 1986-2016.  
 
                                                      
8  See for example, Christopher J. Medlin, A Dyadic Research Program: The 
Interaction Possiblity Space Model, Forthcoming: Journal of Business-to-Business 
Marketing; Daving T. Wilson, 1976, “Dyadic Interaction: an Exchange Process’, in 
NA-Advances in Consumer Research Volume 3, (eds.). Beverlee B. Anderson, 
Cincinnati, OH: Association for Consumer Research, pp:394-397. For International 
Relations researches, see for example Van Jackson, 2012, Beyond Tailoring: North 
Korea and the Promise of Managed Deterrence published online:  
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  3.5.1.2  Attitudinal and internal dimension 
 
 The second dimension of Randall and Svåsand indicates that party 
system institutionalization can be measured by looking at the way parties 
accept each other as a legitimate competitor. This can be determined by 
examining the number of times ideologically/organizationally different 
political parties perform party mergers or form coalitions. Ideally, if party 
competition is based on a clear political division with a clear party program, 
the competition between the parties will maximize each party’s own 
support network, rather than parties performing candidate pooling and 
mergers across different party platform.  
 Therefore, tracing and counting the number of party mergers and 
splits across Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea’ party system 
development will give a clear indication of the internal and attitudinal 
dimension. If more party mergers or coalition occur across ideologically 
different parties, then there is ‘less’ mutual acceptance. However, if party 
mergers and coalition formations are limited within the same ideological 
spectrum (i.e., a merger or coalition formed within the same conservative-
based parties), then mutual acceptance is higher. This study traces the party 
system development across Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea 
from 1986-2016 and present it in a diagram format provide a visual 
explanation of the mergers and coalitions across the four countries.  
 
  3.5.1.3 Structural and External Dimension 
 
 The third dimension of Randall and Svåsand’s framework 
describes the relationship between party system to the polity, referring to 
a way in which political systems regulate party systems. The authors talk 
about regulations of party finance and electoral campaigns…” (p.24). 
According to them, the more parties and their activities are supported by 
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public measures, such as public subsidies and access to media and legal 
protections for their existence based in these countries’ constitutions, the 
more it is likely that party systems are institutionalized. This study 
particularly focuses on Randall and Svåsand’s discussion about the ‘legal 
protections on the existence of organizations’, specifically with regards to 
laws on the freedom of speech and regulations on party organization (i.e., 
disqualification of all sitting lawmakers from representing the party) in 
post-1986 across the four countries.  
 The structural/external dimension will be evaluated using the 
Freedom House Survey ratings across Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and 
South Korea.9  The thesis will compare the Freedom House scores for 
political rights and civil liberties in Japan, Philippines, South Korea, and 
Taiwan from 1998 to 2016. It seeks to validate the following principle: the 
higher the average score for political rights and civil liberties, the more a 
country nurtures and values free and fair competition among political 
parties. 
  3.5.1.4 Attitudinal and External Dimension 
 
 Lastly, Randall and Svåsand argue that for a party system to be 
institutionalized, the electorate must express a degree of trust in the parties, 
and that institutions and elections must be viewed as legitimate (p.24).  
 In this study, the attitudinal and external dimension will be 
examined by using and comparing the electoral volatility scores of Japan, 
Taiwan, Philippines, South Korea. Electoral volatility measures the degree 
of change in the voting behavior between elections. It identifies the 
changes in the shares of the vote for each party organization across the four 
countries from 1986 to 2016. To determine this, the study will employ the 
                                                      
9 For more information on how Freedom House reports are made, please see the 




Pedersen index, which compares the changes in net-volatility. Pedersen 
index is the sum of the absolute changes in vote share divided by two.10 
The measure of volatility reveals the extent to which party organizations 
preferred by voters are being reallocated from one election to the next. The 
higher the score, higher the likelihood that voters will shift their support 
from one party to the other, from one election to the next. Such analysis, 
accounts for the parties that have received more votes than the electoral 
threshold. For Japan and Taiwan, the electoral threshold is 5 percent. 
Meanwhile, in the Philippines, the electoral threshold is 2 percent (20 
percent of the lower house seat; but other parties can still qualify if the 20 
per cent of the seats have not been filled up). For South Korea, the electoral 
threshold is 3 percent, thus a party can have a seat by winning 5 seats at 
the local constituencies.  
 In addition, if changes in the party name occur, this study considers 
it as a party change. For example, Grand National Party and the Saenuri 
Party of south Korea are considered as separate parties. This is because 
according to the rules in the central election commission of South Korea, 
once the new party submits a party name, the old party name is erased from 
the party lists and the party is considered a new party. This also applies to 
the three countries.  
 
 3.5.2  Building a composite index of party system   
  institutionalization  
 
 The table below exhibits the dimensions and the indicators of the 
party system institutionalization index for this research. It examines how 
the original values of each indicators—measured in terms of average year 
                                                      
10 𝑉𝑡 =  Σ(|𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1|)/2, where 𝑉𝑡 stands for the net change of volatility, 𝑃𝑖𝑡 stand 
for the percentage of the vote, which was obtained by party I at election t. 
 
 78 
of party-dyadic relationship, number of mergers across 
ideologically/organizationally opposing parties, political freedom, and 
electoral volatility—are standardized into dichotomous scores.  
 
Table 1: Composite index for levels of party system institutionalization  
Dimensions  Indicators Measurement 
Internal and structural 
dimension 
Average Party-Dyad Years (1986-2016) 3.0 = 3 to 5 years 
2.0 = 2 to 3 years 
1.0 = 0 to 2 years 
Internal and attitudinal 
dimension 
 
Number of party mergers across opposing 
political parties 
3.0 = 0 to 5 mergers 
2.0 = 5 to 10 mergers 
1.0 = N > 10 
Structural and external 
dimension 
Political Freedom11 3.0 = 1.0 to 1.25 
2.0 = 1.25 to 3.25 
1.0 = 3.25 to 7.0 
Attitudinal and external 
dimension 
Electoral volatility 3.0 = 0 to 10  
2.0 = 21 to 30 
1.0 = N > 41 
 
 The first dimension is determined using a measurement originally 
developed in this study by deriving the average age of party competition. 
The second dimension is measured based Janda’s proposal by examining 
the number of mergers across ideologically opposing parties. For the third 
dimension, this study uses the Freedom House scores indicating the 
political freedom and civil liberties in each country. Lastly, the fourth 
dimension is analysed based on electoral volatility that is derived from 
Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and was eventually applied in the works of 
Hicken and Kuhonta (2011) and Weatherall (2013). 
 The measurement process basically consists of applying an ordinal 
scale from 1 (low institutionalization) to 3 (high institutionalization) to the 
values of each indicator. Taking electoral volatility as an example, values 
                                                      
11 Please consult https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-
2018 for how political freedom is operationalized by the Freedom House survey.  
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ranging from 1 to 10 are given a score 3 (high institutionalization), while 
values higher than 41 are given a score of 1 (low institutionalization). This 
score range of 1 to 3 makes it possible to compare each of the index in 
Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea that will eventually 
determine their party system institutionalization levels.  
 
 3.5.3 Operationalization of the independent variables 
 
  3.5.3.1 Social Cleavage 
 
 This study argues that the path dependent nature (i.e., recurring 
nature) of social cleavage explains the variation in the party system 
institutionalization level of the four countries. More specifically, a deep 
division in the social cleavage created at an early stage of political 
developments in Japan and Taiwan has continuously organized party 
competition. In the Philippines and South Korea, conflicts have given rise 
to social distinctions, but these however did not lead to collective actions 
and have failed to organize political representations.    
 Nevertheless, there is a large resentment with applying Lipset and 
Rokkan’s and Bartolini and Mair’s (1990:213-220) conceptualization of 
social cleavage to the cases of Third Wave democracies and the developing 
democracies. For example, Vicky Randall (1988, 2002) argues that the 
parties in countries like Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea can hardly 
fit Lipset and Rokkan’s theory of social cleavage. It is without a question 
that the application of the cleavage concept outside the founding 
democracies in the West will face formidable obstacles. This is because 
either the national and industrial revolutions have not occurred in the same 
form as in Western Europe, or they have failed to produce a similar lasting 
impact on party systems. In order to fruitfully apply the cleavage concept 
to Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea, therefore, a number of 
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minor modifications of the original approach are in order. First, this thesis 
will abstract from the European experience in looking for the critical 
junctures that have left a lasting impact on party systems across Japan, 
Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. Secondly, the thesis will examine 
the role of ‘agencies’ in cleavage formation. In our case, those agencies 
will be political elites and party organizations in Japan, Taiwan, 
Philippines, and South Korea. The reason being established elites may not 
only have an interest in, they may also be capable of shaping party systems 
and even of preventing social structure (i.e., social cleavage) from 
manifesting itself in politics.  
 Then social cleavage are compared across the four countries using 
the Bartolini and Mair’s (1990:213-220) cleavage is comprised of three 
elements: (a) social cleavage must have ‘social-structural’ elements such 
as class, religious denomination, status, or education; (b) social cleavage 
must have an element of collective identity of this social group; (c) social 
cleavages must have an organizational manifestation in the form of 
collective action or a strong organization of social groups concerned.  
  
  3.5.3.2 Institutionalized Factions 
 
 To examine the impact of institutionalized factionalism on party 
system institutionalization across the four countries, the following will be 
discussed. First, is to identify and compare if party factions across the four 
countries are institutionalized. Second is to discuss whether 
institutionalized factions in individual parties provide a cohesive means—
becoming as one organizational unit—at the early stages of party 
development. The study considers major parties from Japan, Taiwan, the 
Philippines, and South Korea.  
 To understand the impact of institutionalized faction in party 
system directly, this study conceptualizes institutionalized faction based 
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on the pioneering work by Richard Rose (1964) and Dennis Beller and 
Frank Belloni (1976). First, Rose (1964) gave much attention on the 
organizational characteristic of intraparty actions in his study of English 
political parties. He distinguished party factions from another intra-party 
type of formation, calling them as “tendency”; thereby giving clear 
definition of ‘institutional factionalism’. According to Rose, a faction is a 
group of parliamentary representatives who pursue a broad range of 
policies through consciously-organized activity over an extended period of 
time. Thus, for him, factions are characterized by ideology, leadership, 
cadres, communication network, and financial resources.  
 On the contrary, a tendency is merely a set of attitudes more than 
an organized group. It is defined as a body of aptitudes expressed in a 
legislature. It deals with certain restricted ranges of problems and often in 
terms of a more or less coherent, but highly flexible ideology or political 
issues. The tendency alignments are, therefore, temporary in nature; and as 
new issues or controversies arise, existing tendency groups dissolve and 
new alignments appear. In sum, those groups that are relatively highly 
organized and durable are factions; while those groups that are relatively 
unorganized and temporary are tendencies.  
 Meanwhile, Beller and Belloni (1976) provide a more advanced 
definition of factionalism. has been given by Dennis Beller and Frank 
Belloni. They characterize factions according to the three following types: 
(a) factional clique and tendencies; (b) personal, client-group factions; and 
(c) institutionalized, organizational factions. 
 Factional cliques and tendencies have very little structure. They are 
either almost totally unorganized or exhibit only a very ephemeral 
organization set up that seeks to pursue a single issue or to fight an electoral 
campaign. Recruitments are more ad-hoc based and have no hierarchical 
command structures. Individual leadership is based on charisma than on 
clientelistic links. Such group only exist for a short time. Meanwhile, 
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personalized factions are based on clientelism, which also serves as the 
central mechanism for mobilizations. Such groups are characterized by 
what are usually asymmetrical exchanges of power resources. Hierarchies 
and chains of command in such groups are vertical. In contrast, the 
hierarchically organized (i.e., institutionalized) factions exhibit a 
developed organizational structure and a higher degree of 
bureaucratization. Recruitment regularly takes place on a non-personal and 
egalitarian basis. While the political ambitions of the groups’ leader(s) are 
important for the cohesion of these groups, their survival and continued 
existence is—as a rule—not dependent on an individual leadership.  
 A summary of the typologies provided by Rose, Beller and 
Belloni’s is summarized in the following table. 
 
Table 2: Types of factions  
Types / Character Structure 
(organization) 




unorganized group  






Tend not to last 







Guns for hire, 
members are 
recruited on the 
























survival of the 
group does not 
depend on an 
individual leader 
Tend to last long, 
multiple elections.  
Source: Beller and Belloni, 1976 
  
 This thesis develops Rose, Beller and Belloni’s conceptualization 
further by summarizing their characteristics of factions according to the 
key words that describe each of the types/characters as the table above 
displays. For example, since factional clique and tendencies will have no 
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structure or is an unorganized group, this study considers it as the lowest 
form of group. In addition, since the recruitment of members are performed 
at an ad-hoc basis, this study considers this as under institutionalized. For 
the mobilization part, factional clique and tendencies are mostly based on 
an individual ‘charismatic leadership’. Therefore, mobilization for clique 
and tendencies are also lowest in its institutionalization.  
 Personal, client-group factions have a hierarchical and vertically 
organized structure (mostly patron-client). This study considers this as a 
more institutionalized form of structure and organization than the cliques 
and tendencies. This is because members are recruited as ‘hired-guns’—or 
vote gatherers; and are only recruited while there as availability of 
resources. Since factional memberships can change depending on the 
availability of resources, recruiting members are based on an ad-hoc basis. 
Thus, this study considers client group and mobilization dimension as 
under-institutionalized forms of party factions because there is no 
difference in the degree of institutionalization among membership 
recruitment category between clique and personalized factions. 
Personalized factions last longer than tendencies. This is because so long 
as the so long as the patrons can pay the clients remain (Sidel, 1989:21). 
Thus, this study ranks personalized factions higher than clique and 
tendencies on age category as well.  
 Institutionalized factions have organizational structure for all of the 
following categories: structure, recruitment, mobilization, and age. For 
example, if factions within a party have their own regional as well as 
central offices, it is considered institutionalized. And if the factions are 
given or if recruitment of members takes place on a regular basis based on 
merit, those factions are considered institutionalized. Such approach will 
make the job of comparing the factions/groups/clique in the four parties 
across the four countries more empirical.  
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 This study also examines if institutionalized factions provide the 
parties (i.e., parties where factions belong) the, means to resolve intra- 
party conflicts and consensus building. It also determines if the parties 
provide organizational means to project a clear party-line against their 
opposition parties at an earlier phase of party development. This is because 
institutionalized factions enhance a party’s ability to survive for longer 
period and stay competitive against more organized and well-financed 
parties in the cases of Japan and Taiwan. Meanwhile, the least 
institutionalized parties in the Philippines and South Korea undergo 
frequent and mergers and contributes to the frequent changes in party 
system.  
 
  3.5.2.3 Mode of Democratic Transition 
 
 The way democratization has unfolded in Japan, Taiwan, 
Philippines, and South Korea might explain why there is a variation in the 
level of party system institutionalization. The thesis argued earlier that 
democratization from the bottom-up (i.e., People Power) hinders the 
establishment of elite consensus. Therefore, political institutions from the 
past are less likely to continue to the post-transition period; and previous 
party system is more likely to collapse. Meanwhile, top-down democratic 
transition enhances the establishment of elite consensus. Therefore, 
previous political institutions are more likely to continue in the post-
transition period when party system is more likely to continue and stabilize.  
 By examining how democratic transitions have unfolded using the 
proposed measurement units across the four countries, this study compares 
the different ways in which political institutions were able to continue and 
consolidate over time. An institutionalized party system generally has 
lesser changes during a transition. Top-down democratic transition 
guarantees the continuation of the system and institutions. Therefore, it is 
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more conducive to party system institutionalization. Meanwhile, the 
bottom-up democratic transition does not guarantee the continuation of the 
party system as conflicts among the elites during the transition phase 
results in the breakdown of the institutions from the previous regimes. This 

































 To what extent are party systems across Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, 
and South Korea are institutionalized? This question has been answered in 
the past but not convincingly. This thesis argues, however, that the type of 
measurement used for that purpose does not fully capture the different 
areas and properties of party system institutionalization.  
 Thus, throughout Chapter IV this question is approached once 
more, taking into account the application of Randall and Svåsand’s 
measure of institutionalization to the party systems across Japan, Taiwan, 
Philippines, and South Korea between 1986 to 2016: (a) structural/internal 
dimension, examined through party-dyadic relations in the legislative 
elections from 1986 to 2016; (b) structural/external dimension, analysed 
through number of times ideologically/organizationally different political 
parties perform party mergers or form coalitions from 1986-2016; (c) 
attitudinal/internal evaluated using the Freedom House Survey ratings 
across Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea; (d) 
attitudinal/external dimension evaluated based on electoral volatility 
across the four countries.  
 This study utilizes a different way of conceptualizing party system 
institutionalization. Rather than relying solely on more traditional 
measures of party system institutionalization such as electoral volatility, 
political party fragmentation, and number of nationalized political parties, 
it focuses on measuring the longevity of inter-party competition, number 
of political party alignment and de-alignments, and political institutions. 
This study aims to provide a wider spectrum of measurement criteria to 
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determine the level of party system institutionalization across the four 
countries.  
 
4.1  Continuity in inter-party competition across Japan, Taiwan, 
 Philippines, and South Korea.  
 
 The following highlights a quantitative presentation and an analytical 
discussion on the continuity in inter-party competition in the four countries. 
This is measured by aggregating the scores of party-dyad (interactions) in the 
four countries using data from the national legislative elections held from 1986 
to 2016.12 Below is a statistical summary of the four countries party dyad.  
 
Table 3: Party-dyad scores for Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea. 
Countries/Dyads Election 
Years 








Japan 1986-2016 281 4.2 1.62 
Taiwan 1986-2016 78 3.7 0.73 
Philippines 1986-2016 715 1.4 2.07 
South Korea 1986-2016 71 0.3 3.33 
 
 This section starts by discussing briefly what the four categories 
(i.e., total number of dyads, average year of dyad, and coefficient of 
variation) means and how these indicators help us to compare ‘continuity 
of inter-party competition’. Starting from the left, there are four countries 
listed with their legislative election years alongside them. In the total 
number of dyad section, we are comparing the total number of pair of 
parties (i.e., party interactions) appeared from 1986 to 2016 in each 
country. Thus, for example, in Japan, there were in total of 281 pairs of 
                                                      
12 Please refer back to 3.5.1.1 for detailed description of the party-dyads.  
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parties competed in the Shugi-in elections from 1986 to 2016. Take 
another example, in the Philippines, in their House of Representative 
elections from 1987-2016, a total of 715 pair of parties have competed. 
The number of total party dyads for Taiwan and South Korea are very 
similar and remains at 78 and 71 respectively. The total number of party 
dyads tell us immediately that there is a high inflation in number of parties 
in the Philippines while in the South Korea and Taiwan, number of party 
dyads are very small; and Japan is in the middle. 
 This information simply show us that many political parties have 
entered in House of Representative elections in the Philippines in any 
given years from 1986 to 2016 while there were only a handful of political 
parties entering in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly 
elections in Taiwan and South Korea respectively. Japan is in the middle, 
showing not too much but not too little number of parties entering the 
Shuigi-in election each year from 1986-2016. Does this mean party system 
is institutionalized in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan while it is not in the 
Philippines? If so, how? Counting the number of party dyads will not give 
us a clear picture because we know from our many previous studies that 
party system is not institutionalized in South Korea. In addition, the 
number of party dyad tell us nothing about if same party pairs competed in 
a legislative election in 2012, for example, are contending against each 
other in the 2016 legislative election. Compare to a more conventional 
measurement, like the effective number of parties introduced by Lakkso 
and Taagepera (1979), party-dyad actually measures the length of party 
interactions. Thus, while the effective number of party measures adjusted 
number of political parties in a country’s party system and the relative 
strength of parties, the concept lacks in describing the length of party 
interactions in a party system, which is more conducive to the study of 
comparing the levels of party system institutionalization across the 
countries.  
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 The average years of party-dyad, which measures interaction 
period of parties, across the four countries is a category, which we can 
compare the longevity of party dyad. The average years of party dyad for 
each country is calculated as follow. For each party dyad across Japan, 
Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan, we recorded their year of interaction 
since 1986 election. This means all the dyadic interaction starts from zero 
from 1986. For example, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) versus the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2012 has 16 years of interactions while 
a zero dyad for the LDP versus Nippon Ishin no Kai (Japan Restoration 
Party –JRP) indicates no interactions. The reason for this was that since 
1986, there were nine consecutive House of Representative elections that 
took place (i.e., in 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996…, 2012). LDP and the DPJ 
existed since 1986 until 2012. Therefore, the two parties have competed 
consecutively for 16 years up to the 2012 Shugi-in election. However, 
party interactions for the LDP and JRP have not previously appeared and 
therefore, resulted in a dyad year of 0 at the 2012 election. Meanwhile, for 
the 2012 Legislative Yuan election in Taiwan, the Kuomintang (KMT) and 
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have competed consistently for 
twenty years since 1986, while a dyad between KMT and Taiwan 
Solidarity Union (TSU) is only eight years.  
 In sum, the 2012 legislative election revealed an average dyad year 
of 7.1 in Japan and 9.3 in Taiwan. This study applied same logic to all the 
party dyads appearing in the legislative elections from 1986 to 2016 in the 
Philippines and South Korea. The year of dyad in table 1 is the average 
year of all the dyad year calculated for the four countries from 1986-2016. 
On the one hand, Japan has the longest year of party dyad with average 
party-dyad year of 4.2 while Taiwan has second highest average party dyad 
years (3.7). On the other hand, the average year of party-dyad in the 
Philippines in 1.4 years while the average year of party dyad for South 
Korea is mere 0.3 year, lowest among the four countries. What the average 
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party-dyad years in the four countries suggest following crucial 
information. First, with average party dyad year of 4.2, the probability of 
similar parties continuously competing is higher in Japan followed by 
Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea. We can infer from this information 
that on average, inter-party competition of a pair of party in Japan is more 
likely to continue to next election year given that the average year of 
Shugi-in elections have recurring rate of 3.1 years from 1986 to 2016. In 
Taiwan, also, the average year of party dyad (3.7) is higher than the 
average year of Legislative Yuan elections recurring rate of 3.3. Therefore, 
in Japan and Taiwan, probability of the same parties continuing to the next 
year elections are more likely.  
 Second, in the Philippines and South Korea, the average years of 
party dyad are significantly less than their average election recurring rate. 
House of Representative election in the Philippines have recurred, on 
average, 3.2 years while in South Korea it is 4 years. However, the average 
year of party dyad for the two countries are 1.4 and 0.3 respectively, 
meaning that probability of party dyad competing in next year’s election 
are dangerously low. We can infer from the information that there is less 
likelihood of same parties continue to compete in the Philippines and South 
Korea.  
 Lastly, the coefficient of variation (CV) level indicates a degree of 
variation of the party dyad years across the four countries. The CV will tell 
us about to what degree do individual years of party dyads vary in our data 
for Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea. The CV is calculated by 
simply dividing a standard deviation by the average party dyad years of 
each country. As a rule of thumb, usually, CV score of greater than 1 (i.e., 
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CV >1) indicates a relatively high variation in the data while a CV score 
less than 1 (i.e., CV<1) indicates a low variation.13  
 The CV score for Japan, as is displayed in table 1, is 1.67. What 
this suggest is that for Japan, majority of party dyad year fall within the 
mean (4.2) ± 1.67 meaning that majority of the average year of party dyad 
in Japan range from 2.53 to 5.87. For Taiwan, the CV rate is 0.74 where 
majority of party dyad year fall within the mean (3.7) ± 0.73, meaning 
Taiwan’s average party dyad year fall from 2.96 to 4.43. For the 
Philippines, (1.4) ± 2.07 making the party dyad years fall from -0.67 to 
3.47. South Korea (0.3) ±3.37, -3.07 to 3.67.  
 The comparison of the coefficient of variation tell us an important 
characteristic about the party system across the four countries. The 
likelihood of same party pair (a dyad) in an election at point 𝑡 to continue 
into 𝑡1 is less in Japan, Philippines, and South Korea compared to Taiwan. 
This make Taiwan stand out as having a party system which is more 
institutionalized. Let us briefly discuss Japan, Philippines, and South 
Korea. 
  The range of party dyad data for Japan, on the one hand, reveals 
that the average year of party dyad lay anywhere from 2.53 to 5.87 years. 
This means that in Japan there are still many dyads that do not survive for 
more than 3.1, the average recurring rate of the Shugi-in election. However, 
with majority of party dyad surviving more than 2 years and the major 
parties have been continuously competing since 1986 makes Japan’s party 
system institutionalized. On the other hand, the average year of party dyads 
reveal concerns for the party systems in the Philippines and South Korea. 
Not only the average year of party dyad are low in the two countries, their 
coefficient of variation reveal extreme variation. For example, the average 
                                                      
13 Coefficient of variation is used in this study because the measurement gives us the 
ability to compare how spread (or varying) the data is across the different data-sets 
with different mean value.  
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party dyad in South Korean legislative election ranges from -3.07 to 3.67 
meaning that majority inter-party interactions breakdown before given a 
change to flourish. Since inter-party interactions break down frequently, 
party systems undergo changes and produces one of the most radical party 
realignments in every election. The coefficient of variation for the 
Philippines also reveal concern that is similar to South Korea case. 
However, at the very least, Philippines inter-party interactions show signs 
of consolidation as there is continuity of interactions within older parties 
such as Liberal Party and the Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC).  
 Based on this observation, this study allocates party system 
institutionalization score of 3 to Japan and Taiwan since their average party 
dyad years are between 3 to 5 years. Meanwhile, the party system 
institutionalization score of 1 is allocated to the Philippines and South 
Korea because their average party dyad years are less than 2 years.  
 
4.2  Party organizational continuity: Party mergers across Japan, 
 Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea.  
 
 On average, parties founded in 1955 in Japan (LDP) won about 60 
percent of the seat in the last lower house election in Japan while in Taiwan 
parties founded in 1914 and 1986 (i.e., the KMT and DPP respectively) 
won more than 60 percent of the seat in the Legislative Yuan. Meanwhile, 
in the Philippines the Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) made its 
comeback and won about 42 percent while the Nationalist People’s 
Coalition (NPC) won about 17 percent of the House of the representative 
election. The Liberal Party was found in 1946 while the NPC was founded 
in 1992. In South Korea, the Democratic Party and the Saenuri Party won 
about 37 percent and 38 percent of the National Assembly election in 2016 
respectively. The Democratic Party was found in 2014 as a merger of the 
Democratic Party and the New Political Vision Party while the Saenuri 
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Party, (currently reorganized and changed its party name to the Liberty 
Korea party) was known as the Grand National Party until 2012.14  
 The main difference between the four countries, as discussed 
briefly, is that party organizations in Japan and Taiwan created more than 
half century ago continue to win substantial seats in the national legislative 
elections. Meanwhile, political parties like the Nacionalista, Liberal Party, 
and NPC have been consistently competing in the elections held in the 
Philippines since 1986. However, these parties continue to compete by 
making coalitions with other parties. The most troubling case is the South 
Korea. Only the Grand National Party have survived for eight years (2000 
to 2008) while other parties have performed mergers and splits to gain 
electoral advantages before national elections. The following section 
examines party system developments of the four countries and discuss part 
system continuity. The following historical background discusses the 
various episodes of mergers and cross-overs in the political system of the 
four countries.  
 
4.2.1  Japan: A brief history of the post-war party system.  
 
 The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominated Japan’s post-war 
politics from the 1960s until now, except for momentary defeats between 
1993 to 1994 and 2009 to 2012. The LDP was created in November 1955 
by the merger of Japan Democratic Party and the Liberal Party. The LDP’s 
counterpart, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP-later changed its name to Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) in 1996), was formed in 1945 under the U.S. 
occupation. Meanwhile, Japanese Communist Party (JCP), being the 
oldest party, survived the Taisho as well as the militant authoritarian 
                                                      
14 The Grand National Party reorganized its party machine to elect Park Gun-hye to 
the 11th president of South Korea. Former Lee Myung-bak’s supporters lost their 
party position and excluded from nomination to party positions.  
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government under the Taisei Yokusankai (Imperial Rule Aid 
Association—I.R.A.A.). The JCP has continuously competed in Japan’s 
elections until the present. What is notable about post-war party system in 
Japan is that there are no party mergers between one ideologically different 
party to another. For example, there was no party merger performed 
between the LDP and the JCP, nor from the SDP and vice versa.  
 However, party mergers occurred mostly within the conservative 
camps. This includes the LDP, the Koemito Party, and the Japanese 
Democratic Socialist Party. There were number of mergers between 
ideologically different parties in Japan. However, such mergers were far 
less in number compared to the Philippines and South Korea. For example, 
Shinshinto party was formed by defectors from LDP, former member of 
Democratic Socialist party (DP), Socialist Democratic Federation (SDF), 
and others. The latter two broke with Japanese Socialist Party in 1960s and 
1970s. Democratic party (DP) included politicians from former LDP and 
also from DSP and SDF. For example, Democratic prime minister 
Hatoyama was originally from LDP, and his successor prime minister was 
from SDF. Liberal Party then split into two; members who went to DP and 
members who established New Conservative Party which was finally 
merged with LDP.15 The graphical representation below shows the party 
mergers in the Japanese party system from 1993 to 2005. 
 
 
[Figure 3, Party System Development in Japan here. See Appendix B Japan] 
 
 
                                                      
15 There was once a grand-coalition government formed from 1993 and 1996 between 
the LDP, the New Party Sekigake, and the JSP under prime minister Tomiichi 
Murayama, leader of the Japanese Socialist Party. However, coalition is not 
considered a merger in this study.  
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 Figure 3 depicts a change in the Japanese party system due to 
realignments from 1993 to 2005.16 This study chose the period from 1993 
to 2005 because this was the first recorded interruptions in the LDP’s 
dominant party rule. Evidently, there were a small group from the LDP 
that decreased the dominance of the party by forming a different coalition. 
Tracing the process of the LDP splinter and coalition formation from 1993 
to 2005 provided a clear picture of party mergers and candidate cross-overs 
in the Japanese party system. 
As presented in figure 3, the factions by the so-called ‘reformers’ 
led to the formation of new conservative parties particularly after the 
LDP’s loss in the 1993 election. These parties include: the Shinseito Party 
(also known as the Japanese Renewal Party); and the Japan New party. 
Eventually, the Japan New Party and the Shinseito Party merged becoming 
the Shinshinto Party. Meanwhile, the New Party Sakigake split into the 
Sakigake Party (later absorbed into the LDP) and the Minshuto Party (later 
became the Democratic Party of Japan).  
The Komeito Party also divided into two: the Komeito New Party 
and the Komei Party. The Komeito New Party later merged into the 
Shinshinto, while the Komei Party later re-organized into the Remei Club 
in 1998. That year, factions within the Shinshinto split into two different 
parties: One faction recognized itself into the Liberal Party (Jiyuto Party) 
and the other merged with the Remei Club. By early 2005, the Liberal 
Party split into two: One faction became the founding member of the 
Democratic Party of Japan, while the other established the Japan 
Innovation Party, which later merged back to the LDP.  
                                                      
16  The thesis consulted following information: Hiroshi Murakami. 2009. “The 
Changing Party System in Japan 1993-2007: More Competition and Limited 
Convergence”, Ritsumeikan Law Review (26):27-34; Ashinova Zhanar Erbolatovna., 
2002., “Modernization of Political Party System in Japan and the Republic of 
Kazakhstan: A Comparative Analysis.” 
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On the progressive camp, there were less party splinters. The Social 
Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) reorganized the party into the 
Democratic Social Party in 1994 and then change back its name to the 
Social Democratic Party in 2005. The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 
did not undergo any reorganization and continued competing in the Shugi-
in elections in Japan from 1994 to 2005. However, there were some 
noticeable party mergers between ideologically different parties in Japan. 
For example, Shinshinto party was formed by defectors from LDP, former 
members of Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), Socialist Democrtic 
Federation (SDF), and others. The latter two broke with Japanese Socialist 
Party in 1960s and 1970s. Democratic Party included politicians from 
former LDP and also from SDF.  
Nevertheless, as the following sections will reveal, Japanese party 
system illustrates far less frequent party mergers across the ideologically 
opposing parties compared to the Philippines and South Korea.  
Given these observation, party organizational continuity of the 
LDP developed into a two-party system in Japan. In addition, the fact that 
party mergers across ideologically different parties did not occur in the 
Japanese party system helped the system to consolidate into two party 
system. For this reason, Japan is allocated a party system 
institutionalization score of 3. 
  
4.2.2  Taiwan: 1986 to 2016 
 
 The Kuomintang (KMT) party has been in power until Taiwan 
underwent democratization. With Taiwan’s democratization in 1986, the 
Democratic Progressive Party began representing that transformed into a 
political stance. From this period, there became a clear divide over the 
issue of national identity that transformed into a political ideology. Over 
time, party systems in Taiwan showcased two dominant camps: the pan-
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Blue and the pan-Green. On the one hand, the pan-Blue consists of parties 
in the Legislative Yuan that that share ideological similarities with the 
KMT, which strongly support the normalization of relations with mainland 
China. On the other hand, the pan-Green is led by the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP), composed of minor parties supporting Taiwan 
independence. Apart from the two groups splitting from the KMT party 
around the early 1990s to 2000s, there are not mergers between the two 
camps in Taiwan’s party system since 1986.  
 
 
[Figure 4, Party System Institutionalization Development in Taiwan here. 
See Appendix B Taiwan]17 
 
 
 As the figure 4 illustrates, party system in Taiwan experienced two 
major party splits, transforming the once dual-party system into a multi-
party system. First, in 1993, a group of KMT party elites split from the 
KMT and formed the New Party in 1993. Then two more political parties 
have emerged to challenge the established political parties in 2000: The 
People First Party (PFP) headed by James Soong and the Taiwan Solidarity 
Union (TSU) led by former president Lee Teung-hui. No significant 
change is recorded in Taiwan’s party system after 2005. Most importantly, 
there is no evidence of party cross over by political candidates or mergers 
between the pan-Blue and the pan-Green. Based on this observation, 
                                                      
17 Party System Development in Taiwan (1986-2016). Author’s own compilation 
based on following information: John F. Copper. 1989, “The Evolution of Political 
Parties in Taiwan,” Asian Affairs: Taylor&Francis LTD. Pp. 3-21; Ching-hsin Yu, 
2005, “The Evolving Party Systems in Taiwan, 1995-2004,” Journal of Asian and 
African Studies, Sage Journals, pp. 105-123; Dafydd Fell and Chung-li Wu, 2006, 
“Inter-Party Competition in Taiwan: Two Decades of Change and Continuity,” East 
Asia (23):1. pp. 3-6  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/8620/1/New_Party.pdf. 
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Taiwan is allocated a party system institutionalization score of 3 similar to 
Japan.  
 
4.2.3  The Philippines 
 
 The history of party politics in the Philippines is as old as Japan. 
At the beginning of the American occupation in the country,18 two political 
parties were formed—the Federalista and the Nacionalista. Both parties 
have dominated the electoral arena, albeit controlled largely by the 
American occupational authority until the Philippines gained 
independence in 1946. After this, the electoral competition continued 
between the Nacionalista Party and the Liberal Party until Ferdinand 
Marcos was elected as president. During his last year of tenure, Marcos 
declares martial law and outlawed political parties except his own 
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL).  
 With Marcos’ ouster however, party system was not restored back 
to its tow-party system in the 1940s. Under Corazon Aquino’s presidency, 
major parties disintegrated into smaller parties, which thereafter could not 
form a unified coalition. What is particularly notable in the Philippine’s 
presidential elections. The brief discussion highlighted number of 
interesting features in the Philippines’ party system. Such characteristics 
are well described by the accounts of Hutchcroft and Rocamora (2003) and 
Almonte (2007). For them, parties serve as a vehicle for their powerful 
patrons to gain government access through elected members in offices. 
This is also affirmed by Almonte (2007:65) who describes the country’s 
existing parties as “catch-all” parties that target to please everyone and 
anyone from all sector and social strata. Moreover, there exists several 
                                                      
18 With the signing of the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898, Spain ceded the 
Philippines to the United States 
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“paper” parties organized to support the presidential ambitions of some 
members.  
 The brief discussion of the party system development in the 
Philippines from 1945 to 2010 highlighted that parties are only served as 
an electoral vehicle and that they are catch-all and employ populist 
measures instead of clearly organized party-line. This study adds one more 
feature of the Philippines party system. Evidently, there are frequently 
party coalition formation by various parties during legislative elections 
especially after the 1986 elections. Below is a brief sketch of party system 
development in the Philippines from 1945 to 1986.  
 
 
[Figure 5, Party System Institutionalization Development in the 
Philippines here. See Appendix B Philippines]19 
 
 
 As figure 5 shows, there were several party mergers and coalitions 
and ad hoc coalition formations in the Philippines from 1945 to 2010. 
Interestingly, the number of parties and coalitions that have been organized 
and dissolved in successive national elections increased since 1987. The 
successive elections under the 1987 constitution reveal recurring coalition 
makings, mergers, and splits. In addition, once the clear divide between 
People’s Coalition and the Grand Alliance for Democracy quickly broke 
down only to be followed by another series of party splits, mergers and ad 
hoc coalition formations. For example, in 1992 election, the NP broke up 
into three factions, the LP suffered from mass defections and financial 
                                                      
19  Party System Development of the Philippines from 1945 to 2010. Author’s own 
compilation based on following information: Carl H. Lande´, 1967., “The Philippine 
Political Party System,” Journal of Southeast Asian History (5):19-39; Joel 
Rocamora, “Philippine Political Parties, Electoral System and Political Reform, 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan006915.pdf. 
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troubles, and later allied itself with the remnants of Senator Auilino 
Pimentel’s PDP-Laban. NPC was composed of various defectors from 
other parties. The Lakas-NUCD-UMDP coalition became the final vehicle 
for former Defense Secretary Ramos. The People’s Reform Party (PRP), 
heavily supported by student volunteers was formed. The Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP party was hastily organized for the 1992 election, after Defense 
Secretary Fidel Ramos lost the LDP presidential nomination to House 
Speaker Mitra. It was merger of newly formed Lakas ng EDSA (not to be 
confused with the Lakas ng Bansa) and the older National Union of 
Christian Democrats-Union of Muslim Democrats of the Philippines 
(NUCD-UMDP) founded in 1984. 
 Since the 2010 national election, however, the two pre-martial law 
political parties shave made a strong comeback (i.e., the LDP and the NPC) 
able to compete with those post-martial law parties such as Lakas. 
However, party system is still very volatile and unpredictable in the 
Philippines. Political parties as organizations are yet to be durable and 
stable. In total, there were 8 party mergers across different parties and 
countless party candidate crossings in the Philippines’ House of 
Representative election from 1987 to 2010. Based on this observation, a 
party system institutionalization score of 2 is allocated to the Philippines.  
 
4.2.4 South Korea: 1945-2016 
 
 At the end of Japan’s colonialism, the Korean Peninsula was put 
under the trusteeship of the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet 
Union took control over the norther part of the Korea Peninsula (above the 
38th parallel), while the United States had the jurisdiction over the south 
(below 38th parallel). Under the United States Military Government in 
Korea (USMGIK) trusteeship, Syngman Rhee became the first President 
of the South Korean Republic having won the election in 1948. Rhee’s 
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ambition of prolonging his rule indefinitely met with nationwide student 
protests that led to the April 19th revolution. With the ouster of Rhee, his 
Liberal Party disintegrated, with some members going to the New 
Democratic Party. Meanwhile, a majority of former Liberal Party members 
joined the Democratic Republican Party, established by Park Chunghee in 
1961 after his military coup d’état. After Park’s assassination, Chun 
Doowhan became president via another military coup d’état. Chun created 
the Democratic Justice Party and recruited former members of the 
Democratic Republican Party as well as the Reunification Democratic 
Party.20  
In June 10 1987, Chun was forced to resign as president and 
declared to have a free election. Chun’s longtime friend, Roh Tae-woo 
became the president. Roh’s election as president was due to a mega split 
in the democratic opposition, which began from 1987 onwards between 
those who followed Kim Young-sam and those who followed Kim Dae-
joong. As the administration candidate, Roh happened to be the lucky 
winner of such political split in the opposition.  
Then, in the 1990s, a political merger has changed the dynamics of 
the party system in South Korea occurred. Opposition leaders Kim Young-
sam (Unification Democratic Party) and Kim Jong-pil (New Republican 
Democratic Party) led their parties to merge into the ruling party 
Democratic Justice Party and formed the Democratic Liberal Party. Kim 
Young-sam then was nominated as the presidential candidate and was 
elected. This significant party merger changed the political divided in the 
country from authoritarian versus democratic to divisions among regions, 
which has consistently weakened party system institutionalization. Similar 
to the Philippines, political mergers between parties were primarily 
                                                      
20 In fairness to the members of the Reunification Democratic Party, the Party was 
banned and Kim Dae-jung was sentenced to the death penalty under the charges of 
conspiring the Gwangjoo democratic uprising in 1980.  
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initiated because of personal interests. Thus, mergers between the 
ideologically different parties become more frequent after the 1986 
democratization. Below is a party system development in South Korea 
from 1945 to early 2016. 
 
 
[Figure 6, Party System Development in South Korea here. See Appendix 
B South Korea]21 
 
 From the top left-hand corner in figure 6, we have two nationalist 
parties, The Korean National Party (KNP) under the leadership of Kim 
ku22 and the Korean Democratic Party formed by Song Jin-woo.23 To the 
center-left, there are two parties: The Committee for the Preparation of 
Korean Independence (CPKI) led by Yu Woon-hyung and the People’s 
Labour Party founded by Kim Byung-ro. Lastly, to right most side, there 
is the Workers Party of South Korea (WPSK). The variety of parties 
present a wide ideological spectrum in a liberated Korea that was as diverse 
as a full democracy.24 However, intensified conflicts involving political 
                                                      
21 Party System Development in South Korea (1948-2016). Author’s own compilation 
based on following information: Heike Hermanns, 2009, “Political Parties in South 
Korea and Taiwan after Twenty Years of Democratization, Inha Journal of International 
Studies, pp. 205-224; Park Jin. 1990, “Poitical Change in South Korea: The Challenge 
of the Conservative Alliance,” Asian Survey, University of California Press, pp. 1154-
1168; David I. Steinberg, “The Evolution of the Political Party System and the Future of 
Party Politics in the Republic of Korea, 
https://apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/turningpoint/CH7.pdf. 
22 Kim ku was one of many leaders of the Korean independence movement under 
Japanese occupation. Kim led the most ultra-nationalistic faction of the movement 
and had often crashes with the communist factions. Kim Ku served as a Premier of 
the Korean Provincial Government in Shanghai.  
23 Song Jin-woo was a Korean journalist, politician, and independence activists.  
24 The Worker’s Party of South Korea (WPSK) was under a leadership of Park Hun-
young a long time Korean Communist and Independence activist. The People’s 
Congress (formally known as the Preparation of National Independence) was 
organized group led by Yu-yoon-hyung a center-left national independence activist. 
The National Alliance for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence (NARRKI) 
was led by Rhee Sueng-man, who had a deep connection to the U.S. 
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assassinations from each group created more chaos than stability. Rhee 
Syng-man eliminated his political rivals.25 The Korean Nationalist Party 
disbanded while some members from the Korean Democratic Party were 
merged into the Liberal Party of Rhee Syng-man by late 1948. The CPKI 
was scattered and went underground while the SKWP also went into hiding 
only resurfaced during the Korean War.  
 With the elimination of majority of his critics, Rhee Syng-man 
established the Liberal Party and became the president of the first Republic 
of Korea in 1948. Then systematically, Rhee created an anti-communist 
state with the help of the USAGIK. Majority of the former nationalist 
independence activists with a communist background were eliminated and 
replaced by former Korean collaborators of Japan. By 1951, Liberal Party 
under the authoritarian rule of Rhee Syngman consolidated due to the event 
of the Korean War (1950-1953).  
 After more than 10 years of Rhee’s authoritarian rule, his Liberal 
Party disintegrated, while the Democratic Party and the Democratic Justice 
Party merged and form the Democratic Party under the leadership of Yoon 
Bo-sun. This was the Second Republic with the first ever parliamentary 
system of government in South Korea.26 However, the Second Republic 
only existed for a short time because Lieutenant General Park Chung-hee 
toppled the Second Republic and installed the Third Republic through 
military coup d’état. Park made all political parties illegal until he ran for 
the presidency as a civilian. Park formed the Democratic Republican Party, 
which unified the opposition—the previous Democratic Justice Party and 
the Democratic People’s Party merged under the New Democratic Party. 
But eventually, under the Yushin Constitution of 1972, all political parties 
                                                      
25 Kim-ku and Yuh Woon-hyung were assassinated by the ultra-nationalists while 
Park Hun-young fled to North and later accused of treason by Kim Il-sung’s North 
Korea Worker’s Party and executed. 
26 Yoon Bo-sun became the president of South Korea and Chang-myun was voted to 
Prime Minister.  
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and activities became outlaw. Then the Yushin fall with the death of Park. 
Chun Doo-whan instigated another coup d’état and took control of the 
government.  
  In 1985 when martial law was lifted, the New Korea Democratic 
Party was formed. However, about a year later, the New Korea Democratic 
Party split into two and a group left the party to form the Unified 
Democratic Party. Then, over the issue of presidential nomination, the 
Unified Democratic Party was split and formed for Peace and Democracy. 
This divide among the democratic opposition gave victory to the 
Democratic Justice Party. However, the Democratic Justice Party merged 
with the New Republican Party because it was outnumbered in the 
National Assembly. This back-stage deal created the infamous ‘regional’ 
divide party system in South Korea. Those who supported Kim Young-
sam of the United Democratic Party (i.e., mostly from north and south 
Kyungsang province) supported this rightist party, while those who 
supported Kim Dae-jung of the Party for Peace and Democracy (i.e., 
mostly from the north and south of Cholla province) remained voting for 
the democratic opposition party. Seoul and the metropolitan Kyunggi 
region became swing states.  
 After the merger between the democratic opposition with the 
military authoritarian (conservative) party in 1990, more frequent mergers 
occurred in South Korea. In total, there were a total of seven mergers. As 
discussed, South Korea’s political party organizational continuity is lowest 
among the four countries. Political parties have not only changed their 
names but have performed numerous mergers across different political 
parties have rendered their organizational continuity. more than 10 
mergers performed across the ideologically different political parties in 
South Korea between 1986-2016. Based on this observation, party system 
institutionalization score of 1 is allocated for South Korea.  
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4.3 Political Rights, Civil Liberties, and Freedom and state-party 
 relationship in Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South Korea 
 
 This section discusses the importance of political rights and civil 
liberties in determining the level of party system institutionalization using 
the Freedom House Scores. It argues that a low average of freedom scores 
in each country indicates less regulations on party organizations. This 
means that party organizations and their activities are fully supported and 
encouraged by their political system.  
 






Japan (1998-2016) 1 1.89 








 Above is the average scores of political rights, civil liberties, and 
freedom across Japan, Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan from 1998 to 
2016. The scores are rated by the Freedom House in a scale from 1 to 7. 1 
is being the freest and 7 being the least free. Briefly, political rights 
measure the extend of free and fairness of electoral process, political 
pluralism (i.e., rights to organize different political parties or groups of 
their choice) and degree of participation (i.e., political choice free from 
dominant institutions such as military, foreign powers, and economic 
oligarchies), and functions of government (i.e., extent of official 
                                                      
27 Freedom in the World: [https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-
world-2018], under country reports section. 
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corruption). Civil liberties measure the extend of freedom of expression 
and belief, associational and organization rights (i.e., freedom of assembly, 
non-governmental organization, trade-union). 
 As shown, the average score for Japan and Taiwan’s political rights 
is within the range of 1. This means that elections are free and competitive 
since 1998 and political parties represent divers ideological views in both 
countries. Furthermore, freedom of expression is guaranteed in Japan and 
Taiwan (with a 1.89 and 1.7 respectively). Meanwhile, South Korea’s and 
the Philippines Political Right score is 1.5 and 2.8 respectively. Civil 
Liberties and freedom scores for South Korea and the Philippines are high 
as well. For example, the average Civil Liberties score for South Korea 
was 1.75 and 2.8 for the Philippines. This indicates that the political 
situation in the Philippines make elections and less competitive and free. 
The following are the Freedom House score for each countries and 
impactions of what they mean in relation to party to state relationships.  
 
 4.3.1 Japan 
 
 According to the Freedom House report from 1999 to 2016, 
elections in Japan are free and fair. In Japan, the people’s political choices 
are free from any dominant influence from powerful interest. There are 
also no legal barriers preventing ethnic and religious minorities from freely 
participating in the political process.  
 The Freedom House report for Japan suggest that Japan also has 
free and highly competitive media landscape. However, some control over 
the politically sensitive news continues by way of the government 
distribution of new through the Kisha Kurabu (press club).28 In recent 
                                                      
28  Traditionally, institutions such as government ministries and corporate 
organizations usually control and restrict news that are released so that the ministries 
and the corporates can control any critical news to them going out.  
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years, however, online media such as pod-casts have challenged the 
traditional media with political news websites having more aggressive 
reporting and analysis. Despite this, the Japanese government does not 
restrict these new. Freedom of assembly is also protected under the 
Japanese constitution. Protests, large and small, take place frequently. One 
particular example was the demonstrations against U.S. military presence 
in Okinawa in 2016, with tens of thousands of participants protesting after 
an American base worker was arrested in May for the murder of a local 
woman. Moreover, labour unions and non-government organizations 
(NGOs) are legally recognized and protected under the Law to Promote 
Specified Non-profit Activities and they remained active. Based on the 
observation of Japan, this study allocates a party system 
institutionalization score of 3 because its political freedom score is 1 from 
1999 to 2016.  
 
 4.3.2 Taiwan 
 
 Overall, the ratings for Taiwan’s political rights and civil liberties 
are low, averaging 1.4 and 1.7 respectively from 1999 to 2016. Taiwan’s 
constitution grants all citizens the right to vote. This also includes members 
of 16 indigenous tribes, who make up roughly 2 percent of the population. 
They are also allocated six seats in the Legislative Yuan are reserved for 
indigenous candidates elected by indigenous voters.  
 Moreover, Taiwan’s media reflects a diversity of views. It reports 
aggressively on government policies and corruption allegations, though 
many outlets display strong party affiliation in their coverage. In recent 
years, Taiwan’s argument has resisted proposed mergers that would have 
placed important media outlets in the hands of businessmen with 
significant ties to China. This enabled the Taiwanese press to report freely 
on the 2016 election.  
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 In addition, although Taiwan’s Assembly and Parade Act of 1998 
enabled authorities to prosecute protestors who fail to obtain a permit or 
follow orders to disperse, freedom of assembly in Taiwan is largely 
respected. Meanwhile, all civil organizations in Taiwan must register with 
the government, though registration is freely granted. Nongovernmental 
organizations typically operate without harassment. Trade unions are 
independent, and most workers enjoy freedom of association though the 
government strictly regulates the right to strike. This study allocates party 
system institutionalization score of 1 to Taiwan because its average 
political freedom score is closer to 1 from 1999 to 2016.  
 
 4.3.3 The Philippines 
 
The Republic of Philippines has received an increasing trend on political 
right and civil liberty ratings due to thousands of extrajudicial killings 
carried out as part of president Rodrigo Duterte’s war on drug. 
Assassinations and threats against civil society activists are also part of the 
reason of this declining score.  
 While open and competitive, elections in the Philippines are 
typically marred by fraud, intimidation, and political violence, the 2016 
national elections were credible. Though there were incidents of election-
related violence, including a number of killings, these were fewer 
compared to previous election years. Other persistent problems included 
vote buying and media bias, which tends to favour wealthier candidates. 
Meanwhile, the country lacks a nationwide freedom of information law. 
However, in July 2016, Duterte issued an order establishing the country’s 
first Freedom of Information directive, though it only mandated public 
disclosure of the executive branch, and did not apply to the legislature or 
judiciary. Moreover, the government proposed a long list of requests that 
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would be exempt from public disclosure order based on the Freedom of 
Information Law. 
 The Philippine constitution provides for freedoms of expression 
and the press, with private media companies in the country considered as 
one of the most vibrant and outspoken in the region. However, the media 
contents are criticized as being more sensationalized rather than 
substantive. In the Philippines, one obstacle to press freedom is the 
Executive Order 608. The order invokes the National Security Clearance 
System and the Human Security Act to protect classified information and 
allow journalist to be tapped by government authorities on the account of 
suspicious behaviour such as involvement in terrorism. Another obstacle 
to press freedom in the country is the threat of ‘libel’, which considered a 
criminal offense that have been used frequently to shut criticism against 
public officials.  
 However, citizen activism and public discussion are robust, and 
demonstrations are common in the Philippines. But these demonstrations 
require permits and police sometimes use violence to disperse anti-
government protests. Meanwhile, assassination of civil society activist 
who oppose his policies, including his administration’s violent war on 
drugs have exacerbated the already dangerous atmosphere. Environmental 
activist, and labour activists were all murdered in recent years and their 
cases remain unsolved.  
 A party system institutionalization score of 2 is allocated to the 
Philippines as its average political freedom score is in between 2.9 from 
1999 to 2016. 
 
 4.3.4 South Korea 
 
 South Korea constitution of 1987 guarantee political pluralism, 
with multiple parties competing for power and succeeding one another in 
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government. However, dissolving some political parties in South Korea 
under the National Security Law reveals that leftist progressive ideology 
is unwelcome in the eyes of the political elites. The National Security Law 
still largely controls the individual as well as political groups. For example, 
listening to North Korean radio program, portraying positive image of 
North Korea or posting pro-North Korea message online are illegal under 
the National Security Law. This shows that strict government censorship 
remains in place with regards to North Korea and leftist progressive 
ideology. Authorities have deleted and persecuted tens of thousands of 
posts deemed to be pro-North, drawing accusations that the law’s broadly 
written provision are being used to suppress political expression.  
 The news media in South Korea are generally free and open. 
Newspaper are privately owned and report aggressively on government 
policies and allegation of official wrongdoings and corruption. However, 
some media outlets are heavily biased toward the conservative parties and 
journalists also face more defamation charges due to criticisms against the 
government with possible punishment of up to seven years in prison.  
 South Korean governments generally respects freedom of 
assembly and association, which are protected under the constitution. 
However, several legal provisions conflict with these principles, creating 
tensions between the police and protestors over the application of the law. 
For instance, the Law of Assembly and Demonstration prohibits activities 
that might cause social unrest, and police must be notified of all 
demonstrations. Local non-government organizations (NGOs) have 
alleged that police who mistreat demonstrators have not been penalized 
equally as with protestors. In general, human rights groups, social welfare 
organizations, and other NGOs are active and generally operate freely. The 
country’s independent labour unions advocate worker’s interest, 
organizing high-profile strikes and demonstrations that sometimes lead to 
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arrests. However, labour unions have diminished its influence over the 
years as the employment of temporary workers increases. 
 South Korea gets a party system institutionalization score of 2 
because its average political freedom score is 1.75 from 1999 to 2016.  
 
 However, readers may be alert with the thesis using The Freedom 
House scores as the measure for stat-to-party relationship as it can be 
interpreted in different ways. For example, while high score means that 
people express their opinion and show their voting intentions in more 
unrestricted ways, but it does not necessarily indicate that people embrace 
institutionalized party system. Therefore, this thesis is not free from 
criticism that indicators like state funding of party and party laws could be 
better indicators for state-to-party-relationships.  
 However, both state party funding and party laws have been 
adopted and institutionalized in all four countries, with the Philippines 
most recently passed law to state funding of the political parties in 2012 
(Austin and Tjernstorm, 2003). All four countries have written law that 
guarantee freedom of assembly and the formation of political parties. 
Nevertheless, in South Korea, as mentioned previously, the freedom of 
assembly and freedom of speech are not fully guaranteed. They are often 
met with crackdown both from the opposition groups and sometimes by 
the government. For example, on December 2014, in the small city of Iksan, 
South Korea, an 18-year-old high school student detonated a homemade 
acid bomb during a talk by Korean born-American author Shiin Eun-mi 
and activist Hwang Sung. The student belongs to a right-wing online club 
along with other conservative groups, demanded prosecution of Shin under 
South Korea’s National Security Law—based on comments she made 
about North Korea during her book tour, which they viewed as praise for 
the regime.  
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 Such crackdown is not limited to individuals. On December 19, the 
South Korean Constitutional Court voted eight to one in favour of 
dissolving the left-wing Unified Progressive Party (UPP) and expelling all 
five UPP representatives from the National Assembly on the basis that the 
UPP posed a “substantial threat” to South Korea’s democratic order and 
had a hidden motive to install North Korean-style socialism in the country. 
The court’s disbanding the UPP is the culmination in a series of state 
actions against the party, on charges of plotting a violent insurrection and 
violating the National Security Law.  
 In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte has revoked the 
amnesty granted to opposition senator Antonia Trillanes IV by signing the 
Proclamation No. 572, declaring Trillane’s amnesty “void abinito.” 
Senator Antonia Trillanes was one of the most vocal critics of president 
Duterte and the revocation of the amnesty came only after the arrest of 
Senator Leila de Lima, another fierce critic of Duterte (Elemia, 2018). 
Such extend measures to suppress the oppositions in the Philippines and 
South Korea often leads individuals as well as the political groups to be 
‘self-conscious’ of their limitations, severely depriving social 
diversification. 
 Therefore, this thesis argues that Freedom House scores do contrast 
the party-to-state relations across Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South 
Korea better than party laws and party funding.  
 
4.4  Voter support in Japan, Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan 
 
 Previous sections in this chapter have pointed that party system 
institutionalization level is higher in Japan and Taiwan while it is lower in 
the Philippines and South Korea. This section of the chapter examines the 
electoral volatility scores from 1986 to 2016 across the four countries. The 
electoral volatility measures the extent to ‘voters’ propensities to transfer 
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votes between parties’ (Pendersen, 1979:4). In addition, electoral volatility 
is an indication of party system changes as well as of changes in the 
behaviour of voters.  
 This study followed Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) measure of 
electoral volatility to examine Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South 
Korea’s electoral volatility in their legislative elections from 1986 to 2016. 
Electoral volatility is calculated by taking the sum of the net change in the 
percentage of votes gained or lost by each party from one election to the 
next, divided by two. A score of 100 signifies that the set of parties winning 
votes is completely different from one election to the next. A score of 0 
means the same percentage of votes across two different elections. The 
higher the volatility score the less stable the pattern of party competition.  
 Below is the table presenting the volatility scores for Japan, Taiwan, 
Philippines, South Korea for comparative purposes. This study divide the 
four countries’ volatility scores into three different periods: (a) from 1986-
1996; (b) from 1996-2006; and (c) 2006-2016. This is to compare the 
changes in the electoral volatility level over time.  
 
 Table 5: Electoral volatility across Japan, Philippines, South  Korea, and 
 Taiwan (1986-2016). 
Country / 
Year 
1986-1996 1996-2006 2006-2016 Average 
Japan  16.1 15.7 17.6 16.5 
Taiwan 11.1 12.2 8.8 10.7 
Philippines 36.7 21.2 16.9 24.9 
South Korea29 27.6 36.0 31.7 31.8 
                                                      
29 This study measures party change according to Harmel and Janda (1994). Harmel 
and Janda argue that party change occurs when changes of leadership, changes of 
dominant faction, and or an external stimulus for change occurs (i.e., election loss). 
It is evident, based on my observation of the South Korea’s 1984 to the most current 
legislative elections, that when political party changes their party names, parties also 
undergo leadership as well as factional changes. Therefore, this study argues that 
frequent names changes in the South Korea’s party organization should reflect the 
high electoral volatility score.  
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(Source: Author’s own calculation using the Pedersen Index. Legislative election data for 
each country have been gathered from following websites: 
http://archive.ipu.org/parline/reports/2161_B.htm;https://www.cec.gov.tw/;http://www.
nec.go.kr/portal/main.do. For the Philippines legislative election data, this study relied on 
information provided by the Comparative Study of Electoral systems (CSES). [URL:] 
http://www.cses.org/datacenter/download.htm. 
 
 Two things stand out in table 3 above. First there is noticeable 
difference in the percentage of vote volatility across the four countries. On 
the one hand, the average volatility rate for Japan and Taiwan from 1986 
to 2016 are low are low. Both Japan and Taiwan’s score fall below 20 
percent, meaning that shift of the vote from one party to another had been 
less than 20 percent. In fact, Japan and Taiwan’s electoral volatility show 
decreasing trend over time suggesting that party system has consolidated 
over time.  
 On the other hand, the Philippines and South Korea’s electoral 
volatility are higher than Japan and Taiwan confirming that party systems 
are not stable. However, the Philippines electoral volatility rate show signs 
of improvement. From 1986, the trend show improvements in voters 
refraining from shifting their votes from one party to another. South Korea, 
nevertheless, show no sign of improvements in stabilization of its party 
system.  
 4.4.1 Electoral volatility in Japan: 1986 to 2016 
 
 Party politics in Japan has witnessed both the change and 
continuity. A dramatic change to Japan’s party system came from the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) rising to challenge the might of the LDP 
during the 2000s; and in 2009 took power from the LDP by winning the 
Shugi-in elections. However, the DPJ was voted out in 2012 by landslide 
defeat and the LDP again assumed power, showing the party’s resilience. 
In fact, the LDP has been ruling Japanese politics from 1955 to 2016, only 
briefly out of power for 3 years. This is reflected in the stability in electoral 
volatility. Based on the observation, this study allocates party system 
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institutionalization score of 2 to Japan since its average electoral volatility 
score from 1986 to 2016 falls within 15 to 25 range.  
 
 4.4.2 Electoral Volatility in Taiwan: 1986 to 2016 
 
  Legislative Yuan elections from 1986 to 2016 show Taiwan’s 
electoral volatility has been the lowest among four countries. Interestingly, 
Taiwan’s low electoral volatility was achieved under a single non-
transferable voting system (SNTV) before the 2005 reform.30 Since 1995, 
the volatility rate has remained around ten points or less for each 
Legislative Yuan elections, with the exceptional the 2001 election showing 
most stabilized party system among the four countries. Based on this, a 
score of 3 is allocated to Taiwan since its electoral volatility rate falls 
between 0 to 15.  
  
 4.4.3 Electoral Volatility in the Philippines: 1986 to 2016 
 
 The electoral volatility in the Philippines for the post 1986 House 
of Representative elections show higher rate of volatility. This high 
volatility rates indicate that individual parties tend to vary from one 
election to the other and voters tend to change the party they vote fore in a 
greater rate than party systems in Japan and Taiwan. A score of 2 is 
allocated to the Philippines since its average electoral volatility score is 




                                                      
30  SNTV creates strong incentives to cultivate a personal vote and produces 
uncertainty in party nomination strategies, which likely to weaken the electoral 
cohesiveness of political parties and increase electoral volatility (Ramseyer and 
Rosenbluth, 1993; Bawn, Cox, Rosenbluth, 1999).  
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 4.4.4 Electoral volatility in South Korea: 1986 to 2016 
  
 The National Assembly elections from 1986 to 2016 in South 
Korea show consistent electoral volatility rates. Unlike Japan, Taiwan, and 
the Philippines, the rate of electoral volatility has been increasing and has 
reached 31.7 percent. This indicates that in South Korea, there is frequent 
party ruptures, mergers, and name changes all contribute negatively 
towards institutionalization of party system in South Korea. South Korea 
receives the lowest party system institutionalization score of 1 because its 
volatility rate falls between 25 to N>25 range.  
 
4.5 Summary of the Chapter 
 
 By allocating the score from 1 to 3 for each dimension of Randall 
and Svåsand, this study is now able to compare and contrast the levels of 
party system institutionalization by combining the scores of all four 
dimensions.  
 













Japan 3 2 3 2 1
0 
Taiwan 3 3 2 3 1
1 
Philippines 2 1 1 2 6 
South Korea 1 1 1 1 4 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on the discussion of the four dimensions in 
this chapter.  
  
 According to the table 4 above, Taiwan seem to have the highest 
institutionalized party system among the four countries with the score of 
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11. Next is Japan, with a combined score of 10. Then, the Philippines with 
a total score of 6. South Korea’s party system is the weakest among the 
other countries with the score of 4.  
  
 Comparison made in this chapter may seem to have focused too 
much emphasis on the difference between the two groupings (i.e., Japan-
Taiwan versus the Philippines and South Korea). Thus, it may seem that 
the thesis has neglected the difference within the groupings—Japan versus 
Taiwan for example. Readers may point to such factors like ‘frequency of 
social movements’ within Japan and Taiwan to argue that there are also 
within groups differences among the four countries. While this is true, 
however, this thesis argues that the difference in such factor in Japan and 
Taiwan are not high enough to warrant such concerns. While political 
movements are higher in Taiwan compare to Japan, Taiwan’s social 
movements are mostly party-based and actually provides ground for party 
development rather than social movements in South Korea (Lee, 2014). 
Lee finds that Taiwan’s party-based authoritarianism has provided grounds 
for party development while South Korea’s personal dictatorship was 
inimical to party development but engendered a contentious social 
movement sectors.  
 In sum, while social movements both occur in Taiwan and South 
Korea and that number of social movements in Taiwan is higher in number 
than in Japan, the social movements themselves do affect less party 
organization and inter-party interactions. Thus, when you consider the 
impact of ‘social movement’ on the party organizations and their inter-
party interactions over time, social movements do not bring significant 
variation to Taiwan’s party organization and their inter-party interactions. 
Thus, within group difference among Japan and Taiwan remain less even 
after considering ‘social movement’.  
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 The difference between the Philippines and South Korea may also 
seem obvious. For example, a quote from Croissant and Völkel (2012) 
states that “it seems that Korean democracy is quite capable of 
compensating for shortcomings of party system, as vibrant civil society 
provides alternative opportunities for political participation and civic 
engagement.” The vibrant civil society do provide alternative opportunities 
for political participation in South Korea and to certain extent in the 
Philippines. In fact, according to Lee’s observation, the directory of South 
Korean NGO’s (otherwise known as civil society) states that most civil 
organizations are membership based, with at least 10,000 members, and 
have an average of 8.5 full time staff members. Cross referencing Lee’s 
findings to the World Value Survey also suggest that South Korea’s civil 
groups are more membership based. About 52 percent of Korean citizens 
responded that they hold membership in at least one civic organization 
(World Value Survey, 2010).  
 In fact, the World Value Survey from 1981 to 2010 show that 
Korean’s trust in political parties and national assembly has declined as 
time passed, leading to a trend of declination in the total average as well. 
However, the changes of the levels of people’s trust in social institutions 
such as non-governmental organization (NGO) has grown.  
 What does this mean for party organization in South Korea? Based 
on the findings by the World Value Survey, one can also argue that such 
higher number of civil society do actually debilitate the function of party 
organizations and lessen the chances of the people represent their interests 
through party organizations. Perhaps, people may get their interest 
represented faster by by-passing the official channels that are more slower 
and sometimes inefficient. Therefore, for the case of South Korea and the 
Philippines, their lower quality of democracy is reflected on the lower level 









 The previous chapter revealed how party systems in Japan and 
Taiwan are highly institutionalized. In particular, Taiwan has the highest 
party system institutionalization level (11) followed by Japan (10). Given 
these results, this chapter discusses the reasons behind the high 
institutionalization of the party systems in both countries based on the 
following factors: social cleavage, party factionalism, and democratic 
transition.  
First is social cleavage. Here, the focus is in explaining the 
following two areas: (a) how social cleavages came about and created a 
deep divide in Japan and Taiwan; and (b) how social groups organized 
around those divisions over time. In the second, this thesis explores how 
institutionalized factions in Japan and Taiwan have helped provide a 
modus operandi in organizing party competition using the cases of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan and the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) in Taiwan. I explore how institutionalized factions in the LDP 
in Japan and DPP in Taiwan have helped parties develop clear party 
strategies to compete against more organized parties such as Japan’s 
Socialist Party (JSP) and Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT). The LDP was able 
to politicize the existing rural-urban socio-economic cleavage to an 
ideological divide over the US and Japan security treaty and constitutional 
revision in the 1960s to early 1980s. Meanwhile, the DPP has successfully 
politicized the underlying ethnic cleavage to the national identity cleavage.  
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Lastly, I explore how mode of democratic transition helped 
political institutions to continue in post-transition period, thus helping the 
party systems in Japan and Taiwan to reach institutionalization.  
 
5.1  Social Cleavage in Japan and Taiwan  
 
 This section explains how salient social cleavages in Japan and 
Taiwan have organized political parties and their interactions in 
contemporary history. The thesis will demonstrate how social cleavages in 
Japan and Taiwan came about during Japan and Taiwan’s critical moments 
in history and then elaborate how these social cleavages progressed into 
political representations.  
 
 5.1.1 Japan’s rural-urban divide  
 
 The evolution of Japan’s social cleavage was evident throughout 
its political history. After the overthrow of the Tokugawa Bakufu (1603-
1868), the Meiji Restoration of 1868 brought significant changes in the 
social stratification in Japan. These included the abolition of the han 
system, 31  the equalization of classes, and the establishment of the 
conscripted army. The Meiji Restoration period also eliminated the 
hereditary military class known as the Samurai. After the overthrow of the 
Tokugawa Shogunate, the samurai working for the daimyos (warlords) lost 
                                                      
31 The Han in Japanese history is fief controlled by a Daimyo, or a territorial lord, 
during the Tokugawa period (1603-1868). 
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their jobs.32 This led the Meiji government to take gradual steps that would 
reintegrate the unemployed samurais.33  
 With the growing dissatisfaction of the former Samurai class, the 
Meiji government devised a program known officially as the “Shizoku 
Jusan” (literally the Samurai Rehabilitation, here after Rehabilitation 
Policy). It was implemented in December 1871 with the promulgation of 
the commercial law. According to Harootunian (1960), this Rehabilitation 
Policy, was implemented to resolve the unemployment issues of the former 
Samurais and to promote economic development. Based on the memoirs 
of Meiji government leaders such as Iwakura, Okubo, and Kido, the 
rehabilitation policy was not limited to protecting only the former 
Samurais, but could also be considered as another way for the government 
to accumulate capital (Harootunian, 1960; see also Smith, 1955).  
 The impact of such policy encouraged Samurai immigration to 
reclaim new land areas. Such rehabilitation also established several 
branches of Japan’s national bank that would safeguard investments of the 
Samurai class. With these banks, it set up the machinery to loan out money 
for the samurais to use in agriculture, industrial, and commercial 
enterprises. These three areas eventually served as the backbone of Japan’s 
industrial development, eventually resulting in its socio-political divide.34 
 In retrospect, the Meiji Restoration brought fundamental changes 
to class stratification as a result of its rehabilitation policy. Since it 
stimulated the growth of commerce, agriculture, and financial institutions, 
                                                      
32 For detailed information regarding social conditions Samurai’s have faced six years 
after the Meiji Restoration, see Sakeda Matsatoshi and Goerge Akita, 1986., The 
Samurai Dis-established: Abe Iwane and His Stipend. Monumenta nipponica, Vol.41. 
No. 3 (Autumn, 1986), pp. 299-330.  
33 Many of those who lost their job overnight wondered around the country causing 
acute social problems. 33  The uprisings and armed revolts did not succeed in 
overthrowing the Meiji government. 
34 For detailed accounts of the rehabilitation and its influence on the division of 
labour, see Harr D. Harootunian., 1960., The Economic Rehabilitation of the Samurai 
in the Early Meiji Period., The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4 pp. 433-444.  
 122 
the policy created a division of labor in these economic areas. Social 
divisions also emerged under the Meiji government as taxes were 
implemented under the Rehabilitation policy. In particular, small rural 
businesses and farmers were heavily taxed (Rieger, 2017). This led to the 
deep urban-rural divide in Japanese society under the Meiji government. It 
eventually produced labor segregation such as the urban-industrial divide 
and the rural-agricultural divisions. This development during the Meiji 
Restoration can be considered as the start of the organization of party 
competition in modern Japan.  
 Since then, such socio-economic cleavage has long considered a 
‘core division’ in Japanese society. As a result, political parties have 
exploited this to organize themselves in politics. The Jiyu Minken Undo 
(Freedom and People’s Rights Movement) represented the interests of 
small business owners and farmers in the rural areas, which also became 
the first political movement opposing the Meiji government. The Jiyu 
Minken Undo gradually transformed into an opposition political party—
the Jiyuto (Liberal Party) (Jansen, 2002). A year later, another liberal party, 
the Rikken Kaishinto (Constitutional Reform Party) was established to 
compete with the Jiyuto party and to represent the interest of those urban 
industrialists 
 Another party was also formed to compete against the Jiyuto and 
the Kaishinto. The hard-core supporters of the Meiji government organized 
the Tesiseito (literally means the ‘Imperialists’) Party that were mostly 
comprised of n members of Satsuma and Chosu clans. The Teiseito party 
emphasized the divine right of the emperor, which according to Kawakami 
(1903), “seems to have endeavored to weaken the democratic movement” 
(Clement, 1912:671-673). During the Meiji period, it was mainly 
considered as a conservative party.  
 In sum, the Rehabilitation policies implemented from 1871 to 1880 
gave birth to a modern Japan. With this modernization came a division of 
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labor, which then led to the establishment of various political 
representations in Japan. The country’s two major parties underwent re-
organization during the Taisho era (1912-1926). In the succeeding years, 
the Jiyuto, under Ito Hirobumi, changed its name and reorganized under 
the name of Rikken Seiyukai, while the Kaishinto was dissolved and was 
absorbed into the Rikken Seiyukai. The two parties become one under new 
name Rikken Seiyuka. Meanwhile, the Teiseito Party was also dissolved. 
In 1927, the merger between the old Meiji oligarchs (mainly from the 
Teseito Party) and some minor parties have created Minseito to oppose 
Rikken Seiyukai’s dominance in the Diet (Duus, 1968, pp. 231-235; 
Scalapino and Masumi, 1962, p. 262).   
 Aside from its socio-economic division during the Meiji 
Restoration, Japan also experienced ideological divide concerning security 
and defense issues. Such issues made an imprint on post-war electoral 
politics.  
 The 1955 system reflected the divergent positions of Japan’s main 
political parties. The leftist parties (JCP and JSP) opposed the expansion 
of the Emperor’s political power, while also questioning the legitimacy of 
the Self Defense Force (SDF). These leftist parties fought proposals to 
revise Article 9 of the Constitution, which forbids Japan to maintain 
standing military forces or to engage in wars to settle international disputes. 
In addition, the leftist camp opposed the United States-Japan Security 
Treaty (Scalapino and Masumi, 1962). On the contrary, the LDP remained 
strongly in favor of revising the Constitution to empower the Emperor and 
agreed to lift the constraints on Japan’s military roles.  
 By the middle of 1976, the multi-member district electoral system 
was established in Japan. However, the security and defense issue quickly 
lost its salience because such type of electoral system emphasized more on 
the local issues connected with regional or group interests (Flanagan et al., 
1991, pp. 290-291).  
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  However, the developments in the international community 
eventually reignited the debate over security and defense. According to 
Richard Samuels (2007), the Yoshida Doctrine was forged in the context 
of increasing complexity and uncertainties in the post-Cold War period. 
This led Japanese opinion leaders to debate over the appropriate contours 
of a new security strategy. At the same time that this debate took place, 
there were electoral reforms that occurred in 1994. According to Samuels 
(2007) both the international developments and the electoral reforms 
enabled political parties to make issue-based appeals to the Japanese voters. 
The security and defense issue once again became a salient factor that 
structured voters’ choice under the new electoral system. This contributed 
to a long-term electoral realignment around the two dominant parties in 
Japan.  
  It is interesting to note how the competing platforms of pre-war 
political parties in Japan are similar to those of the post-war parties that 
carried on to the 1955 system. Prior to the war, the Jiyuto Party laid down 
important principles aimed at the full extension and permanent 
preservation of the freedom and rights of the people; declared that all men 
ought to be equal; and that adapting a constitutional government was best 
for Japan (Uyehara, 1910: 89). Meanwhile, the Kaishinto Party platform 
sought to maintain the dignity of the imperial throne, as well as promote 
the happiness of the people. Lastly, the Teiseito party also pledged to 
support Japanese Imperialism and emphasized the divine right of the 
emperor. In comparison, post-war political parties also promote similar 
competing platforms during the 1955 system. Leftist parties such as the 
JCP and the JSP opposed the expansion of the political power of the 
Emperor (similar to the Jiyuto), while also questioning the legitimacy of 
the Self Defense Force (SDF). Meanwhile, the LDP remained strongly in 
favor of revising the Constitution to empower the Emperor (similar to the 
Teiseito and Kaishinto party) and to lift the limits of Japan’s military roles. 
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The parallelism is quite evident as if the pre-war parties have made a 
comeback only to be reorganized under different party names.  
 
 5.1.2 Taiwan’s National Identity Conflict  
 
 Taiwan presents a robust case of social cleavage that shapes its 
party system. It highlights a persistent ethnic divide that led to the 
politicization of its national identity promoted by various political 
organizations. This ethnic divide focuses on the local Taiwanese versus the 
migrant Chinese who arrived with the KMT from mainland China. 
Taiwan’s ethnicity issue has since became a focal point of the political 
conflict between its dominant parties.  
 The evolution of Taiwan’s identity cleavage began when the island 
became a part of Japan through the Treaty of Shimonoseki signed between 
China and Japan on April 17, 1895. The defeated Qing Dynasty in 
mainland China ceded the Taiwanese Island to Japan. The Japanese 
government spent considerable portion of its budget to make Taiwan a 
first-class military base for its mission to conquer Southeast Asia (Worden 
and Meditz, 2005; Amsden, 1979). An elaborated network of railways, 
motor roads, radio communications, sea harbors, and air-fields were 
installed.  
 During its occupation, Japan not only made economic reforms, but 
also carried out institutional changes in Taiwan. Barclay (1954) and Myers 
and Ching (1964) pointed to the critical role played by the Japanese in the 
education sector in Taiwan. The colonial government implemented an 
assimilation policy that has successfully turned the aborigines into loyal 
supporters of Japanese imperialism. However, such ‘Japanization policy’ 
made little progress in transforming the minds of the native Taiwanese 
with Chinese ancestry.  
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 With Japan’s surrender in August 1945, Taiwan returned back to 
mainland China. However, Taiwan enjoyed economic growth and favored 
its modernization under the Japanese over the Chinese government. Chu 
and Lin (2001) argued that Taiwan’s distinct experiences in nation 
building under the Japanese occupation triggered the search for a 
Taiwanese identity (pp.104-111).  
 However, the Kuomintang government that escaped to Taiwan 
from China impeded the development of this ‘shared identity’ among the 
Taiwanese. It deliberately favored mainlanders and Banshan (Hal-
Mountaineers)35 over Taiwanese residents in assigning government posts 
vacated by the Japanese. This resulted in widespread resentment among 
the local Taiwanese that led to an anti-government uprising in February 28, 
1947. However, the Kuomintang violently suppressed the revolt, which 
became a brutal reminder of the common sorrow shared among the 
Taiwanese people. The incident prompted Taiwan to organize an 
independence movement separating itself from mainland China, which has 
since dominated Taiwanese politics.  
Both the memories of the February 28th incident and the systematic 
exclusion of the local Taiwanese elites in government resulted in the ethnic 
tensions in Taiwan. The island eventually experienced soft-
authoritarianism under the revolutionary government of the Kuomintang. 
Headed by Chiang Ching-kuo the son of Kuomintang’s founding leader 
Chiang Kai-shek, the Taiwanese government led the island’s 
modernization prior to its democratic transition.  
It was during this modernization period that the Tangwai (literally, 
outside the party) political movement began to flourish. It mainly opposed 
the KMT’s soft-authoritarianism. The Tangwai consisted of different 
groups that were united to push for the democratization and self-
                                                      
35 Banshans were the Taiwanese natives who had spent the war years in China, 
recruited by the Nationalist government.  
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determination of Taiwan. It attracted large local supporters that eventually 
compelled the KMT to lift its decade-long ban against political parties. In 
1986, the Tangwai officially launched the Democratic Progressive Party 
with the promise of a democratic and independent Taiwan (see for example 
Chu and Lin, 2001: 11-13; Shih and Chen, 2010).  
 The DPP largely exploited public sentiments against the KMT and 
used the existing ethnic divide between the local Taiwanese and the 
immigrants from mainland China. It promoted the party as a political 
organization that pushed for Taiwan’s independence and advocated a 
nationalist-democratic ideology. Meanwhile, the KMT promoted the 
reunification of Taiwan with mainland China. This national identity divide 
has since resulted in a long-standing political conflict that dominated the 
party system in Taiwan (Rigger, 1999; Wong, 2003; Zhong, 2016).  
Since the KMT’s rule of Taiwan in 1945, the struggle for a separate 
Taiwanese identity began under its authoritarian system. When martial law 
was lifted in 1987 and the process of democratization followed, the 
Taiwanese people intensified its pursuit of their identity (Rigger, 1999). 
The contentious debate about who can be considered as “Taiwanese” has 
continuously influenced voting behavior and the prospects of democratic 
consolidation in Taiwan. Consequently, the ‘Taiwanese national identity’ 
has been a source of debate between the KMT and the DPP, which they 
mainly base their party-lines in electoral competition.  
 
 Summary: Social Cleavage in Japan and Taiwan 
 
 Social cleavages are instrumental in mobilizing political groups in 
Japan and Taiwan. These gave clarity to the competing platforms of 
political parties and intensified party competition in both countries. As a 
result, party systems in Japan and Taiwan became more institutionalized 
given their long-standing social cleavages. 
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 In Japan’s case, the ‘Rehabilitation Plan’ during the Meiji 
Restoration, gave rise to different labor forces and ultimately led to an 
‘urban-rural’ cleavage. Such socio-economic divide led to intense political 
competition between the Jiyuto and Kaishinto parties, which eventually 
ceased during the Pacific war after the Japanese military government 
disbanded all political parties. However, these two vanguards of liberalism 
merged together to counter the political elites that supported the wartime 
government. Thus, a new division within the national Parliament (called 
the I.R.A.A) was comprised of those that backed Japan’s war efforts and 
those that opposed it. Meanwhile, post-war political party system in Japan 
revived the old urban-to-rural political divide. The people who supported 
the conservative bloc (Liberal Democratic Party) came mostly from the 
rural areas, while those who favored the progressive bloc (Social 
Democratic Party of Japan, Communist Party of Japan) mostly came from 
the urban areas.  
 In Taiwan’s case, the ethnic tension that fueled political divisions 
over national identity started when the island returned to China after the 
Japanese occupation. The economic development policy carried out by the 
Japanese were deemed more favorable compared to the KMT-led 
Nationalist government of China implemented in Taiwan. Moreover, the 
KMT prevented local Taiwanese to participate in national elections and to 
take high positions in the government. Because of this, resentment against 
the originally mainland Chinese government grew among the local 
Taiwanese. 
 Eventually, Taiwan’s soft-authoritarian government resulted in the 
creation of opposition movements against the KMT rule. The Tangwai 
movement gained momentum during the 1980s and eventually launched 
the Democratic Progressive party (DPP). It began challenging the KMT in 
the national legislature of Taiwan (the Legislative Yuan, and organized its 
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party-line on the ethnic tension and national identity issue. The DPP 
eventually became a formidable opposition party in Taiwan’s party system.  
 
5.2  Party Factionalism in Japan and Taiwan  
 
 The existence of social cleavages in Japan and Taiwan enabled 
their major parties to politicize them. In particular, the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) of Japan and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of 
Taiwan employed such social cleavages as the basis of establishing their 
political organizations. During their organizational development, party 
factions occurred but were institutionalized. This facilitated better 
functionality and strong consensus in Japan’s LDP and Taiwan’s DPP that 
influenced the institutionalization of their party systems. 
   
 5.2.1  Institutionalized factions in Japan: The LDP 
 
 In terms of their history, political parties in Japan have several 
experiences of formations, mergers, dissolution, or regroupings. For 
example, the reunification of the Right and Left Socialists Parties in 
October 1955 immediately followed the merger of the conservatives under 
the banner of the new Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Meanwhile, 
factions are more enduring, which provided a backbone for mergers and 
regroupings for the ‘conservative’ and the ‘progressive’ camps (Totten and 
Kawakami, 1965; Schmidt, 2011). Factionalism in Japan determined the 
post 1945 party system by grouping parties in these two opposing camps 
that enabled them to become cohesive units.  
 Party factions within major parties in Japan greatly vary. While the 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and the Clean Government party 
(Komeito) have strictly prevented factionalism, JSP carries different 
political beliefs ranging from the Marxist to social democratic ideologies 
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(Totten and Masumi, 1966; Stockwin, 2000:213-220). The Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ), which emerged as the largest opposition party in the 
mid-1990s, was also divided into several factions, each headed by a senior 
faction leader. However, as Itagaki (2008) states, DPJ factions are more 
“loose” than the LDP factions.  
 In the case of the LDP, there were several factions operating within 
the party. Studies by Ike (1972); Fukui (1978); Shiratori (1988); and 
Kohno (1997) all confirmed that there were two informally organized 
groups within the LDP: Zoku (parliamentarian factions) and habatsu 
(personalized factions), which eventually became institutionalized within 
the LDP. The parliamentarian faction played a central role--- formulating 
policies, screening and approving legal bills and executive measures, and 
ensuring intra-LDP organs were reflected in government policy (Kollner, 
2005:2). Meanwhile, the personalized factions managed the party.  
 These two factions within the LDP came from different party 
realignments and mergers between the Liberal Party and the Democratic 
Party. The union between the two parties have produced eight leadership 
groups retaining their separate memberships. To illustrate the extensive 
groups of factions within the LDP, a schematic diagram of the LDP 
factions from the period of 1955-2004 is presented below. In this diagram, 
the names of each faction leaders are mentioned indicating a separate 
faction. Arrows indicate lineal descent from one leadership to the next. 
Interestingly, some factions have a succession of leaders that survived 





[Figure 7, Institutionalized party faction in the LDP from 1945-2010 here. 
See Appendix B_1 Japan]36 
 
 Based on the diagram above, the succession of leadership in the 
LDP factions has been well documented. For example, Kochi Kai, which 
was established in 1957, traces its original leaders to former Prime 
Minister Hayato Ikeda. The Kochi Kai faction was established originally 
by Shigeru Yoshida,37 succeeded by Hayato Ikeda, Shigesaburo Maeo, 
Masayoshi Ohira, Zenko Suzuki, Kiichi Miyazawa, Koichi Kato to Shinzo 
Abe. During its reign as the most powerful faction of the LDP, the Kochi 
Kai produced four prime ministers and several lawmakers in Japan. Its 
stability made it as the third-largest LDP faction apart from the current 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who is from the Seiwa faction.   
 However, not all succession of leadership was systemized. The 
dissolution of the LDP’s Kishi faction in 1962 is a good example, which 
resulted in the creation of new factions headed successively by Fukuda, 
Kawashima, and Fujiyama. Furthermore, the death of Ono Banboku 
resulted in the split of another LDP faction Kakuseikai, which created the 
Murakami and Funada factions. Both groups, however, have disappeared 
soon after. 
After 2009, the LDP has seven factions. One faction is the Heisei 
Kenkyuaki (Heisei Research Council), managed by Nunkaga Fukushiro. 
                                                      
36 Institutionalized party factions in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP): 1945 to 
2010. Sources: Author’s own compilation based on following readings: Köllner, 
2004, “Factionalism in Japanese political parties revisited or How do factions in the 
LDP and DPJ differ?,” Japan Forum (16):1.pp. 87-109; Köllner, 2005, “The origins, 
functions, and consequences of factions in dominant parties: The case of the Japanese 
LDP,” presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions’ workshop on dominant parties and 
democracies; Stockwin, 1989, “Factionalism in Japanese Political Parties,” Japan 
Forum (1)2: 161-171. 
37 Shigeru Yoshida (1878-1967) was a Japanese diplomat and politician who served 
as Prime Minister of Japan from 1946 to 1947 and from 1948 to 1952. He was one of 
the longest serving Prime Minister in Japanese history.  
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This is the faction which traces its history back to former Prime Ministers 
Yoshida Shigeru, Sato Eisaku, and Tanaka’s lineage. Currently, the largest 
faction, Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyutai (Seiwa Policy Research Council) is 
managed by Machimura Nobutaka. The Seiwa faction traces its history 
back to former Prime Ministers Kishi Nobusuke and Fukuda, Mori, 
Koizumi Junichiro, Abe Shintaro, and Fukuda.  
In addition, one of the two mid-sized faction is the Kochikai. This 
faction traces its roots back to Prime Ministers Yoshida Shigeru, Ikeda, 
and Miyazawa. The other mid-sized faction is Shisuikai (Political Mission 
Centered Group) currently led by Nikai Toshihiro and is considered the 
most conservative among the current factions. Another faction is the Shiko 
Kai (Group for Serving the Public) led by former Prime Minister Aso Taro. 
Among the smaller faction is Kinnmirai Seiji Kenkyukai (Research for the 
Political Future) or the Ishihara Nobuteru faction. Moreover, the Tanigaki 
group and the Oshima faction is headed by former LDP President Tanigaki 
(Herbenar and Nakamura, 2014). 
According to the typologies put forward by Beller and Belloni 
(1976), the LDP can be considered as having institutionalized factions. 
First, the groups essentially have organization structure. Leiserson (1968) 
describes the LDP factions as “army divisions” headed by a “general” who 
have advisers among his general staff. It has line officers, fixed 
memberships, offices, publications, regular sources of funds, and so forth 
(p. 501). Second, their membership recruitment takes place regularly on a 
non-personal and egalitarian basis.  
 The LDP was a product of a party merger of the two right-wing 
conservative parties—the Liberal and the Democrats. The merger came as 
a result of the Liberal Party losing their parliamentary majority in 1953. 
The two parties decided to merge after a decision by left-wing and right-
wing Socialists to reunite (Cox and Rosenbluth, 1993; Kohno, 1992, 1997). 
 133 
The emergence of the LDP consequently had significant impact in the 
party system of Japan.  
 First, factions within the LDP played a role in settling internal 
conflicts through factional power-sharing and elite circulation. This 
structure enabled a peaceful rotation of leadership between the Democratic 
Party leader and the Liberal Party leader in the LDP. The original factions 
in the LDP were formed from the grouping of politicians from the two 
parent parties. Yoshida Shigeru, Ogata Taketora, and Ono Bamboku led 
the factions of former Liberal Party members. Kishi Nobusuke, Miki 
Bukichi, and Hatoyama Ichiro led the factions of former Democratic Party 
members. These men succeeded in solidifying their factional bases by 
holding monthly meetings during the LDP’s first year in existence (Fukui 
1978, p. 108).  
 Second, the LDP factions were instrumental in bringing different 
strands of conservative ideology under a single umbrella from 1955 to 
1993. Essentially, the pattern of factionalism produced by the LDP after 
the 1956 elections revealed that ideology became a less important factor to 
win an election and tensions became less prominent between bureaucrat-
turned-politicians and professional politicians. 38  Moreover, money 
became the primary means to court members to one’s faction (Krauss and 
Pekkanen, 2010: 109-111). These factions attracted former bureaucrats 
and professional politicians alike. Thus, the post-war division between the 
two (the former Liberal Party members and the former Democratic Party 
members) quickly disappeared as factions willingly adopt both.  
 This observation is further corroborated by Reed (1991) and 
Richardson (1997). Both authors argue that the factions in the LDP work 
                                                      
38 those who served the war-time government of Japan as career bureaucrats quickly 
turned to politics soon after Hirohito announced Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War. 
Yoshida Shigeru, who served as the first prime minister of post-war Japan from 1946-
1947 was a prime example of the ‘bureaucrat-turned-politician. Kishi Nobusuke is 
another good example of this.  
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to integrate and help prevent breakups when the party was at its infant stage. 
Factions also help build consensus, consolidate the conservative ideology, 
and transform the security issues into a major political issue.  
 However, party system institutionalization in Japan is also 
influenced by other important factors aside from organized factionalism. 
According to the theory put forward in this thesis (i.e., Chapter Three, 
pages 34-37), it also requires party interactions over time.  
 Aside from the LDP, there are also factions that existed in other 
political parties in Japan. These parties include, the Japanese Socialist 
Party (JSP), the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the Democratic 
Socialist Party (DSP), and the Komeito Party. Totten and Kawakami (1965) 
notes the partisan alignment in the Shugi-in (House of Representatives) 
particularly in 1965. The 294 members of the LDP were divided into ten 
factions; the 144 members of the JSP were grouped into six factions; the 
23 members of the DSP had only a single faction; and the 5 members from 
the JCP. While the conservative LDP party factions are regarded as 
‘hierarchical’—divisions with subdivisions dubbed ‘battalions’, the 
factions in the socialist and other opposition parties are often referred to as 
‘communities’ (Totten and Kawakami, 1965: 111). 
 
 5.2.2  Institutionalized Factions in Japan: The JSP and the  
  DPJ  
 
 During the 1960s, the JSP consisted of the Kawakami, Wada, and 
Eda-Narita (“Structural Reform”) factions. The Marxist-influenced 
Sasaki-Suzuki faction, together with the Heiwa Doshikai (Peace Comrades) 
or Nomizo faction, opposed these reform factions.39  
                                                      
39  Studies that trace changes within the party and of those factions are scarce. 
However, Stockwin (1989, 2000) mentions that theses factions of the JSP have 
existed until mid 1990s. 
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 JSP was the largest opposition party against the LDP until 1994. 
The JSP endured through its institutionalized factions. These factions 
proved to be very important to the growth of the party’s membership and 
during the parliamentary electoral campaigns (Totten and Tamio, 
1965:116). The wide ideological positions among the factions in the JSP 
have attracted members from the hard-core Marxists to the moderate social 
democrats. This provided a sense of belonging to each member that were 
recruited. Instead of causing infighting, having different ideological 
factions within the party facilitated dialogue and consultation. This led to 
the formulation of better-informed policy and wider strategic alternatives 
for the party to respond to different issues in the country (Totten and Tamio, 
1965). In addition, possessing a wide ideological spectrum within the JSP 
have broaden the party’s appeal to the Japanese public.  
 However, there were also some drawbacks of having factions in the 
JSP based on ideological differences. For example, after the formation of 
the JSP in 1945, the ideological conflicts among its factions led to several 
defections. The party’s right wing faction broke away from the JSP and 
created the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) in the early 1960s and the 
secession of the center-left faction led to the establishment of the Social 
Democratic League in the 1970s. Both of these defections could be 
regarded as examples of the divisive impact of ideologically-motivated 
factions (Stockwin, 2000: 213-220).  
 Meanwhile, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which emerged 
as the largest opposition party replacing the JSP after the restricting of the 
party system in 1994 is also divided into several factions, each headed by 
a senior faction leader (Schmit, 2011). Compared to the LDP’s military 
structured like factions, factions in the DJP are generally regarded as 
“loose” factions without formal hierarchical orders like the ones in the 
LDP (Itagaki, 2008). And compared to JSP’s ideological factions, the DPJ 
was organized primarily on patronage and loyalty to leaders. Thus, the 
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tendency is that the DPJ recruited more young lawmakers who had no 
other party affiliations before entering the DPJ. 
 By 2009, the Ishinkai or more commonly known as Ozawa faction 
in DPJ was the strongest one with 42 members in both Houses of 
Representatives and the House of Councilors, while the smallest faction of 
Noda Yoshihiko only had seven members.  
 Before 2009, the largest faction within the DPJ was the Isshinkai 
(Political Reform Group). The faction was headed by Ozawa Ichiro. The 
next largest faction was the Seiken senryaku kenhyûkai (Political Strategy 
Study Group), led by the former Prime Minister Hata Tutomu. The Minsha 
kyôkai or the Democratic Socialist Society was led by Kawabata Tatsuo. 
The fourth largest faction was the Kuni no katachi kenkyûkai or Study 
Group for a New Japan, with Kan Naoto as the leader. Meanwhile, the 
Seiken Kôtai o jitsugen suru kai or the Group for Realizing Regime 
Change was headed by Hatoyama Yukio, who together with Kan and 
Yokomichi founded the DPJ in 1996. In addition, the Shinseikyoku 
Kondankai (Group Discussing the New Political Situation) was led by 
Yokomichi Takahiro. The Ryounkai, literarrly the “society above the 
clouds,” was jointly led by Maehara Seiji and Edano Yuko (Schmidt, 
2011:4-5).  
 This brief account of the factions and its members of the DPJ shows 
that each of the factional groups are headed by the ‘big shots’ in Japanese 
Politics. For example, Ozaaw Ichiro, commonly known as the ‘Shadowy 
Shogun’ for his back-room influence, has been a Member of the Parliament 
since 1969, representing the Iwate 3rd district. Hata Tutomu, a former 
Prime Minister of Japan has been elected 14 times. Thus, the factions 
within DPJ tried compensating what it lacked (i.e., in their organizational 
cohesion and weak memberships) by recruiting the political ‘veterans’ near 
their retirement. In this sense, the factions in the DPJ were neither 
ideologically organized like in the factions of the JSP or hierarchically 
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organized like the ones in the LDP. However, since factions in the DPJ 
were led by the battle-hardened election veterans, the DPJ proved its 
strength by defeating the dominant LDP and gaining the largest number of 
seats in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors.  
 Indeed, factionalism is an important reality in party organizations 
in Japanese politics. The factions dominated by the conservative and the 
progressive parties perform various functions that essentially promote 
effectiveness and consensus among themselves. This ultimately enabled 
the continued interactions within the party and among other parties. 
However, there are several factors and incidences when factions can also 
cause the disintegration of parties.  
 
 5.2.3 Institutionalized Factions in Taiwan: The KMT 
 
 Founded in 1920, the Kuomintang (KMT) was established in 
mainland China. It relocated to Taiwan after it was defeated by the Chinese 
Communist Party in 1949. It has since ruled Taiwan for more than five 
decades and continued until the island’s transition to democracy.  
 By the early 1990s, two major groups were identified with the 
KMT—the mainstream and the non-mainstream factions. The mainstream 
faction was composed primarily of local Taiwanese who constituted the 
majority in the party, while the non-mainstream faction was mostly 
composed of members either born in China or those born in Taiwan but 
whose parents were originally from the mainland (Bosco,1992; Hood, 
1996; Cheng, 2003).  
  Compared to most party factions in Japan, the mainstream faction 
in the KMT is largely viewed as quite fragmented with its members 
generally tied with local interests rather than national interests. In addition, 
most of the members in this faction supported Lee Teung-Hui in his 
presidency. This was primarily because of his being Taiwanese and his 
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ability to exclude many Chinese mainlanders from attaining important 
positions in the party. Thus, the mainstream faction in the KMT can be 
considered to be more similar to the LDP and DPJ factions in Japan. All 
of them were considered as pragmatic since they were organized not based 
on ideology, but on the basis of patronage and electoral success.  
 Meanwhile, the Wisdom club (chi-shih hui), a sub-group of the 
mainstream faction, came about when Taiwan’s liberalization gave the 
KMT party members more freedom to express their own ideas (Hood 
1996). With its establishment in 1989, this faction was formed by the 
Taiwanese KMT members of the Legislative Yuan. The Wisdom club 
operated in close association with the mainstream faction, but its primary 
interest was to gain and maintain power in the Legislative Yuan. Its 
advocacy was to promote a Taiwan first agenda focusing on an 
independent Taiwan (Hood, 1996).  
 For the non-mainstream faction, the New KMT Alliance (Hsin 
Kuomintang Lien shien) was one of the several groups that essentially 
contributed to the downsizing of KMT’s power and influence in Taiwan’s 
politics. In the December 1989 elections, several candidates for the 
Legislative Yuan ran on an anti-corruption platform and won sizable 
majorities in their districts (Hood, 1996). This led to intense conflicts 
within the KMT that ultimately resulted in the creation of a new party in 
1993 from the breakaway faction of the New KMT alliance faction.  
 The succeeding years of democratization in Taiwan encouraged 
members in the KMT to express their political thoughts and ideas that also 
solidified their factions. As a result of this internal party conflicts, the 
KMT faced serious problems in recruiting new members and in dealing 
with the deepening rift between the local Taiwanese and the mainland 
Chinese. In addition, the KMT had to confront the looming issue of the 
public’s clamor for a Taiwanese identity that has gained traction during its 
democratization phase (Hood, 1996).  
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 Yet despite these challenges, the KMT managed to thrive and 
compete in Taiwan’s elections. Cheng (2006) argues that the party’s astute 
leadership as well as the island’s constitution and electoral system are the 
factors behind KMT’s survival. And because of the looming challenges 
that it needs to address, the KMT forced itself to adapt strategic measures 
to court wider domestic support by offering public service programs such 
as computer literacy, foreign language training, among others.  
 In addition, the party has tried to distance itself from its 
authoritarian past and focused on changing its political image (Hood, 
1996:481). In a way, the factional struggles in the KMT has in a way 
helped the party to move away from its old reputation of a conservative 
‘watchdog’ into its more engaging public image over the years.  
 
 5.2.4 Institutionalized factions in the DPP 
 
 Aside from the KMT, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is 
also a major party in Taiwan. Established in 1986, it was initially created 
as a political opposition movement that challenged the dominant KMT. 
Alexander Yali Lu (1992:129) describes the DPP in the following context: 
 
“The DPP is essentially a party movement. On the one hand, it functions 
as a normal party by participating in elections, engaging in legislative 
work, and even running a few county and city governments. On the other 
hand, it considers itself as a mass movement, the principal mission of 
which is to mobilize people to exert pressure upon the ruling KMT and 
the government to democratize the political structure as well as to carry 
out other reforms”.  
 
  Because of its origin, the DPP drew support from various advocacy 
groups. It garnered support from groups such as the Writers Editors 
Alliance composed of Taiwan’s nationalists and the Tangwai Public Policy 
Research Association whose members are advocates for democracy in the 
policy field. Eventually, the Writers Editors Alliance became the New Tide 
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Faction of the DPP. It gradually took control of the DPP’s organizational 
machinery. Through the New Tide faction, the political stance of the DPP 
radically transformed. From its position of changing Taiwan’s 
authoritarian government into a democracy, the DPP sought to achieve 
independence for Taiwan. The party’s ideology shifted from its advocacy 
on the right to self-determination for Taiwan to its aspiration for Taiwanese 
independence.  
The significant influence of the New Tide faction gave momentum 
to the DPP with the support of advocates for the independence movement. 
These supporters were mostly Taiwanese who were forced to live abroad 
during the authoritarian rule of the KMT-led government and eventually 
return to Taiwan to take part in the independence movement (Schubert, 
1994: 267-270). Gradually, the DPP had moved from exploiting the ethnic 
cleavage for voter mobilization to adopting the independence movement 
as its party platform. This development in the DPP had its advantages and 
disadvantages. On the one hand, the party was able to settle its internal 
conflict by taking on the Taiwan independence issue as its unifying 
platform. On the other hand, the DPP faced antagonism from the KMT 
hardliners and incurred the wrath from officials of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) in mainland China.  
Indeed, the DPP was able to create a united front against its 
opposition because of its promotion of an independence platform for 
Taiwan. Fulda (2002) argues that the DPP’s hardline approach 
strengthened its image to its core supporters and solidified its identity as a 
clear opposition to the KMT rule. The election results from 1991 to 2000 
support this claim. While the DPP experienced a number of electoral 
setbacks, it was able to progress throughout the 1990s. Eventually, the 
party won the following: the Taipei mayoral race in 1994, the local 
elections in 1997, and the Kaohsiung mayoral race in 1998. While it 
generally did not perform well during national elections, the DPP slowly 
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made its mark during the local elections against the more organized and 
well-financed KMT.  
 Despite being a younger party to the KMT with less political 
experience and organizational capability, the DPP was able to survive for 
more than 30 years. Its survival can be attributed to its appeal as an 
opposition party against the KMT and its strong pro-independence stance 
for Taiwan. Its strong party-line can be credited to the institutionalized 
factions within its organization.  
 Factions in the DPP are generally regarded as institutionalized 
based on the following characteristics. According to Shelley Rigger 
(2001:71-74), they possess formal organizational structures such as offices 
and staffs. These factions can be considered as quasi-autonomous actors’ 
vis-a-vis party institution such as Central Executive Committee (CEC), 
and Central Standing Committee (CSC) (Rigger, 2001:76-93). For Huang 
(1990:93-94), factions in the DPP are considered institutionalized because 
they encompassed all the administrative levels in the party.  
 Aside from its logistical and structural characteristics, the 
mobilization and survival of the group in the DPP did not depend on an 
individual leader. This strengthens its ability to stay united despite internal 
divisions, which enhances the institutionalization of factions within the 
DPP. Because of these, factions in the DPP lasted long from 1986 to 2006, 




  Summary: Party Factionalism in Japan and Taiwan 
 
 Factions in Japan and Taiwan’s political parties are instrumental in 
sharpening their organizations for inter-party competition. In the case of 
Japan, the military-like nature of the dominant LDP enabled its factions to 
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effectively manage internal conflicts and build consensus to successfully 
compete in elections. Meanwhile, the ideologically-based factions in the 
opposition parties such as the JSP and the DPJ provide their members with 
a sense of belonging and unity through its patronage system. Other parties 
such as the JCP and the Komeito Party had disallowed any factions within 
their organization but had strong organizational foundation. Thus, party 
factions in Japan helped sustain its political organizations and promote 
continued interactions within the party and among other parties.  
 In the case of Taiwan, factions in both the KMT and the DPP 
started with its political elites that significantly influenced its party system. 
The early ‘authoritarian’ image of the KMT and its internal strife decreased 
the party’s popularity that led to increased efforts to democratize its 
organization. To increase its chance of survival, the KMT presented 
changed into a more liberal image to recruit talented party members and 
win elections (Hood, 1996: 481). In contrast, the different factions in the 
DPP were united to push for Taiwan’s Independence. It gradually 
progressed into a moderate party that appealed to a wider public in order 
to achieve electoral victories. Factions in both the KMT and DPP shaped 
the development of their respective parties and prolonged their existence. 
These factions strengthened their respective parties which contributed to 
the institutionalization of the party system in Taiwan.  
  
 Nevertheless, for those informed readers, institutionalized factions 
can also be thought as autonomous entities which enable politicians to 
make decisions to cross over party borders more easily. Because the 
designs of parties are themselves endogenous “parties are the product of 
design of institutions that compel politicians to erect parties of a particular 
sort because that sort, and not some other, serves their interest (Filippove 
et al., 2004:196). Thus, politicians in factions also face and must decide 
which strategy helps him or her advance their goals; and factions’ 
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autonomy might provide growing incentives for different factional 
members to advance intra-party conflict. 
  Nonetheless, we have to also consider the possibility that dominant 
factions will also make strategic use of their dominance over party 
organization to counteract opposition factions. In this case, party 
organization becomes a device that loosens or strengthens control over 
regional branches to restrain decisions to cross over party borders. This is 
mostly evident in the example of the LDP. Park, for example, has 
suggested that, institutionalized factions contribute to the effective 
management of the party as an organization (Park, 2001:444-7; see also 
Richardson 2001: 154-9). In the same manner, it is noted that for many 
years, factions in DPJ have been useful in terms of “mutual aid during 
campaign periods and beyond and for exchanging information” (Kollner, 
2004:100). In addition, it is evident that party leaders have frequently used 
the balancing principle in personnel politics to contain overt intra-party 
conflicts and to prevent members to cross over party borders. 
 For Taiwan, the factionalism carry slightly a different nuance. For 
the KMT the effective use of the local factions through KMT’s state 
patronage and party favors to win votes at a local level while intra-party 
struggles within the KMT helped the party shed off its authoritarian image. 
On the other hand, the DPP was able to survive for more than 30 years 
because of its strong appeal as the sole opposition party again the KMT. 
Such stronger appeal to voters were possible because of the party’s strong 
institutionalized faction controlling its agenda and pushing the party to 
take national identity issue. While the DPP have been deeply fragmented, 
it managed to stay united. Although break off of the Labor Party (LP) in 
1987 and the founding of Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP) by the 
dissatisfied DPP-politicians in 1996 had happen, it did not prevent the DPP 
from falling apart. On this, Taiwan expert Stephan Grauwels discussed the 
likely cost of inter-party comprise for the DPP: 
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 “Any significant DPP concessions on national identity or money politics 
might cause tensions within the DPP at best, or a split at worst, with especially 
the New Tide breaking away and realigning in a new, more “puritanical” party 
on the left of the political spectrum. The DPP could lose the support of ardent 
independents, who at present are still a captive market for the party.” (Gruawels 
1996: 97).  
  
 However, such break-off of New Tide faction from the DPP as 
envisaged by Grauwels did not happen. Instead, the young DPP managed 
to maintain its unity through factional compromise.  
 
 Therefore, even after considering for the alternative explanation, 
institutional factions still explain the stability of inter-party interactions in 
Japan and Taiwan.  
 
 
5.3 Democratic Transitions in Japan and Taiwan  
 
 Previous sections in the chapter have demonstrated that salient 
social cleavage and institutionalized factionalism led party systems to 
institutionalize in Japan and Taiwan. This section of the chapter will 
demonstrate that top-down democratic transitions also lead Japan and 
Taiwan’s party system to institutionalize mainly by allowing its previously 
institutional elements to continue to the post-transition and endure over 
time. Such continuity allows political stability in which the inter-party 
interactions also stabilize.  
 
 5.3.1  Japan’s Path towards Democracy: US Influence and 
  Tutelage 
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 After Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War, the US began occupying 
Japan. From September 2, 1945 to April 28, 1952, the Americans 
implemented various political and economic measures. The US disarmed 
Japan to prevent it from waging another war, while purging those who 
were responsible for its war crimes. Moreover, laws were enacted to 
support the unionization of labor and the dissolution of the Zaibatsu. These 
Zaibatsu companies that aided Japan’s war efforts were dismantled in line 
with the US industrial demilitarization. The Americans also adopted “the 
Dodge Line” that targeted the reduction of skyrocketing Japanese inflation, 
which reached to 165% in 1948 (Smith, 1995:66). Another important 
decree that the Americans imposed on the country was the dilution of the 
absolute monarchial power of the Japanese emperor into a mere 
ceremonials role. Instead of the Emperor, the National Diet became the 
most powerful political institution, which was bestowed with more 
privileges than the Cabinet members. 
 To further establish the Diet as a post-war political system, left-
wing parties were given support. From 1946 to 1948, the American 
authorities eliminated all the legislation and police controls against leftist 
parties. However, some two hundred thousand alleged militarists and 
ultranationalists were purged from public life, 40  with the intention of 
establishing a moderate Japan from its militant authoritarian past. With the 
implementation of “The Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel 
from Public Office,”41 nearly all the conservatives at the national level, 
were purged (i.e., 80% military officials and 17% of political elites). As a 
                                                      
40 With the intention of establishing a moderate force in Japanese politics, in January 
1946, SCAP implemented the order titled “The Removal and Exclusion of 
Undesirable Personnel from Public Office” The purge order aimed at curbing right-
wing elements by prohibiting militarists and other political organizations whose aims 
ran counter to those of the SCAP. 




result, the Socialists gained the upper hand in Japan’s political landscape 
since the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) secured majority of the seats in the 
Diet—with 143 seats in the lower house during the April 1947 election that 
led to the formation of a coalition government under Tetsu Katayama. 
 Japan’s democratization process was laid down by the US under 
the leadership of General Douglass MacArthur. Various reforms were 
implemented, the most important of which was the American authored 
constitution of Japan. But as tensions during Cold War increased, US 
policymakers became increasingly concerned about further communist 
expansion in Japan. One measure that was adopted to shield Japan from 
communist influences was the establishment of a bilateral defense pact. 
However, growing threats of Communist expansion in Asia were evident 
after the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949 and the outbreak 
of the Korean War in 1950. These developments led US policymakers in 
Washington to transform Japan from a social democracy to a capitalist 
democracy.  
  5.3.1.1 Japan’s Path towards Democracy: Transition 
   through transactions  
 
 By the early 1950s, the advent of the Cold War and the takeover of 
China by the communists compelled the US to take a radical anti-
Communist stance in designing Japan’s foreign policy. This departure 
from its original policy of democratizing and decentralizing Japan started 
in 1947 known as the ‘reverse course’ (Curtis, 1988; Dower, 1993; Lee, 
2004). In terms of its economic policy, this reverse course abandoned the 
laws supporting labor unions and the dissolution of the Zaibatsu. In terms 
of its political impact, it reinstated those individuals who were purged from 
public life. Between 1949 and the end of 1950s, US authorities and the 
Japanese government collaborated in a “Red Purge”. According to 
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Baerwald (1979:99), this “Red Purge” had the “ultimate effect of switching 
the objectives of the purge from removing militarists and ultra-nationalists, 
to eliminating the Communists and their sympathizers,” (Baerwald, 
1979:99). Eventually, the US overturned many of its earlier reform 
initiatives and brought back old conservatives into the Japanese political 
life in an effort to build Japan as a bulwark against the spread of 
Communism in Asia.  
 This ‘reversal’ and the resurgence of the old conservatives had 
several political implications. The comeback of the Japanese conservatives 
ultimately led to the emergence of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 
1955. This ‘reverse course’ policy also reinstated former wartime 
bureaucrats. They eventually turned into professional politicians recruited 
by a bureaucrat-turned politician himself, Yoshida Shigeru. They 
consolidated their political influence by replacing a number of the pre-war 
professional politicians. This created a deep divide within the conservative 
bloc—those bureaucrat-turn-politicians on the one side, and those pre-war 
politicians on the other side under Ichiro Hatoyama. However, this rivalry 
between the two factions did not last long as they became unified to 
strengthen the party’s continued reign in Japanese politics.  
 Meanwhile, the Zaibatsu was also able to make its comeback with 
the reverse course policy (Yanaga, 1968:120). It has a major influence in 
the consolidation of the 1955 party system (i.e., one party domination 
under the LDP). The Zaikai (business community) provided various 
methods of carrots and sticks to put pressure on the conservative factions 
to end their factional struggles that undermined the power of the Japanese 
Socialist Party (now Social Democratic Party of Japan, SDPJ). The 
Yoshida faction (Liberal Party) and the Hatoyama faction (Democratic 
Party), pressured by the community representing the Zaibatsu—Zaikai, 
merged under the famous slogan, ‘Abandon small differences and 
concentrate on large similarities’.  
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  With the return of the conservative politicians, bureaucrats, and the 
business community, Japan underwent a transformation into a full 
parliamentary democracy. The strong support of the skilled bureaucracy 
and the wealthy Zaikai were instrumental in maintaining the dominance of 
the LDP. This created a one-party domination in the Japanese party system, 
despite having multiple minor opposition parties from 1955-1994. This 
provided party system stability under the stewardship of the LDP 
government (Johnson, 1990).  
 Along with the initial guidance and the political reforms initiated 
by the US as well as the internal developments in the Japanese government, 
democratic transition in Japan is regarded as having a top-down approach. 
This facilitated the institutionalization of its party system and sustained its 
stability in the country’s political landscape.  
 
 5.3.2  Taiwan’s Road to Democracy: From Soft-Authoritarian to 
  Gradual Liberal Rule  
 
 Taiwan’s transition to democracy came without any foreign 
interference unlike the US influence in Japan’s case. Its process of 
democratization was rather prolonged and methodical. However, its 
transition to democracy is considered as the most ideal example of 
democratic transition in Third-wave countries.  
 In Taiwan, democratic transition began with the decision of Chiang 
Ching-kuo to modernize. The changes occurred in the mid-1980s that saw 
Taiwan slowly transforming its soft-authoritarian regime and creating a 
favorable condition for more liberalization. Subsequently, more 
information became available to the Taiwanese public through foreign 
media outlets from Japan. In addition, more Taiwanese students began 
studying abroad, particularly in Western democratic countries. These 
students brought home liberal democratic ideas.  
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 These developments and other mounting internal pressures 
prompted the Central Committee of Taiwan to finally announce the 
establishment of a constitutional democracy in March 1986. Subsequently 
in July 1987, Chiang Ching-kuo lifted Martial Law, which eventually 
restored civil rights in Taiwan. By the end of 1987, the international 
community considered Taiwan as having a ‘partial Democracy’. Diamond 
and Olsen (1987) describes Taiwan’s ‘partial democracy’ as having 
“genuine democratic elements that had been combined with authoritarian 
power” (Diamond and Olsen in Wesson (eds), 1987:167).  
 
 
  5.3.2.1 Taiwan’s Road to Democracy: From Single to  
   Multiparty System. 
 
 In January 1988, Chiang Ching-kuo died and Lee Teng-hui was 
elected in the National Assembly. Through Lee, the KMT-dominated 
government of Taiwan allowed the formation of the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP), as an opposition party to participate in politics. 
By 1989, the Civil Organizations Law was enacted, allowing the legal 
presence of other small opposition parties to compete with the DPP. 
Together, the DPP and the KMT laid out terms and conditions for the 
creation of other political parties by lifting the restrictions on campaign 
activities.  
 After Lee Tueng-hui’s re-election in 1990, he strongly pushed for 
constitutional reforms within the current framework. By April 1991, the 
National Assembly passed more constitutional amendments to support this 
position and allowed new elections in all three parliamentary branches. 
Both bodies of the legislative branch, the National Assembly and the 
Legislative Yuan, would be determined by popular elections. Candidates 
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would be nominated by the President and then voted on by the National 
Assembly (Leng and Lin, 1993:87).  
 In addition, Lee rescinded the “Temporary Provisions” that 
terminated all provisions from authoritarian powers. Thus, Taiwan 
transitioned to a full multiparty democracy with the continued influence of 
the same political institutions with the KMT and the DPP in place. This 
created a more stable political environment that encouraged efficient ways 
to implement democratic reforms. The continued co-existence and 
interactions between the KMT and the DPP also created an environment 
favorable to Taiwan’s democratization.  
 Essentially, the democratic transition in Taiwan came from a top-
down approach. It was the decision of the KMT’s leader Chiang Ching-
kuo to let go of his strong grip over Taiwan. As the dominant party leading 
the government, the KMT lifted Martial Law and allowed the creation of 
DPP as the major opposition party and other small parties. Both the KMT 
and the DPP were instrumental in the institutionalization of Taiwan’s party 
system.  
 
 Summary: Democratic transitions in Japan and Taiwan 
 
 As discussed in detail, the political stability institutionalized by 
one-party domination in the post 1955 Japanese party politics can be 
attributed to the way country had democratized. The democratic 
transition has been initiated by the US occupational authority has enabled 
the continuity of the pre-war party factions, strong bureaucracy, and 
business community to bring consolidated, one party system in Japan.  
 Meanwhile, Taiwan’s democratic transition came without any 
foreign influence. Rather, the democratic transition processed in a 
methodical way, which progressed in over 10 years. This slowly 
progressed transition has guaranteed the survival of both the authoritarian 
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institution (KMT) and the progressive elements (DPP) in the society to 
make compromises and reorganize themselves to be fully adaptable in a 
new environment and be able to interact continuously and thrive even 
under multiparty democracy.  
 
 Meanwhile, there must be concerns for an opposite outcome to top-
down feature of democratic transition from what the thesis has argued. 
Mainly, the top-down feature of transitions will give authoritarian 
successor parties advantageous positions to fractionalize/or other parties. 
Such concerns are legitimate because regime transitions have proved to be 
theoretically challenging because “different kinds of authoritarianism 
differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy” (Geddes, 
1999). Furthermore, it is generally expected that authoritarian ruling 
parties are exceptionally resistant to democratization. However, some of 
the strongest authoritarian parties in the world have not resisted 
democratization but have embraced it. In addition, an incremental pattern 
of institutional reform helped the single-party retain power while enabling 
fragmented opposition groups to participate in competitive elections in 
Senegal (Creevy, Ngomo, and Vengroff, 2005). In the case of Japan and 
Taiwan, the authoritarian party was a single-party regime. Single-party 
regime is where access to political office and control over policy are 
dominated by one party, though other parties may legally exist and 
compete in elections (Geddes, 1999). In the case of Japan and Taiwan, our 
empirical observations have revealed that the single-party regime (LDP 
and the KMT) had more chances of getting re-elected or stay in power after 
their transitions to democracy, thus the need for them to use their 
advantageous positions to fractionalize other parties seem over statement. 
 However, as Geddes (1999) suggested two kinds of 
authoritarianism use their advantageous positions to directly influence the 
opposition parties after democratic transition. For example, if on the one 
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hand, the regime is military regime where a group of officers decided to 
role and exercise some influence on policy (i.e., South Korean example as 
we will see later) it is more likely to use their advantageous positions to 
directly influence the election and the opposition parties. On the other hand, 
in a personalist regimes differ from both military and single-party in that 
access to office and the fruits of office depends much more on the 
discretion of an individual leader. The leader may be an officer and may 
have created a party to support him/herself (Bratton and Van de Walle 
1997:61-96, Linz and Chehabi 1998: 4-45; Geddes 1999: 121-122). Both 
military regime and the personalist regimes may be more prone to exercise 
their advantageous positions.  
 Based on the aforementioned observations, one can confidently 
argue that Japan and Taiwan’s top-down feature of transitions led to 
institutionalization of party system as the single-party regime retain power 
while enabling opposition groups to participate in competitive elections; 




















 The previous chapter explained that salient social cleavages, 
institutionalized party factionalism, and authoritarian-led (i.e., top-down) 
democratic transition increased the level of party system 
institutionalization in Japan and Taiwan.  
 This chapter then discusses the cases of the Philippines and South 
Korea, wherein their party systems are considered as under-
institutionalized. Using similar factors, it explains how their respective 
social cleavages, party factions, and democratic transitions affect party 
system institutionalization. These factors validate the low party system 
institutionalization scores garnered by the Philippines (6) and South Korea 
(4) in Chapter Four.  
 This chapter reveals the following findings: first, having no salient 
social cleavages, political parties in the Philippines and South Korea relied 
mostly on charismatic leaderships and social distinctions like regional 
cleavage. The creation of political parties was mostly on an ad-hoc basis 
(i.e. prior to major national elections). Therefore, inter-party competitions 
did not continue over time and party organizations perform frequent 
changes especially after each electoral defeat. Second, personalized 
cliques form the various factions found in the political parties of the 
Philippines and South Korea. These point to the prevalent party-switching 
among candidates based on their loyalty to their leaders. Such reality 
significantly reduced the parties’ legitimacy and their ability to continue 
as effective political organizations. Lastly, the manner in which democratic 
transitions occurred in the Philippines and South Korea affect the stability 
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of their political institutions. Because of this, party systems in both 
countries experienced frequent changes.  
 
6.1  Social Cleavage in the Philippines and South Korea  
 
 6.1.1  The Philippines’ Patronage Politics: From Colonial 
   to Modern 
 
 Generally, there is difficulty in determining a specific conflict that 
led to the formation and development of political movements. The 
establishment of national revolutions in the Philippines explains this 
observation.  
 These political movements were not only anti-colonial struggles 
but also a social upheaval guided by a vague ideology. The struggle against 
three centuries of Spanish colonial rule resulted in the Philippines 
declaration of independence from Spain in 1898. However, its 
independence did not last long due to the Philippine-American War from 
1899 to 1901. Apart from its long struggle for independence, the 
Philippines is also home to one of the most persistent religious conflict in 
the world. The conflict in Mindanao, located in the southern Philippines, 
has a long history of conflict among armed groups that includes Muslim 
separatists, communists, clan militias, and other criminal groups. However, 
none of these conflicts have been translated into a salient political 
movement that would lead to the creation of a national political party. 
Instead, the Philippines produced a clientelistic party system throughout 
its political history.  
 During the American colonial rule, the two-party-system in the 
Philippines was regarded as institutionalized. Prior to this, the country 
neither had national-level democratic institution nor organized political 
parties. It was the American colonial authority that established the 
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foundations of political parties in the Philippines, which countered the 
widely-supported revolutionary threats in the country (Hutchcroft, 2000). 
The U.S. began granting access to political powers to mestizo elites,42 who 
had already developed a strong economic base in major regions in the 
Philippines during the Spanish colonial period. To win over both the 
educated elites and the local chiefs who gave support to the revolutionary 
efforts, the U.S. created local government units and a national 
representative assembly (Organic Act passed by the U.S. Congress in 
1902).43 
 Studies produced by May (1984) and Hayden (1943) explained the 
limited political freedom and restrictive institutions imposed by the US on 
the Philippines. The Americans limited the electorate to a very small elite 
segment of the population. The US colonial regime also actively prevented 
any forms of popular uprisings or popular mobilization that would 
challenge its authority. It also imposed the anti-sedition law that declared 
the pursuit of independence as a crime punishable by death (Banlaoi and 
Carlos, 1996: 49; Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003). According to Manacsa 
and Tan (2005), this anti-sedition law was regarded as the initial reason 
behind the transient nature of political parties in the Philippines, arguing 
that it prevented the growth of opposition groups that would compete 
against the elites.  
 But eventually, the U.S. pursued the institutionalization of the party 
system in the Philippines that would unabashedly advocate its colonial rule 
                                                      
42 In the Philippines, Filipino mestizo are people of mixed Filipino and any foreign 
ancestry.  
43  An interesting comparison can be made with regard to the Japanese colonial 
authority in Korea. In Korea, the Japanese colonialists largely prevented the Korean 
landed elites becoming politically powerful. The landholding traditional aristocrats 
were excluded access into political power or participating in any substantial roles in 
politics. Had the Japanese, instead of the Americans, become the colonial rulers of 
the Philippines in the 1900s, one may speculate, Japanese institutional reform would 
have created a very different type of Filipino elites today.  
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(Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003). Thus, the Partido Federalista was born 
with the support of the Americans. Cullinane (1989) and Salamanca (1984) 
documented the enormous political privileges the Federalistas enjoyed 
under the American rule. The most important of which was that the party 
was given the sole power to make appointments to key provincial offices 
in the Philippines. 
 By 1905, however, the Partido Federalistas lost this privilege. 
Cullinane (1989), Paredes (1989), Hutchroft and Rocamora (2003) 
explained that the Americans eventually realized the limits of having only 
one Manila-based group of elites to rule an archipelago since “the political 
forces in the provinces were mobilizing to gain their access to the 
patronage and political influence” (Cullinane, 1989:240). The Americans 
thus implemented a ‘divide and rule’ tactic by creating a new group of 
Filipino leaders to “strengthen your hold on the entire archipelago”, 
(Paredes, 1989:53-60). Thus in 1907, the Philippines eventually had two 
political parties with the establishment of the Nacionalista Party as 
approved by the US colonial authority.  
 But despite having two political organizations, the Philippines’ 
party system was not institutionalized. This was because voting rights were 
strictly regulated by the constitution. According to the Act 1582 of the 
country’s 1935 Constitution, the Philippine Commission only allowed 
Filipino men over 21 years old to vote during the American occupation. 
Moreover, there were no inter-party interactions based on different policy 
issues that exist in any institutionalized party systems.  
  The Nacionalista Party was purportedly a more independent party 
under the leadership of provincial politicians like Sergio Osmeña of Cebu 
and Manuel Quezon of Tayabas. Unlike the Federalista Party, the 
Nacionalistas were more anti-American and enjoyed “a more permanent 
political base upon which to collaborate and compete with the colonial 
authorities,” (Cullinane, 1989:389-390). Martin Shefter (1994) noted that 
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the Nacionalistas became a prototype for many of the succeeding political 
parties. The party had essentially consolidated its power at the national 
level while being responsive to allies (or clienteles) in the provinces who 
wanted more autonomy from American colonial supervision. Shefter 
further argued that the Nacionalista party was “founded by the elites who 
occupied positions within the prevailing regime to mobilize a popular 
following behind themselves in an effort to either gain control of the 
government or to secure their hold over it,” (p.30). 
 The colonial democracy, propagated by the Americans, 
encouraged the emergence of the elite-controlled democratic institution 
that systematically excluded the masses. It also led to a provincial basis of 
national politics and the emergence of a patronage-oriented party (i.e., the 
Nacionalista Party) that did not give rise to any ideological differences. 
These episodes in the Philippines’ colonial history eventually resulted in 
this notable trend that has since been evident in the country’s modern 
political party system.   
 The independence of the Philippines from American colonial rule 
saw some interesting changes unfolding in its political system. First, the 
intra-elite disputes largely destroyed the Nacionalista that resulted in 
confusion among its members over the issue of ‘who shall we relate to’. 
Osmeña had assumed the presidency of the Nacionalista party but was 
defeated during the 1946 election by Manuel Roxas, a former Nacionalista 
member, who established the Liberal Party (Teehankee, 2002). 
Throughout 1946 to 1972, the Liberals and the Nacionalista alternated in 
power under the rules formally established in the 1935 Constitution.  
 Eventually, the succeeding elections in the Philippines included, 
not only the support of the political elites, but also the votes of the Filipino 
mass public. Carl Landé (1965) explains: “local elites (often landholding) 
patrons used variety of means—kinship, personal ties, and the offering of 
jobs, services, and other favors—to build a clientele composed of those 
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from lower social classes. This clientele constituted a large vote bank, 
which could be exchanged for money and power from national politicians” 
(p. 24). Thus, when the candidates for national offices needed votes, local 
leaders were tapped to provide support in return for various political favors 
or financial benefits.  
 This results in a functional interdependence of local, provincial, 
and national leaders in each party organization (Sidel, 1999) that exists in 
the current political system in the Philippines (Thompson, 2010, p.6). It 
largely resulted in “patronage politics” featuring patron-client networks in 
the country that was institutionalized under the rule of former President 
Fidel V. Ramos in 1995.  
 Under Ramos, elected representatives in the Philippine Congress 
were allocated a sizeable sum of discretionary funds to be used in “projects” 
of their own choice. These funds were popularly known as the pork barrel 
(Kasuya, 2009), which already existed during the 1920s. This pork barrel 
draws from various sources, including the Public Works Act, the Priority 
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), and the discretionary funds from 
the president and departmental secretaries. Ramos re-instituted the pork 
barrel as a tool to lure the rural elites to his side similar to what the 
Federalista did back in 1920s (Kasuya, 2009; Putzel, 1992). At present, 
pork barrel in the Philippines is used as a means to reward or sanction 
politicians in government.  
 Given its colonial history and patronage politics, the Philippines 
was not able to develop its party system based on a clear social cleavage. 
Therefore, most party members and political candidates who stand in 
elections do not have strong advocacies and political stance. 
  
 6.1.2  South Korea’s Anti-Communism and Regionalism: Impact 
  on its  Political History 
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 Historically, South Korea has a strong anti-communist sentiment 
that was propagated during the US Occupation. Such sentiment, along with 
hostilities against North Korea, discouraged any clear social cleavage. The 
outbreak of the Korean War and the subsequent military totalitarian 
governments under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-whan systematically 
blocked the representation of diversity (i.e., ideology, labor-unions) in 
South Korea. It was only from the early 2000 that South Koreans were able 
to voice their opinion based on distinct ideological representation.  
 Because of the dominance of the rightist groups and the 
conservatives, the existence of a social cleavage in South Korea was not 
apparent. The restrictive measures against opposition parties and the 
political assassination of leftist and communists’ leaders did not result in 
an ideologically-based division in South Korea. In addition, subsequent 
authoritarian governments following Syngman Rhee’s administration 
strictly impeded social diversity and greatly controlled labor unions and 
other political groups that could form a political opposition. Similar to his 
precursor, Rhee Syngman, Park Chung-hee’s regime suppressed political 
dissidents and labeled them as followers of North Korea.  
 One of these cases was the arrest of eight college student activists 
and opposition party leaders on April 9, 1975. They were arrested under 
suspicions of espionage for North Korea, sentenced to death, and then 
immediately executed less than eighteen hours after the Supreme Court 
ruled against them on charges of treason, rebellion, and cooperation with 
North Korea. Until the 1990s, South Korean society remained under such 
totalitarian rule, wherein the government used the threat of communism 
and North Korea as a tool for eradicating those who opposed the 
government.  
 The same logic applied to the formation of any type of 
organizations such as labor unions, teachers’ unions, university reading 
clubs, and pro-democracy marches. Any projection of differences or 
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dissent was construed by the government as favoring North Korea. As an 
illustrative example, the Chun Doo-whan regime labelled the pro-
democracy marches during the May 18th Gwang-ju Democratic Uprising 
as riots. It alleged that the Gwangju residents are communists and pro-
North Korean sympathizers (Alice, 2015). 
 Such draconian measures in South Korea prevented the 
politicization of socio-economic and ideological divisions until the late 
2000s. Any rural-urban divide did not appear as South Korea had not 
experienced industrial revolution during this period. Rather, the 
industrialization was planned and led by the military government. The Park 
Chung-hee government reallocated rural population to urban areas to 
provide cheap labor for the entrepreneurs while using Saemaul Undong 
(New Village Movement, SMU) to control the rural sector (Moore, 1985). 
Because of this, no apparent rural-to-urban disparity was politicized in 
South Korea.  
 
 6.1.3 Democratization and Regionalism in South Korea.  
 
 During its democratization phase and the three-party merger44 that 
defined its political landscape then, South Korea consolidated and 
promoted regional cleavage among its electorate. The provincial electorate 
(mostly from Youngnam and Honam area) are considered to be emotional 
voters who tend to vote blindly for the party that claims regional ties. But 
as regionalism intensified, it made political parties underperform and 
became weak against external shocks such as election loss. This is because 
                                                      
44 Briefly, the three-party merger had two greater influence on the party system 
institutionalization in South Korea. First it solidified regionalism and second it gave 
presidents enormous power which explains why party organizations are weak and 
undergo organizational changes frequently. The thesis will discuss the three-party 
merger with respect to democratic transition in more detail in the forthcoming 
democratic transition section.  
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political parties in South Korea have little loyalty to ideology or agenda. 
Instead, politicians focus on loyalty to individuals and regional issues. As 
a result, parties are easily dissolved and new parties formed. Political elites 
mostly exploit past grievances in order to garner support. This resulted in 
frequent intra-party conflicts and party splits as well as electoral volatility. 
Regional cleavage may thus have an indirect influence in the weakening 
of party system in South Korea. 
 But after the country’s democratization period, regionalism has 
since been a significant influence during elections (Choi 1993; Lee 1990; 
Park 1993; Yang 2001). Regionalism has been found to be one of many 
influential factors in determining every election outcome from the 1987 
presidential election to the 2016 National Assembly election.  
 Many political scientists in South Korea have since analyzed the 
causes and characteristics of the country’s regionalism (Cha 1993; Park 
1993; Lee 1999, 1998; Kim et al., 2007, Kang 2003 for example). However, 
this thesis objects to the classification of regionalism as a form of social 
cleavage for the following reasons.  
 First, politicians in the country tend to manipulate regionalism for 
their own electoral victory while minimizing the debate on political 
ideologies and policy preferences during elections. In fact, many 
politicians from the Honam regional base have crossed over to the 
conservative party while many candidates form the Younnam regional 
base have been members of the parties representing the Honam reigon 
depending on the political circumstances during elections. South Korea’s 
electorate has voted based on the candidates’ personalities and their 
regions of origin. Those who support Kim Dae-jung came largely from the 
Honam (South) while those who supported Kim Yong-sam came from 
Kyung-sang (Southeast Region). Chung-cheong (Southwest) supported 
Kim Jong-pil. This precipitated the era of the three KIMs in South Korean 
politics. Throughout the 1990s with relatively more open political playing 
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field, Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and Kim Jong-pil lorded over their 
respective parties and formed, dissolved, merged, and then used parties in 
any way they could to achieve their long-desired goal of becoming the 
president. According to Im (2004;18), “Since 1987, the ‘three Kims’ 
created new parties: Kim Young-sam created three parties, Kim Dae-jung 
established four different political parties, while Kim Jong-pil formed 
three political parties. 
 Based on modern election results, regionalism has aided the 
underperformance of political parties in South Korea, which resulted in 
their underperformance. These enabled parties reliant on vote-rich regions 
and their area-specific electoral constituencies that made them resistant to 
outside pressures and influence. Their platforms and policies related to 
class, religion, or economy were subsumed under these particular 
motivations. As a result, South Korea’s underperforming party 
organizations were able to continually reinvent itself due to the public’s 
voting behavior based on regional rivalries. Thus, Kim (2003) view 
regionalism as a “disease of Korean politics” (p.29). If they encounter 
issues or scandals (i.e., election loss or corruption cases), parties simply 
changed their names and appeal to their regional constituents for renewed 
support (Kim 2003).  
 Second and more importantly, there is evidence that other factors, 
aside from regionalism, are involved that can affect the decisions of the 
Korean electorate. Economic voting (Kang, 2014), age/generational voting 
(Kim, 2006), and ideological voting (Cho 2003; Lee 1999; Sohn 1995) 
influence the people’s political choices. In fact, the 2004 National and 
Presidential elections revealed the significant decrease in regionalism as a 
factor in explaining voters’ preferences (Kim et al., 2006; Kang 2004). 
 Therefore, the influence of regionalism to the institutionalization 
of the party system in South Korea is weak. Despite its impact on voters 
for many years, the region-based conflict did not become the mobilizing 
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factor that created political parties in the country. Rather, regionalism was 
one of the many social distinctions that was used to sway votes during 
elections in South Korea.  
 
 Summary:  Social Cleavages and Party Systems in the  
   Philippines and South Korea. 
 
 Generally, both countries lacked either a clear a socio-economic 
rift or an identity divide that would have been the basis of the organization 
of their political parties. They did have ‘social-structural elements’ that 
could have led to divisions among their people. However, the political 
nature of the Philippines and the pro-North Korea ideological frame in 
South Korea have largely prevented them from developing salient social 
cleavages.  
 In the Philippines, the strong influence of patronage politics since 
the Spanish colonial period has become a dominant feature of its political 
culture. This patronage politics encourage relationships between powerful 
families and loyal supporters from local towns or provinces. In addition, 
the strong anti-sedition law implemented during the American occupation 
prevented the expansion of the opposition elites (Manacsa and Tan, 2005). 
The prevalence of patronage politics and the control of the opposition 
superseded any possible social distinctions or political conflicts to emerge 
that would have been politicized by local parties.  
 
 In South Korea, its strong authoritarian government prevented 
social dissent and political representation until the late 1990s. Any 
opposition against the government would be suppressed based on false 
allegations of supporting North Korea or communism. Meanwhile, 
regionalism, which has a strong influence in the way South Koreans vote 
since 1987, did not develop into a form of social cleavage. It did not lead 
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into any collective actions nor form any political parties. Instead, 
charismatic political figures (i.e., the three Kims) used regionalism to 
influence people in their region of origins to vote for them and their parties. 
These regions can be considered as large political machinery that are based 
on ‘imagined’ divisions that do not exist. Thus, despite its impact during 
elections, regional-based division in South Korea did not evolve into a 
strong social cleavage that would have firmly established political parties 
and enrich inter-party competition in the country.  
 Since party organizations and their interactions are not organized 
by salient social cleavages, party-to-party legitimacy in the Philippines and 
South Korea is low. And because social cleavages are transient, electoral 
volatility is high. In addition, party mergers and coalitions are rampant and 
occurs even across ideologically-divergent parties. Thus, the non-salient 
social cleavages in the Philippines and South Korea result in the under 
institutionalization of their party systems.  
 
6.2 Party Factionalism in the Philippines and South Korea 
 
 The history of factionalism in the Philippines is the oldest among 
the four countries. Factions in the country’s political parties were primarily 
based in towns and provinces and generally have significant influence over 
its national parties (Machado,1974; McCoy eds., 2009). Factionalism and 
politics of party factions in the Philippines, thereby, is bi-factional (Landé, 
1990; Machado, 1974). In South Korea, factionalism and the politics 
behind it, is also a common occurrence. But unlike in the Philippines, 
factions in South Korea are primarily the ‘sub-units’ of political parties 




 6.2.1 The Philippines’ Party Factions: Bi-factionalism and 
  Political Transactions  
 
 The development of party factionalism in the Philippines can be 
attributed to the Spanish American colonial governments (Landé 1990; 
McCoy 2009). To effectively control the archipelago, both governments 
employed local chiefs to manage the country. While the Spaniards only 
gave the local chiefs freedom to pursue economic policies, the Americans 
provided economic and political power as well (Anderson, 1988, Landé, 
1965).  
  Political factions in the Philippines are traditionally organized 
locally. Kinship ties have traditionally been at the center of factional 
organization. Aside from this kinship ties, personal loyalty creates factions, 
as well as mutual obligation that was born out of the exchange of favors 
between families at the periphery and faction leaders at the center (Landé, 
1965). These factions compete for influence in local, provincial, and 
national elections (Machado, 1974). In many respect, the Philippines has a 
two-sided factionalism that both address the local as well as provincial and 
national interests.  
 The country possesses a bi-factional nature of local politics since 
the American colonial period. This ‘bi-factionalism’ is described as a two-
level organization of factions. At top of the hierarchy is a patron who 
appoints the datus (lit. local princes) to various positions and rewards them 
individually with ‘porks’ and financial support. Those datus then use 
patronage and political influence at the local level to organize a 
faction/group underneath them. At the lower level, factions are further 
organized by several other leaders linked to the datu. These symbiotic ties 
between the political patron and the datus are expected to deliver political 
support (mostly votes) for the top leaders affiliated with them (Landé, 1965, 
Machado, 1974). Such bi-factionalism in the Philippines are still evident 
 166 
in its political system. Landé (1965) suggests that it has been a dominant 
feature in Philippine politics based on the personal and family rivalries 
among politically powerful people. It was already evident during 
American colonialism in the Philippines that significantly influenced the 
development of political parties in the country. The nature of its bi-
factionalism emphasized on the struggle for personal rewards among 
political leaders. It is characterized by a descending allocation of spoils, 
distributed on a face-to-face basis, filtering down to the village/local 
leaders, and finally to the common man. Such political system provides 
benefits for the people involved and facilitates the dyadic ties permeating 
Philippine society. It essentially represents the spoils moving downward in 
exchange for votes going upward especially during election season.  
 These patrons or the political ‘big shots’ have been traditionally 
expected to give dues to the ‘little people.’ Such relationship produces 
several factions that are invariably led by the elites and composed of 
subordinates under them from lower socio-economic classes with various 
interests. This mutually beneficial relationship precludes the emergence of 
class or ideologically-based parties in the Philippines. In its political 
system, factions have not transformed into a specialized political 
organization with an ideology or advocacy. Instead of competing based on 
political issues, party factions vie for economic rewards and influence that 
often result in ruthless rivalry among the political elites. In addition, the 
competition among them also includes other activities outside of the 
political realm, which also includes economic and business interests. 
 By the late 1950s to early 1970s, these local factions eventually 
broke away from the traditional patterns of factionalism (Machado, 1974). 
Instead of relying on the influence of personal and family networks, 
candidates began focusing on establishing an organization, which could 
link barrio or community to the provincial and national parties. Machado 
(1974) studied a handful of local factions and found that some of these 
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organizations turned factions were primarily located in the islands of 
Luzon and Visayas have become more professionalized as machine for the 
interest of the barrio captains.  
 However, such factions in Luzon and Visayas did not become 
institutionalized. Rather, they remained localized and hired as a vote 
mobilization machine (Machado, 1974: 1188-1195). Until the 1950s, the 
rivalry between factions in San Miguel in the city of Manila, for example, 
was very intense during its local elections. The factional competition was 
based on several alliances with large landholding families supported by 
families with businesses in Manila.  
 However, the forms of factional competition changed from making 
alliances to the locally powerful families to recruiting members from 
outside when the local elections became diversified—from a contest to win 
votes for the poblacion (town-based) elections to winning both poblacion 
(town) and the barrios (neighborhood) elections. Thus, what was a contest 
between two alliances of established pobliacion (town-based) family 
became a contest between the voters for the town and the voters in the 
barrio. These required factions to have wider base of membership and 
recruitments, leading “factions recruiting from outside the circle of 
traditional supporters among leading pobliacion families” (Machado, 
1974:1188).  Nevertheless, until the time when Machada wrote his study, 
the factions in San Miguel remain locally- based while serving as a vote 
mobilizer for the Nacionalista Party (p. 1189).  
 The change of traditional factional competition in the local election 
of Patag in the Silay city of the Philippines, is another example. According 
to Machado (1974), there were three main factions each initially centered 
on one extended family in Patag. But since the introduction of Barangay 
elections in 1960s, the elected Mayor created his own political 
organization with his own men while remaining in regular and direct 
contact with the barrio leaders and allied families (p.1191).  
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 In sum, local factions have transformed from being a promoter of 
the powerful local families’ interests to being an effective vote mobilizer. 
While remaining its original ties with the local families, these factions 
became increasingly inclusive by actively recruiting members beyond the 
powerful families. However, there is no scholarly and journalistic account 
yet of political factions in the Philippines that have gone beyond their 
original roles in the 1930s and 1960s. Factions still remain locally 
organized and regarded as a ‘vote mobilization machine’ for the nationally 
organized party for the benefit of the political elites.   
 On the one hand, factions in the Philippines can be considered 
stable and durable because they are locally organized by powerful families. 
Generations after generation of members in these families normally 
participate in each election. Thus, the various factions that these families 
organize endure and last long. On the other hand, there is uncertainty on 
whether or not these local factions organized sub-units for nationalized 
parties in the Philippines where they are supposed to influence domestic 
policies. Perhaps a future study can explore this issue by comparing the 
voter turnout rate between the local and the national elections. 
  Another characteristic of the factions in the Philippines is that they 
are hired to gain votes to be rewarded with a share of government resources. 
From the provincial as well as nationalized parties, the loyalties of 
members in most factions could be bought through the lucrative ‘pork 
barrel’. And since locally powerful families make alliances to elect barrio 
captains who have the best access to a town Mayor’s organization (Landé 
1965; Machada 1974), these families’ ‘loyalty’ can change depending on 
the barrio captain’s ability to bring resources back to them. Thus, loyalty 
changes may be more frequent in factions in the Philippines.  
 Given its bi-factional nature of having patrons and recipients, the 
Philippine’s party system can thus be described as under-institutionalized. 
The transactional character of its political system tends to breed 
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widespread corruption at the local and national levels of government. And 
most importantly, this hinders political parties in the country to compete 
during elections based on policy issues and ideological views.  
 
 6.2.2 South Korea’s Party Factions: From Splinter Groups to  
 Party Formation. 
 
 “Korean parties are almost oblivious to their organization. Subsequently, 
parties organize their networks in consideration of the fame of their candidates 
and their personal dignity as recognized in local areas. Party candidates try to 
reinforce their private organizations, not on the basis of any manifest political 
ideology, but through human relations with local patrons who possess prominent 
reputation and strong authority. Both party candidates and local patrons, seek 
alliances resulting in a cliquish pedigree in which personal affinity count more 
than ideology” (Ko, 1967:16).  
 
 This observation was made in the 1960s but remains an apt 
description about South Korea’s political parties. To some extent, they are 
characterized by intra-party split and one-man political parties (Diamon 
and Kim 2000; Hermanns, 2009). In addition, personality-driven level 
factions in political parties have been prevalent, which generally result in 
the lack of party unity and consensus (Jin Kai, 2017).  
 Generally, ‘charismatic individuals’ who become party leaders 
drive Korean politics. This was reflected from the time of Syngman Rhee 
to the era of the Three Kims (i.e., Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and 
Kim Jong-pil). The influence of these charismatic leaders is felt both 
within their parties and in national politics. Known as kae-pa-galdueng or 
‘factional struggle,’ it is considered as the main reason why party 
fragmentations occur—something that occurs with more frequency and 
greater intensity.  
 These party factions in South Korea have also afflicted opposition 
parties which sometimes fail to promote a cohesive stance against the 
dominance of the ruling party. Since these parties generally recruit 
members without any regard on their previous party affiliations, party 
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members are easily convened under the ‘centripetal force’ of government 
power. Opposition parties are normally organized from several splinter 
groups, merged together with the aim of toppling the ruling party. As one 
observer has put it, “an opposition party in South Korea is the product of 
factional power struggles and it is largely motivated by resistance (Denney, 
2013). Moreover, factionalism in an opposition party made it difficult for 
this groups to have a unified single leadership. Its practice of choosing 
different leaders as the party heads often resulted in splinter before the 
presidential elections as the 17th and the 18th presidential elections 
demonstrate.  
 The ruling or governing party in South Korea also experiences 
factionalism. It generally recruits their members without any regard on 
their previous party affiliations. Their party members are easily convened 
under the ‘centripetal force’ of governmental power and factional conflicts 
could be appeased or suppressed with sufficient political and economic 
leverages. However, whether ruling or opposition party, partisan 
infightings are the recurring theme in South Korea’s politics. Factionalism 
goes beyond inter-party competition and almost always result in intra-party 
divergence, conflict, and even critical stand-offs. As a result, the names of 
political parties have changed frequently and new parties are constantly 
convened as the result of various intra-party deadlock and disagreements. 
 The case of the opposition party mergers and splits from the early 
1960s to the late 1970s illustrate just how fragile political alliances in the 
progressive parties were. By May 1965, progressive parties made their 
staggering effort to create a unified stance against the military government 
led by Park Chung-hee. The Minjung Party (MP) or the “People’s Party” 
was thereby created, which was composed of a group led by Yoon Po-sun 
and another group led by Park Soon-chun.  
 Soon after its creation, however, the MP experienced intra-
factional strife over the issue of party leadership. The party was split into 
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two factions—some followed Yoon while others followed Park. In the end, 
Park became the Party leader. But soon, the two factions clashed again 
over the Treaty between Korea and Japan and the withdrawal of Korean 
troops from Vietnam, which made Yoon’s faction leave the party. Those 
who stayed in the MP (mainly Park’s faction) then split into two factions 
again. One argued for the reorganization of the MP, while the other pushed 
for the creation of a new party. Those who pushed for the creation of a new 
party then joined Yoon (who earlier left the MP) and created the New 
Korea Party (NKP) in October 1965.  
 However, there were pressures to form a united stance among 
opposition parties to defeat the civilian-turned- military regime of Park 
Chung-hee. Despite difficulties, attempts were made to unite the two 
biggest opposition parties together—the NKP led by Yoon Po-sun and the 
MP headed by Yu Chin-o who succeeded Park Soon-chun. Subsequently 
a new opposition party, known as the New Democratic Party (NDP), was 
created on February 7, 1967 with only three months remaining before the 
presidential election (Kim, 1991). But alas, the internal strife within the 
NDP failed to prevent Park Chung-hee from becoming the president during 
the 1967 election. Having been directly elected by the people, Park was 
given the legitimacy to rule South Korea and justification for the coup 
d’état in 1961, which overthrew the democratic government came as a 
result of April 19th Revolution. 
 The opposition parties from the 1960s to the 1970s have shown 
constant internal disputes as the NDP case has illustrated. It was only 
during a crisis such as the 1961 coup d’état that brought the opposition 
politicians together. Apart from those critical events, the NDP had to 
endure the perennial problem of factionalism, the constant struggle for 
dominance, and even an open split in the party. Meanwhile, ineffective 
party leadership in the NDP continued through most of the 1960s along 
with the party’s failure to recruit talented young politicians to join its ranks. 
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Because of these negative factors, the party’s image deteriorated through 
a series of political miscalculations and critical errors (Kim and Kihl 1976).  
 Another case of party factionalism undermining the party system 
in South Korea is the United Democratic Party (UDP) that competed 
during the 1987 election. The UDP’s internal party conflicts began over 
issues regarding the nomination of its presidential candidates. Senior party 
member Kim Dae-jung split from the UDP and created the Democratic 
Peace Party (DPP). This split of the UDP, deemed as a major opposition 
party, has resulted in the election of Roh Tae-woo of the Democratic 
Justice Party (DJP), which was the ruling authoritarian party. Because of 
Roh’s election as president, South Korea long remained under an 
authoritarian regime until the 1990s.  
 However, internal strife between factions in a party was not limited 
to progressive parties in South Korea. The conservative party also suffered 
political setbacks and party splits because of intense factional infightings. 
For example, the Grand National Party (GNP) that was once a strong, 
nationalized conservative party changed its name to Saenuri in 2012.  
 The story of Saenuri’s factional infightings goes back to the 2007 
presidential nomination process. Assembly member Park Guen-hye and 
Lee Myung-bak fought viciously over the nomination for the presidential 
candidacy. The struggle got to a point when a member of Park’s camp was 
detained on suspicion of violating Lee’s personal privacy while members 
from the Lee’s team continuously brought the issue of Park’s scandalous 
relationship with Choi Soon-sil and Choi’s father Choi Tae-min. When Lee 
was inaugurated as the 17th president, his faction within the GNP pressured 
those members who supported Park Guen-hye by not nominating members 
who supported Park. When Park Guen-hye became the presidential 
nominee, she changed GNP’s name to Saenuri and returned the favor to 
Lee’s faction. When Park was impeached because of her political scandal, 
the Saenuri split into two parties. Those who were supportive of Park 
 173 
remained and renamed the party to Liberty Korea Party and those who 
criticized Park left the Liberty Party and formed Baerun Party.  
 
 Summary: Party Factions and Institutionalized Party Systems 
   in the Philippines and South Korea  
 
 Factions within political parties did not result in party system 
institutionalization in both countries. These party factions are largely 
formed based on patronage and charismatic leadership. These factors 
promote expediency among politicians to bolt out of a party and create a 
new one, which render the political party vulnerable to rapid movement 
among party members.  
 In the Philippines, bi-factionalism is apparent in their political 
parties. Factions are organized as instruments for vote mobilization for the 
benefit of the local, provincial, and national parties. However, since most 
of the party factions in the Philippines are locally oriented, their influence 
to national party organization are minimal. But their purpose is strictly 
limited to generating votes and gathering loyalty for the patrons. Through 
political transactions, leaders from national parties financially assist their 
local faction leaders in exchange for political support and vote generation 
in favor of the party. This bi-factionalism and political transactions make 
the country’s party system vulnerable to corruption.  
 Meanwhile in South Korea, party factions are dependent on 
charismatic leaders. This tends to encourage party members to cross over 
and change parties whenever personal conflicts between leaders and 
members arise. Party members tend to shift their loyalty to a competing 
party leader in exchange for better rewards or political advancement. 
Typically, factions come and go with individual figures and do not last 
long. Moreover, the country’s party factions are less systematized with 
limited organizational structures, which cause frequent party splits.  
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 Because of these, factionalism in the Philippines and South Korea 
do not promote party organizational cohesion and political endurance. 
Moreover, it does not have direct party-to-state relationship and party-
voter-linkage in both countries. Thus, party splits are prevalent and results 
in the low-level of institutionalization in their party systems.  
    
6.3 Democratic Transitions in the Philippines and South Korea  
 
 The transition from authoritarian to democratic government in both 
countries have brought sudden changes to their political institutions and 
rendered party systems less institutionalized. Both the authoritarian regime 
and the opposition movements had less time to prepare for the post-
transitional phase. Since it reluctantly lost its power, the authoritarian 
regime would not participate in the transitioning process. Meanwhile, the 
opposition movement had every reason to discredit the authoritarian 
regime and to destroy the working institutions it developed. And because 
the transition occurred abruptly, it had less time to prepare for the post-
transition phase. In addition, power competition among the opposition 
intensified conflicts, which subsequently result in divisions in the grand 
‘democratic coalition’ both in the Philippines (Teehankee, 2002) and 
South Korea (Heo and Stockton, 2005). 
 
 6.3.1  Democratization in the Philippines: The People Power 
  Revolution and Its Political Reforms  
 
 Popular movements have significantly contributed in the 
democratization of the Philippines. The socialist group, National Democrat 
Front (NDF) has long been at the center of the popular movement, which 
initially sought to overthrow the government. Meanwhile, the Communist 
Party of the Philippines (CCP) has been engaged in armed struggles 
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through its ‘National People’s Army (NPA) (Devesa, 2005). In addition to 
these socialist and communist groups, religious organizations played a 
significant role in the social and political transformation in the country. 
Radical Catholic priests participated in political struggles by preaching 
‘liberation’ and organizing grassroots communities aimed at freeing the 
nation of a repressive regime led by the dictator Ferdinand Marcos 
(Tornquist, 1996; Wagner, 1997).  
 In 1983, the assassination of the opposition leader Senator Benigno 
Aquino Jr. triggered a nationwide movement to end the Marcos Regime. 
The massive demonstrations exacerbated by an economic crisis 
undermined the authoritarian regime’s legitimacy. The masses rallied 
behind the united opposition’s presidential candidate, Corazon Aquino, 
who was regarded as the symbol of protest against the dictatorship (Magno, 
1988:7). The people’s peaceful assertion of their power during the 
presidential election and subsequently the EDSA revolution in 1986 put an 
end to Marcos’ dictatorial regime. It started the restoration of democracy 
in the country and was regarded as a significant point in the evolution of 
Filipino democracy and led the world’s ‘decade of democratization (Yoo 
2008; Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003).  
 In the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution, 
Corazon Aquino embarked on a series of political reforms in the 
Philippines. Aquino organized a committee to draft a new Constitution, 
ratified through a referendum in February 1987. The 1987 constitution 
decentralized the government and eliminated officials in the central and 
local levels appointed by Marcos, who were considered as his cronies. 
These political reforms paved the way for members in the civil society and 
other progressive and reformed- mined groups to enter politics through 
direct elections (Kawanaka, 2002; Yu, 2005). Moreover, a provision in the 
1987 constitution eliminated those appointed in the legislative body (the 
Congress) during the Marcos’ era, which he had dissolved in the 1970s.  
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 In addition, the 1987 constitution also regulated the terms of 
elected executives and legislators. It allowed the president to serve for only 
one term of six years from the previous 8 years (4 years each term) in the 
previous constitution. Senators can serve a maximum of two consecutive 
terms and members of the House of Representative can serve a maximum 
of three consecutive terms.45 The political reforms focused on limiting or 
preventing the possibility of a single political patron to dominate the whole 
political and economic structure of the Philippines.  
 With the political reforms stipulated in the 1987 constitution, old 
political cronies of Marcos have rapidly declined and a new political 
structure emerged. The Kilusang Bagong Lipunnan (KBL, or New Society 
Movement) and a network of patron-client relationship that the party 
controlled have waned and replaced by a new political force. For example, 
parties like Lakas-NUCD (Lakas ng Tao-National Union of Christian 
Democrats), Laban ng Democratikong Pilipino (LDP), the Nationalist 
People’s Coalition (NPC), and the Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP) 
were established during the Aquino administration.   
 These reforms unfortunately failed to produce a stable multiparty 
system. The sudden replacement of policies and personnel brought 
political instabilities during the country’s democratic transition. During the 
Aquino presidency from 1986 to 1992, the military threatened to topple 
her government through coup d’état (there were five unsuccessful coups). 
Moreover, Philippines politics is still dominated by powerful and rich 
families. The 1986 People Power movement may have revived, to some 
degree, democratic rule in the Philippines, but it continued to promote the 
influence of the political elites. For example, the Lopez family who were 
stripped of their assets and driven into exile by Marcos, returned to Manila 
                                                      
45 Senators serve six years per term, and House members serve three years per term. 
As in the United States, elections are held for half of the Philippines Senators every 
three years.  
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in 1980 and began reclaiming both its corporations and its provincial 
power base.  
 President Corazon Aquino herself belonged to one of the most 
powerful oligarchs in the Philippines (McCoy, 2009). The power vacuum 
left by Marcos’ cronies were quickly filled by those related to or have 
connections with politically influential families. This resulted in the 
revival of the patron-client network with the return of these elites. 
Meanwhile, election related violence and corruption also intensified as the 
new constitution allowed multiparty politics with only an electoral 
threshold level of 2 percent. This made the entry of a political party to the 
Congress relatively easy.46 Since positions in the public office provide 
access to government resources, the drive of a political candidate to win 
an election is high. And because of the country’s patronage politics, there 
are several incidences of candidate switching party mergers and splits.  
 
 As discussed in the previous section, Philippines politics has its 
roots deeply entrenched in local politics. “Local bosses rely on inter-
governmental alliances…to monopolize public section resources” (Sidel, 
1999: 145) and wield substantial coercive and socio-economic power. 
Without institutionalized political parties, the central political forces have 
always relied on local factions to mobilize voters, thus making the central 
government vulnerable to local influence. But while being dependent on 
local political alliances, the nationally-elected political elites have also 
created localized party machineries to perpetuate political control and limit 
the power of local and provincial-level politicians (Gera, 2007:148).  
 Under Marcos, the power of local elites was forfeited by the central 
government. With the imposition of martial law (21 September 1972), the 
                                                      
46 The electoral threshold is the minimum share of the primary vote which a candidate 
or a political party requires to achieve before they become entitled to any 
representation in a legislature.  
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provincial and municipal politicians as well as factions began tailoring 
their activities to the centrally-directed bureaucracies which carried out the 
president’s policies (Turner, 1989). However, with the Philippines 
democratization came the decentralization of the bureaucratic power that 
the country had over its local and provincial elites. Hutchcroft (1998), 
Rood (n.d.), and Rivera (2002) argue that the democratic transition in the 
Philippines was infused with political agenda to accommodate the 
demands of the powerful local elites in exchange for support to the political 
objectives of the post-Marcos leadership. Thereby, the Aquino 
administration endorsed decentralization as a preventive measure against 
the re-emergence of a tyranny. However, this also restored the power of 
the anti-Marcos local elites. Rood (n.d.) notes that the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives Ramon Mitra pushed for the Local Government 
Code so he could gain the support of local politicians in his bid to succeed 
President Aquino in 1992, which did not come into fruition (p.5-6).  
 Without solid and stable political parties in the Philippines, the re-
emergence of the local political force and the power shifting from the 
center to the local government units meant that the ‘patronage’ politics 
made its comeback. The nature of the political parties in the country, as a 
result of its democratic transition through people power, characterized the 
under-institutionalized nature of its party system.  
  
 6.3.2  Democratization in South Korea: The June Democratic 
  Movement and Its Political Aftermath 
 
 The assassination of Park Chung-hee in 1979 brought a sudden end 
to his 18 years of dictatorship, which increased the people’s hope for 
democratization. Those who were expelled for their pro-democracy 
movement returned to their previous posts. This development was called 
the Seoul Spring, a period of democratization in South Korea from October 
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1979 to May of 1980.47 However, it ended with the Gwangju Massacre in 
1980.  
 Soon after the Gwangju massacre, the military government led by 
General Chun Doo-whan extended martial law, banned all political 
activities, closed down universities, censored the press, and arrested 
opposition politicians. Then in February 1981, Chun was elected as the 
president of the Fifth Republic under a revised constitution and maintained 
authoritarian rule for the next seven years. The National Security law in 
combination with the anti-Communist law were routinely utilized to 
suppress political opposition. 
 In 1987, massive demonstrations known as the June Democracy 
Movement, swept the whole nation that led Chun to concede to the 
people’s demand for democratization. This concession, known as the June 
29 Declaration, was formally announced by Roh Tae-woo, who was 
Chun’s handpicked successor and the ruling party, the Democratic Justice 
Party leader. This declaration marked the beginning of South Korea’s 
transition to democracy.    
 Given the popular demand for democratization, there were high 
expectations that the 1987 presidential election would go to the opposition. 
However, when the common goal of weakening the authoritarian regime 
was achieved, the democratic coalition divided into two camps. Due to the 
country’s plurality voting system, the authoritarian Roh won the election 
because two prominent civilian leaders split the democratic opposition 
votes.  
 Roh and his administration was by no means a continuation of the 
ruthless military regime. However, it was an extension of the military 
regime with moderate reform policies that were compatible with the 
                                                      
47 The word spring is used as a political metaphor. It implies the start of better time, 
liberation from political suppression or massive demonstrations against the political 
establishment. The Seoul Spring originated from the Prgaue Spring of 1968, which 
triggered the Warsaw Pact troop invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
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interests of the old regime supporters (Croissant, 1998). With Roh at the 
top representing the old regime of the military forces mixed into the 
democratic system, there was less likelihood of a military coup d’état occur 
again.  
 One problem the elected President (i.e., Roh Tae-woo) had was a 
weak legitimacy (with only 37 percent of the popular vote). In addition, 
his Democratic Justice Party (DJP) also failed to win an absolute majority 
in the 1988 National Assembly election. 48  For the first time in South 
Korea’s history, there was a strong opposition against a weak majority. 
With the growing popularity of democratic transition, South Korea seemed 
heading towards a multiparty democracy. Because of this, the political elite 
who supported the old authoritarian regime felt threatened. Thus, Roh and 
the DJP thought and devised a plan to continue their rule under democracy 
via a grand party merger. This grand merger would give them 
parliamentary power to pass the laws and the life line to the authoritarian 
party (DJP) without the need for the party and the government going 
through thorough transformation from its autocratic past.  
 The political development of the 1991 three-party-merger leading 
to the National Assembly election on March 25, 1992 provided 
explanations on why democratic transition in South Korea failed to 
produce institutionalized party system. The event not only brought changes 
in vote alignment, but it made South Korea, based on what O’Donnell 
(1993) termed as a “delegative democracy,” rather than a full-democratic 
country. According to him, “[d]elegative democracies rest on the premise 
that whoever wins the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she 
sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and 
by a constitutionally limited term of office (59).”  
                                                      
48 The DJP won only 125 seats out of 299 while the opposition parties Reunification 
Democratic Party (RDP, led by Kim Yong-sam) won 59 seats; the Peace Democratic 
Party (PDP led by Kim Dae-jung) won 70 seats, and the New Democratic Republican 
Party (NDRP led by Kim Jong-pil) won 35 seats.  
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 6.3.2.1 The 1991 Three-party Merger 
 
By mid 1989, the media outlets supported the merger of the opposition 
groups, believing that it is necessary for South Korea to have a political re-
organization. They argued that such “political re-organization will bring 
political stability and economic growth to the nation, which had been 
afflicted by unrest and instability in the course of democratization in recent 
years” (Lee, 1990:127). However, most importantly, the merger of the 
opposition groups will isolate the remains of the authoritarian past and end 
the DJP in most democratic way.  Amidst the media bombardment, 
Roh approached the leaders of each opposition parties promising 
constitutional reforms through changing the government from presidential 
to parliamentary system. Roh and his DJP approached Kim Dae-jung with 
the promise of giving the Peaceful Democratic Party (PDP) full legislative 
power to handle the Gwangju Massacre issue. But when Kim Dae-jung did 
not take the offer, Roh’s DJP then approached Kim Young-sam’s 
Unification Democratic Party (UDP), and Kim Jong-pil’s New Democratic 
Republican Party (NDRP). Kim Young-sam thought that he had a better 
chance of becoming the next president if his UDP merged with the DJP. 
Meanwhile Kim Jong-pil believed that his NDRP had a better chance of 
survival by merging with the DJP.  
 Thus, the authoritarian DJP and the democratic opposition groups 
UDP and NDRP merged and formed the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP). 
The merger allowed the old authoritarian groups’ resources and power 
bases intact, thereby making the consolidation a deepening of delegative 
democracy in Korea. The authoritarian groups could also have gained 
access to government institutions such as the presidency and the National 
Assembly, and also exert a considerable influence on public policy making, 
especially on electoral laws.  
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 The newly created DLP allowed authoritarian rule to continue and 
then gradually decay (Lee, 1995; Yang, 1995) rather than undergo a 
thorough adaptation to democratic principles. Eventually, the DLP became 
an absolute majority in the National Assembly with 218 seats. Kim Dae-
jung and his PDP became the sole opposition. 
 This three-party-merger caused the party system in South Korea 
less institutionalized because of the following reasons: First, the merger 
allowed the authoritarian groups to gradually decline. This gradual decline 
in authoritarian rule produced strong-man presidents in South Korea. The 
delegative democracy in South Korea render party organization 
meaningless as the president in power can have enormous influence. Such 
president can determine who to nominate for party leadership in the 
governing party. Since democratization, every president in South Korea 
has practiced this style of governance.  
 For example, most of the reform efforts in the National Assembly 
and electoral politics are driven by the president. Kim Yong-sam’s reform 
efforts in these areas were mostly driven by his own will and were 
inconsistently implemented. Nevertheless, the reforms were popular with 
the public and were meant to consolidate Korean democracy, but the 
manner in which the president carried out the reforms was personalistic 
(Lee, 1999). During his presidency, Kim issued around 1,780 presidential 
decrees, nearly twice the number of laws passed by the parliament 
(Crosisant and John (eds.), 2002:19). 
 Another sign of delegative democracy in South Korea was 
showcased during Park Gyen-hye’s presidency. Park forced floor leader 
Yoo Seung-min, her longest aid and a floor leader of the Saenuri Party, to 
step down from his post by publicly lambasting him for leading 
negotiations with the main opposition party on the passage of a 
parliamentary revision bill which she earlier vetoed. As soon as Park made 
her public remarks on Yoo, the Saenuri Party hurriedly came up with a 
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resolution recommending his resignation. This revealed the sheer power 
presidents can exercise to political parties in South Korea. Moreover, 
presidents have a long history of dissolving opposition parties in South 
Korea. 49  
  Second, given that presidents had enormous power during their 
term (i.e., five-year single term), rampant corruption has always been the 
problem in South Korean politics. Kim Yong-sam and Kim Dae-jung were 
incapacitated in the second half of their presidencies because of corruption 
scandals that involved their families and close associates. The corruption 
scandals involving their sons hit a fatal blow on the authority and 
leadership of the democratic government of the two Kims (Im, 2004: 191-
2). What is worse, these corruption cases usually result in party splits or 
party change, as the ruling party of the president wants to distance itself 
from their leader. At the end of his tenure, Kim Yong-sam’s DLP changed 
its party name to the Hanara Party (lit. Grand National Party, GNP) and 
elected Lee Hoe-chang as presidential candidate and party leader. Kim 
Dae-jung and his National Congress for New Politics Party (NCNPP) 
faced the same fate. The NCNPP merged with smaller New People’s Party 
(NPP) led by Lee In-jae and created Millennium Democratic Party. Roh 
Mu-hyun, Lee Myung-bak, and Park Gun-hey all faced similar issues.  
 
  Summary:  Democratic and Party System institutionalization in 
   the Philippines and South Korea  
 
 Both countries experienced people-led transitions to democracy 
with the active influence and participation of opposition groups. Though 
they have succeeded in removing authoritarian regimes, the people’s 
                                                      
49 For example, Rhee Syngman charged his political opponent, Cho Bong-am with 
espionage and eliminated the Progressive Party. Cho was executed the following 
year. 
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democracy movements in the Philippines and South Korea have not 
established strong political parties and institutions during their transition 
phases. Therefore, rather than making compromises with the outgoing 
authoritarian regime, the democratic opposition groups ended up making 
political compromises among themselves. They intended to consolidate 
and protect their share of political power and influence at the expense of 
promoting a stable political environment and a stable party system.  
 In the Philippines, the People-Power Movement brought 
decentralization in its bureaucratic institutions. But with decentralized 
power comes the resurgence of the powerful local elites and the 
proliferation of patronage politics. Such decentralization increased the 
influence of local patrons on national parties that enabled corruption and 
inefficiencies. The rise of the local patrons and their increased influence 
on the nationalized party turned parties back to the ‘old boys club’ 
(Rocamora, n.d.). Since its democratic transition, the length of inter-party 
interactions has shortened and party-to-party legitimacy became lower. 
 In South Korea, the June Democracy Movement led to its 
democratization and the restructuring of its party system. The greed for 
power in post-transition Korea resulted in a split among the democratic 
coalition, with half of it making a pact with the former authoritarian power 
that formed the 1991 Three-Party merger. Because of this, previous 
authoritarian influence remained among parties in South Korea and led the 
country to entrust enormous power to elected presidents with limited terms. 
These powerful presidents have often undermined party politics and 
further consolidated personalism over to party politics. This concentration 
of power make the presidents and his family members vulnerable to 
corruption. From Roh Tae-woo to Park Guen-hye, all democratically 
elected presidents have had scandals related to their family members and 
closest friends and these scandals have always led into party splits near the 
end of their tenure. This contributes to frequent changes in inter-party 
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interactions, party-to-party legitimacy, and high electoral volatility. 
Moreover, opportunism and a quest for power rather than continued inter-
party interactions define the party system in South Korea.  
  The bottom-up democratic transitions in the Philippines and South 
Korea may vary, yet their impact is largely similar. Inter-party competition 
became superficial as politicians and their parties competed during 
elections for power and not based on policies. Moreover, this people-led 
democratic transition influenced their voting behaviour in a negative way. 
With the decentralization of government and the resurgence of regional 
divide, Filipinos and Koreans voters are largely affected by the influence 
of local elites and charismatic leaders. These factors point to patronage 
politics to mobilize votes in both countries. Therefore, this approach to 
democratization served to undermine the institutionalization of party 






























 This thesis expounded on the existing scholarly studies on party 
system institutionalization. Chapter Two discussed how the literature have 
progressed from Huntington’s ‘institutionalization’ to Mainwaring and 
Scully’s ‘party system institutionalization’. According to studies, party 
system institutionalization is mainly conceptualized in one-dimension (i.e., 
system-ness), which led some scholars to produce subsequent arguments 
based on non-empirical assumptions. Moreover, most studies treated party 
system institutionalization as an independent variable rather than a 
dependent variable. Such limitations were addressed in Chapter Three and 
suggested scholarly approaches to contribute to the existing literature and 
broaden understanding on party system institutionalization.  
 This study also presented institutionalization as a concept and 
discussed its variations in the party systems of different countries. Chapter 
Four analyzes this using Randall and Svåsand’s four indexes and applying 
them in the political context of Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and South 
Korea. Based on the composite index, the level of institutionalization of 
each country’s party system is revealed in the following scores: Taiwan 
(11); Japan (10); the Philippines (6); South Korea (4). Such quantitative 
analysis provides a scientific way of determining the degree of 
institutionalization of party systems based on empirical observation and 
numerical data. Thus, this study has contributed to a new measurement of 
institutionalization.  
 The divergent party system institutionalization scores across the 
four countries point to both external and internal factors. These external 
factors include social cleavage (the core of political competition within a 
polity) and democratic transitions (the critical juncture in a nation’s 
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political life that can significantly influence change and continuity of party 
systems). Both are considered relevant since they alter existing systemic 
constraints and redesign the contours of the political system. In addition, 
the internal factor involves party factions. Essentially, factions that are 
well-structured favor the development of party systems in a country.  
 These external and internal factors are further examined based on 
the following hypothesized relationship: The first one linked party system 
institutionalization with social cleavage, arguing that a silent social divide 
would sustain political parties based on clear party lines. Second, party 
system institutionalization is associated with institutionalized factions, 
which enabled parties to continuously operate without experiencing major 
changes. Lastly, party system institutionalization involves different modes 
of democratic transition. The top-down (authoritarian-led) and bottom-up 
(people-led) transitions result in changes in political institutions that may 
impact the development of party systems. Using comparative historical 
analysis, this study examines the reasons behind the variation of party 
system institutionalization across the four countries.  
 Chapter Five explains the reasons behind the high-level of party 
system institutionalization in Japan and Taiwan. Social cleavages in both 
countries have long sustained the existence of their political parties based 
on clear party lines. Moreover, institutionalized factions in their political 
parties helped organize and sustain competition since their early 
development (as in the case of Japan’s LDP and Taiwan’s KMT). In 
addition, the top-down (authoritarian-led) democratic transitions led to the 
preservation of political and economic institutions in Japan and Taiwan. 
Each of these factors has influenced the continuity and durability of parties 
and the stability of interparty competition, party-to-state relations, and 
voter-to-party linkages over time. Based on both countries’ cases, this 
thesis contends that salient social cleavages, institutionalized factions, and 
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top-down democratic transitions have not only prolonged the existence of 
their political parties, but also institutionalized their party systems.  
 Chapter Six explains why there is low-level of party system 
institutionalization in the Philippines and South Korea. First, social 
distinctions in both countries did not result in an organized political 
expression that would have institutionalized their party systems. Second, 
the absence of institutionalized factions among their political parties 
hindered the development of their party systems. Third, bottom-up 
(people-led) democratic transitions resulted in radial changes in the 
political and economic institutions of the Philippines and South Korea. 
Each of these factors has caused disruptions in the existence of party 
organizations, unpredictability in inter-party competition, complexities in 
party-to-state relations, and decline in voter support over time. Based on 
both of these countries’ cases, this thesis contends that social distinction 
(rather than social cleavage), non-institutionalized factions in party 
organizations (such as localized groups and personal cliques), and 
democratic transition (based on bottom-up approach) deterred the growth 
of their political parties and undermined the institutionalization of their 
party systems.  
 
 The following table summarizes the main points of this study: 
Table 7: Summary of the main points 
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* PSI stands for party system institutionalization.  
 
  
 The following provides the rationale behind the variations in the 
level of party system institutionalization of each country: Japan has a 
relatively institutionalized party system. Its rural-urban social cleavage 
organized political representations that produced a clear party line. 
Moreover, institutionalized factions in Japan’s LDP helped unify and 
organize the party to compete against major and more established political 
parties. These factors eventually led to the growth of the party, becoming 
a major political organization in the country’s party system. Meanwhile, 
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Japan’s top-down democratic transition provided regime stability and the 
continuation of its political institutions.  
 Taiwan has the most institutionalized party system among the 
countries discussed. It has a clear national identity cleavage that is 
highlighted in inter-party competition and enabled the mobilization of 
voters. In addition, institutionalized factions in Taiwan’s DPP empowered 
the party to compete against major parties and to mobilize voter support. 
Meanwhile, Taiwan’s gradual top-down democratic transition maintained 
its political institutions.  
 The Philippines has a relatively low level of party system 
institutionalization. The pervasive nature of ‘patronage politics’ centering 
on patron-client relations affected the country’s political institutions. 
Because of this, there was no distinct social cleavage that would have 
influenced and organized competition among political parties. Moreover, 
party factions are less institutionalized since they are largely organized 
around personal and family rivalries of the politically powerful 
personalities, leading to frequent party crossovers among politicians. 
Meanwhile, the bottom-up democratic transition in the Philippines through 
People Power Revolution brought political instability as its political elites 
from the Martial law era continued to influence the country’s political 
institutions.  
 South Korea has the least institutionalized party system among the 
other countries evaluated. Its previous political organizations that 
promoted democratic socialist ideology were suppressed and persecuted 
by its past authoritarian regime. Since then, political parties were 
organized according to the political issues presented to them at any given 
time, resulting in the absence of a well-defined social cleavage. Moreover, 
the country’s political parties were organized around personal cliques and 
loyalty of members, which leads to frequent party splits and contributes in 
undermining party longevity. Meanwhile, South Korea’s bottom-up 
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democratic transition through the June Democratic Movement produced 
abrupt and sudden changes in its institutional arrangements that prevented 
its party system to be more stable and institutionalized.  
 
 Aside from the discrepancies in their degree of institutionalization, 
this thesis also assessed the quality of institutionalization of the party 
systems across the four countries. It demonstrated that party system 
institutionalization is not only based on systematic level but also at an 
attitudinal level. This study also considered not only the extent to which 
party systems are institutionalized, but also the degree to which these 
political organizations perform democratic tasks (i.e., organize and 
represent based on a clear social cleavage) and the level of public 
involvement in politics. Based on this thesis, political parties in Japan and 
Taiwan are able to perform democratic tasks with an increased political 
participation among their people compared to those of the Philippines and 
South Korea.  
 
 Empirically, this thesis has established that the development of 
party systems requires state institutions to be stable and political parties be 
adaptable to the ongoing macrosocial changes for party systems to be 
institutionalized. But despite the contributions of this study, the complex 
nature of party system institutionalization warrants further studies 
especially on the dynamic properties of political organizations. It is hoped 
that this academic research on party system institutionalization can 
influence future academic analysis on party politics in particular, and 
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Election 
Years 
Party Dyads  Year of 
Dyads 
1986 Liberal Democratic Party vs Socialist Party of Japan  0 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Komeito Party  0 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Japanese Communist Party  0 
 




Liberal Democratic Party vs New Liberal Club  0 
 




Socialists Party of Japan vs Komeito Party 0 
 
Socialist Party of Japan vs Japanaese Communist Party 0 
 
Socialist Party of Japan vs Jaapan Democratic Socialist Party 0 
 
Socialist Party of Jpaan vs New Liberal Club 0 
 
Socialist Party of Japan vs United Socialist Democratic Party 0 
 
Komeito Party vs Japanese Communist Party 0 
 
Komeito Party vs Japan Democratic Socialist Party  0 
 
Komeito Party vs New Liberal Club  0 
 
Komeito Party vs United Socialit Democratic Party 0 
 
Japanese Communist Party vs Democratic Socialist Party 0 
 
Japanese Communist Party vs New Liberal Club 0 
 




Democratic Socialist Party vs New Liberal Club 0 
 




New Liberal Club vs United Socialist Democratic Party 0 
1990 Liberal Democratic Party vs Socialist Party of Japan  4 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Komeito Party  4 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Japanese Communist Party  4 
 








Liberal Democratic Party vs Prorssive Party  0 
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Socialist Party of Japan vs Komeito Party 4 
 
Socialist Party of Japan vs Japanese Communist Party 4 
 
Socialist Party of Japan vs Japan Democratic Socialist Party 4 
 
Socialist Party of Japan vs United Socialist Democratic Party  4 
 
Socialist Party of Japan vs Progressive Party 0 
 
Komeito Party vs Japanese Communist Party 4 
 
Komeito Party vs Japan Democratic Socialist Party  4 
 
Komeito Party vs United Socialist Democratic Party 4 
 
Komeito Party vs Progressive Party 0 
 








Japanese Communist Party vs Progressive Party  0 
 




Japan Democratic Socialist Party vs Progressive Party 0 
 
United Socilaist Democratic Party vs Progressive Party 0 




Liberal Democratic Party vs Shinseito Party 0 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Komeito Party  8 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Japan New Party  0 
 




Liberal Democratic party vs Japanese Communist Party  8 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Sakigake 0 
 




Social Democratic Party of Japan vs Shinseito Party 0 
 
Social Democratic Party of Japan vs Komeito Party 0 
 
Social Democratic Party of Japan vs Japan New Party  0 
 








Social Democratic Party of Japan vs Sakigake 0 
 
Social Democratic Party of Japan vs United Socialist 
Democratic Party  
0 
 
Shinseito Party vs Komeito Party  0 
 
Shinseito Party vs Japan New Party 0 
 
Shinseito Party vs Japan Democratic Socialist Party 0 
 
Shinseito Party vs Jaapanese Communist Party 0 
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Shinsheito Party vs Sakigake 0 
 
Shinseito Party vs United Socialist Democratic Party  0 
 
Komeito Party vs Japan New Party 0 
 
Komeito Party vs Japan Democratic Socialist Party  0 
 
Komeito Party vs Japanese Communist Party  8 
 
Komeito Party vs Sakigake  0 
 
Komeito Party vs United Socialist Democratic Party 8 
 
Japan New Party vs Japan Democratic Soicialist Party  0 
 
Japan New Party vs Japanese Communist Party 0 
 
Japan New Party vs Sakigake 0 
 
Japan New Party vs United Socialist Democratic Party 0 
 




Japan Democratic Socialist Party vs Sakigake 0 
 




Japanese Communist Party vs Sakigake 0 
 




Sakigake vs United Socialist Democratic Party 0 
1996 Liberal Democratic Party vs New Frontier party  0 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Democratic Party of Japan  0 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Japan Communist Party  11 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Social Democratic Party  11 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs New Party Sakigake 0 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Democratic Reform Party  0 
 
New Frontier Party vs Democratic Party of Japan  0 
 
New Frontier Party vs Japan Communist Party 0 
 
New Frontier Party vs Social Democratic Party  0 
 
New Frontier Party vs New Party Sakigake 0 
 
New Frontier Party vs Democratic Reform Party  0 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Japan Communist Party 0 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Social Democratic Party  0 
 
Democratic Party of japan vs New Party Sakigake 0 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Democratic Reform Party 0 
 
Japan Communist Party vs Social Democratic Party  11 
 
Japan Communist Party vs New Party Sakigake 0 
 
Japan Communist Party vs Democratic Reform Party 0 
 
Social Democratic Party vs New Party Sakigake 0 
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Social Democratic Party vs Democratic Reform Party  0 
 
New Party Sakigake vs Democratic Reform Party 0 
2000 Liberal Democratic Party vs Democratic Party of Japan  4 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs New Komeito  0 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Liberal Party  0 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Japanese Communist Party  15 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Social Democratic Party  15 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs New Conservative Party  0 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Mushozoku-no-kai  0 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Liberal League  0 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs New Komeito  0 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Liberal Party  0 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Japanese Communist Party  4 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Social Democratic Party  4 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs New Conservative Party  0 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Mushozoku-no-kai 0 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Liberal League  0 
 
New Komeito vs Liberal Party  0 
 
New Komeito vs Japanese Communist Party  0 
 
New Komeito vs Social Democratic Party  0 
 
New Komeito vs New Conservative Party  0 
 
New Komeito vs Mushozoku-no-kai 0 
 
New Komeito vs Liberal League  0 
 
Liberal Party vs Japanese Communist Party  0 
 
Liberal Party vs Social Democratic Party  0 
 
Liberal Party vs New Conservative Party  0 
 
Liberal Party vs Mushuozoku-no-kai  0 
 
Liberal Party vs Liberal League 0 
 
Japanese Communist Party vs Social Democratic Party 15 
 
Japanese Communist Party vs New Conservative Party 0 
 
Japanese Communist Party vs Mushozjoku-no-kai 0 
 
Japanese Communist Party vs Liberal League 0 
 
Social Democratic Party vs New Conservative Party  0 
 
Social Democratic Party vs Mushozoku-no-kai 0 
 
Social Democratic Party vs Liberal League  0 
 
New Conservative Party vs Mushozoku-no-kai  0 
 
New Conservative Party vs Liberal League 0 
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Mushozoku-no-kai vs Liberal League  0 
2003 Liberal Democratic Party vs Democratic Party of Japan  7 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs New Komeito  3 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Japanese Communist Party  18 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Social Democratic Party  18 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs New Conservative Party  3 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs New Komeito  3 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Japanese Communist Party  7 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Social Democratic Party  7 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs New Conservative Party  3 
 
New Komeito vs Japanaese Communist Party  3 
 
New Komeito vs Social Democratic Party  3 
 
New Komeito vs New Conservative Party  3 
 
Japanese Communist Party vs Social Democratic Party  18 
 
Japanese Communist Party vs New Conservative Party 3 
 
Social Democratic Party vs New Conservative Party  3 
2005 Liberal Democratic Party vs Democratic Party of Japan  9 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs New Komeito Party 5 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Japanese Communist Party  20 
 
Liberal Dmeocratic Party vs Social Democratic Party  20 
 








Liberal Democratic Party vs Shinto Daichi (New Party 
Mother Earth)  
0 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs New Komeito Party  5 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Japanese Communist Party  9 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Social Democratic Party  9 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Kokumin Shinto  0 
 








New Komeito Party vs Japanese Communist Party  5 
 
New Komeito Party vs Social Democratic Party  5 
 
New Komeito Party vs Kokumin Shinto  0 
 
New Komeito Party vs Shinto Nippon (New Party Japan) 0 
 




Japanese Communist Party vs Social Democratic Party  20 
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Japanese Communist Party vs Kokumin Shinto  0 
 








Social Democratic Party vs Kokumin Shinto  0 
 








Kokumin Shinto vs Shinto Nippon (New Party Japan) 0 
 
Kokumin Shinto vs Shinto Daichi (New Party Mother Earth) 0 
 
Shinto Nippon (New Party Japan ) vs Shinto Diaichi (New 
Party Mother Earth) 
0 
2009 Democratic party of japan vs Liberal Democratic Party  13 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs New Komeito 9 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Japanese Communist Party  24 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Social Democratic Party  24 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Your Party (Minna no To) 0 
 












Liberal Democratic Party vs New Komeito  9 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Japanese Communist Party  24 
 
Liiberal Democratic Party vs Social Democratic Party 24 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Your Party (Minna no To) 0 
 








Liberal Democratic Party vs Shinto Daichi (New Party 
Mother Earth)  
4 
 
New Komeito vs Japanese Communist Party  9 
 
New Komeito vs Social Democratic Party  9 
 
New Komeito vs Your Party (Minna no To) 0 
 
New Komeito vs Kokumin Shinto (People's New Party) 4 
 
New Komeito vs Shinto Nippon (New Party Japan) 4 
 
New Komeito vs Shinto Daichi (New Party Mother Earth) 4 
 
Japanese Communist Party vs Social Democratic Party  24 
 
Japanese Communist Party vs Your Party (Minna no To) 0 
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Social Democratic Party vs Your Party (Minna no To) 0 
 
























Kokumin Shinto (People's New Party) vs Hinto Nippon 
(New Party Japan) 
4 
 
Shinto Nippon (New Party Japan ) vs Shinto Diaichi (New 
Party Mother Earth) 
4 
2012 Liberal Democratic Party vs Democratic Party of Japan  16 
 




Liberal Democratic Party vs New Komeito  12 
 




LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY VS NIPPON MIRAI 
NO TO (Tomorrow Party of Japan) 
0 
 
Liberal Democratic party vs Japanese Communist Party  27 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Social Democratic Party  27 
 












Democratic Party of Japan vs New Komeito  12 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Your Party (Minna no To) 3 
 
Demcoratic party of Japan  vs Nippon Mirai no To 
(Tomorrow Party of Japan) 
0 
 
Democratic party of Japan vs Japanese Communist Party  27 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Social Democratic Party  27 
 













Nippon ishi no Kai (Japan Resotration Party) vs Your Party 
(Minna no To) 
0 
 
Nippon ishi no Kai (Japan Restoration Party) vs Nippon 
Mirai no To (Tomorrow Party of Japan) 
0 
 








Nippon ishi no Kai (Japan Restoration Party) vs Kokumin 
Shinto (People's New Party) 
0 
 
Nippon ishi no Kai (Japan Restoration Party) vs Shinto 
Daichi (New Party Mother Earth) 
0 
 
New Komeito vs Your Party (Minna no To)  3 
 




New Komeito vs Japanese Communist Party  12 
 
New Komeito vs Social Democratic Party  12 
 
New Komeito vs Kokumin Shinto (People's New Party) 7 
 
New Komeito vs Shinto Daichi (New Party Mother Earth) 7 
 
Your Party (Minna no To) vs Japanese Communist Party 0 
 
Your Party (Minna no To) vs Social Democratic Party  0 
 








Japanese Communist Party vs Social Democratic Party 27 
 
















Kokuminto Shinto (People's New Party) vs Shinto Daichi 
(New party Mother Earth)  
7 
2014 Liberal Democratic Party vs Democratic Party of Japan  18 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs Nippon Ishin no To (Japan 
Restoration Party)  
2 
 
Liberal Democratic Party vs New Komeito 14 
 
Liberal Democratic party vs Japanese Communist Party  29 
 
Liberal Democratic party vs Social Democratic Party  29 
 













Democratic Party of Japan vs New Komeito 14 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Japanese Communist Party  29 
 
Democratic Party of Japan vs Social Democratic Party  29 
 




















Nippon Ishin no To (Japan Restoration Party) vs Jisedai no 
To (Party for Future Generation) 
2 
 
Nippon Ishin no To (Japan Restoration Party) vs Seikatsu no 
To (People's Life Party)  
2 
 
New Komeito vs Japanese Communist Party  14 
 
New Komeito vs Social Democratic Party  14 
 
New komeito vs Jisedai no To (Party for Future Generations) 0 
 
New Komeito vs Seikatsu no To (People's Life Party)  0 
 
Japanese Communist party vs Social Democratic Party  29 
 
















Jisedai no To (Party for Future Generation) vs Seikatsu no 














Election Year Party Dyad Year of 
Dyad 
1986 Koumintang- Chinese Youth Party  0 
1989 Koumingtang- Chinese Youth Party  3 
 
Koumingtang-Democratic Progressive Party 0 
 
Chinese Youth Party vs Democratic Progressive Party 0 
1992 Koumingtang-Democratic Progressive Party 3 
 
Koumingtang- Chinese Social Democratic Party 0 
 
Democratic Progressive Party vs Chinese Social Democratic Party 0 
1995 Koumingtang- Democratic Progressive Party 6 
 
Koumingtang- New Party 0 
 
Democratic Progressive Party vs New Party  0 
1998 Koumingtang-Democratic Progressive Party 6 
 
Koumingtang-New party 3 
 
Koumingtang-Democratic Union of Taiwan 0 
 
Koumingtang-New Nation Alliance 0 
 
Koumingtang-Taiwan Independence Party 0 
 
Koumingtang-Nationwide Democratic Non-partisan Union 0 
 
Democratic Progressive Party vs New Party  3 
 
Democratic Progressive Party vs Democratic Union of Taiwan  0 
 
Democratic Progressive Party vs New Nation Alliance  0 
 
Democratic Progressive Party vs Taiwan Independence Party  0 
 




New Party vs Democratic Union of Taiwan  0 
 
New Party vs New Nation Alliance 0 
 
New Party vs Taiwan Independence Party 0 
 
New Party vs Nationwide Democratic Non-Partisan Union 0 
 
Democratic Union of Taiwan vs New Nation Alliance 0 
 
Democratic Union of Taiwan vs Taiwan Independence Party  0 
 




New Nation Alliance vs Taiwan Independence Party 0 
 




Taiwan Independent Party vs Nationwide Democratic Non-Partisan 
Union 
0 
2001 Koumingtang-Democratic Progressive Party 9 
 224 
 
Koumingtang-People First Party 0 
 
Koumingtang-Taiwan Solidarity Union 0 
 
Koumingtang-New Party  6 
 
Democratic Progressive Party vs People First Party  0 
 
Democratic Progressive Party vs Taiwan Solidarity Union 0 
 
Democratic Progressive Party vs New Party  6 
 
People First Party vs Taiwan Solidarity Union 0 
 
People First Party vs New Party  0 
 
Taiwan Solidarty Union vs New Party  0 
2004 Koumintang vs Democratic Progressive Party 12 
 
Koumingtang vs People First Party  3 
 
Koumingtang vs Taiwan Solidarity Union 3 
 
Koumingtang vs Non-Partisan Solidarity Union 0 
 
Koumingtang vs New party  9 
 
Democratic Progressive party vs People First Party  3 
 
Democratic Progressive Party vs Taiwan Solidarity Union 3 
 
Democratic Progressive Party vs Non-Partisan Solidarty Uion 0 
 
Democratic Progressive Party  vs New Party 9 
 
People First Party vs Taiwan Solidarity Union 3 
 
People First Party vs Non-Partisan Solidarity Union 0 
 
People First Party vs New Party  3 
 
Taiwan Solidarty Union vs Non-Partisan Solidarity Union 0 
 
Taiwan Solidarty Union vs New Party  3 
 
Non-Partisan Solidarity Union vs New Party 0 
2008 Koumingtang vs Democratic Progressive Party  16 
 
Koumingtang vs People First Party  7 
 
Koumingtang vs Non-Partisan Solidarity Union 4 
 
Democratic Progressive Party vs People First Party  7 
 
Democratic Progressive Party vs Non-Partisan Solidarty Uion 4 
 
People First party vs Non-Partisan Solidarity Union 4 
2012 Koumintang vs Democratic Progressive Party  20 
 
Koumingtang vs People First Party  11 
 
Koumingtang vs Taiwan Solidarity Union 8 
 
Koumingtang vs Non-Partisan Solidarity Union 8 
 
Democratic Progressive Party vs People First Party  11 
 
Democratic Progressive Party vs Taiwan Solidarity Union 8 
 
Democratic Progressive Party vs Non-Partisan Solidarty Uion 8 
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People First party vs Taiwan Solidarity Uion 7 
 
People First party vs Non-Partisan Solidarity Union 8 
 
Taiwan Solidarty Union vs Non-Partisan Solidarity Union 4 
2016 Democratic Progressive party vs Koumintang  24 
 
Democratic Progressive Party vs People First Party  15 
 
Democratic Progressive Party vs New Power Party  0 
 
Koumintang vs People First party 15 
 
Koumintang vs New Power Party  0 
 






Party Dyads Dyad 
Years 




Lakas ng Bansa - United Nationalist Democratic Organization 0 
 
Lakas ng Bansa - Liberal Party 0 
 
Lakas ng Bansa - Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) 0 
 
Lakas ng Bansa - Nacionalista (Nationalist Party) 0 
 
Lakas ng Bansa - Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL)  0 
 
Lakas ng Bansa- Grand Allliance for Democracy (GAD)  0 
 
Lakas ng Bansa - Partido ng Bayan (Party of the People)  0 
 
PDP-LABAN vs United Nationalst Democratic Organization 0 
 
PDP- LABAN vs Partido Liberal Pilipinas (Liberal Party) 0 
 
PDP-LABAN vs LABAN  0 
 
PDP-LABAN vs Nacionalista Party 0 
 
PDP-LABAN vs Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) 0 
 
PDP-LABAN vs Grand Alliance for Democracy (GAD) 0 
 
PDP-LABAN vs Partido ng Bayan  0 
 
United Nationalist Democratic Organization vs Liberal Party 0 
 
United Nationalist Democratic Organizaiton vs LABAN 0 
 
United Nationalist Democratic Organization vs Nacionalista Party 0 
 
United Nationalist Democratic Organization vs KBL 0 
 
United Nationalist Democratic Organization vs GAD 0 
 
United Nationalist Democratic Organization vs Partido ng Bayan 0 
 
Liberal Party vs LABAN 0 
 
Liberal Party vs Nacionalista  0 
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Liberal Party vs KBL  0 
 
Liberal Party vs GAD  0 
 
Liberal Party vs Partido ng Bayan  0 
 
LABAN vs Nacionalista  0 
 
LABAN vs KBL  0 
 
LABAN vs GAD  0 
 
LABAN vs Partido ng Bayan  0 
 
Nacionalista vs KBL 0 
 
Nacionalista vs GAD 0 
 
Nacionalista vs Partido ng Bayan  0 
 
KBL vs GAD 0 
 
KBL vs Partido ng Bayan 0 
 
GAD vs Partido ng Bayan 0 




Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino - Nationalist People's Coalition 0 
 
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino - Kaolisyong Pambansa  0 
 
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino - Partido Nacionalista Party  0 
 
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino - Kilusang Bagong Lipunan  0 
 








Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats vs Nacionalista Party 0 
 
Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats vs Kilusang Bangog 
Lipunan (KBL)  
0 
 
NPC vs Kalisyong Pambansa 0 
 
NPC vs Nacionalista Party 0 
 
NPC vs KBL 0 
 
Kalisyong Pambansa vs Nacionalista Party 0 
 
Kalisyong Pambansa vs KBL 0 
 
Nacionalista Party vs KBL 3 
1995 Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats - Laban ng 
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) 
3 
 




Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats - Partido Liberal ng 
Pilipinas (Liberal Party)  
3 
 
Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats - Partido Demokratiko 
Pilipino-Lakas Bayan (PDP-Laban) 
0 
 









Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats - Pwersang Masang 
Pilipino (Party of the Filipino Masses-PMP) 
0 
 
Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats - Partido ng 
Manggagawa at Magsasaka (Lapiang Manggagawa) 
0 
 
Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats - Partido Demokratiko 




Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) vs Lakas-Laban Coaltiion  0 
 
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) vs Partido Liberal ng 
Pilipinas (Liberal Party) 
3 
 
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) vs Partido Democratiko 
Pilippino-Lakas Bayan (PDP-LABAN) 
0 
 
















Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) vs Nacionalista Party  3 
 
Lakas-Laban Coalition vs Liberal Party 0 
 
Lakas-Laban Coalition vs PDP-Laban  0 
 
Lakas-Laban Coalition vs NPC 0 
 
Lakas-Laban Coalition vs KBL  0 
 
Lakas-Laban Coalition vs PMP 0 
 
Liberal Party vs PDP-Laban  0 
 
Liberal party vs NPC 0 
 
Liberal party vs KBL  0 
 
Liberal Party vs PMP 0 
 
PDP-Laban vs NPC 0 
 
PDP-Laban vs KBL 0 
 
PDP-Laban vs PMP 0 
 
NPC vs KBL  3 
 
NPC vs PRP 0 
 
NPC vs PMP 0 
 
KBL vs PMP 0 
1998 Lakas ng Tao- Christian Muslim Democrats - Laban ng Makabyang 
Masang Pilipino (LAMMP) 
0 
 




Lakas ng Tao- Christian Muslim Democrats- Partido Liberal ng 




Lakas ng Tao- Christian Muslim Democrats- Partido para sa 
Demokratikong Reporma  
0 
 
Lakas ng Tao- Christian Muslim Democrats- Probinsya Muna 
Development Initiative (Provinces First Development initiative) 
0 
 
Lakas ng Tao- Christian Muslim Democrats- Aksyon Demokratiko 0 
 
Lakas ng Tao- Christian Muslim Democrats- Ompia Party 0 
 
Laban ng Makabayang Masng Pilipino vs NPC 0 
 
Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino vs Liberal Party  0 
 








Laban ng makabayang Masang Pilipino vs Aksyon Demokratiko  0 
 
Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino vs Ompia Party 0 
 
NPC vs Liberal Party 0 
 
NPC vs Partido para sa Demokratikong Reporma 3 
 
NPC vs Probinsya Muna Development Initiative  0 
 
NPC vs Aksyon Demokratiko  0 
 
NPC vs Ompia Party  0 
 
Liberal Party vs Partido para sa Demokratikong Reporma 0 
 
Liberal Party vs Probinsya Muna Development Initiatives 0 
 
Libeal Party vs Aksyon Demokratiko 0 
 
Liberal Party vs Ompia Party  0 
 
Partido para sa Demokratikong Reporma vs Probinsya Muna 
Development Initaives  
0 
 
Partido para sa Demokratikong Reporma vs Aksyon Demokratiko 0 
 
Partido para sa Demokratikong Reporma vs Opmia Party 0 
 
Probinsya Muna Development Initiatives vs Aksyon Demokratiko  0 
 
Probinsya Muna Development Initiatives vs Ompia Party 0 
 
Aksyon Demokratiko vs Ompia Party 0 




Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats- Laban ng 
Democrratikong Pilipino (LDP) 
3 
 
Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats- Partido Liberal ng 
Pilipinas (Liberal Party) 
9 
 
Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats- Partido para sa 
Demokratikong Reporma  
3 
 




Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats- Aksyon Demokratiko 3 
 





Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats- Partido Democratiko 
Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban) 
3 
 
Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats- Partido Demokratiko 
Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PDSP) 
0 
 
NPC vs LDP 3 
 
NPC vs Liberal party 3 
 
NPC vs Partido para sa Demokratikong Reporma  6 
 
NPC vs Probinsya Muna Development Initiatves 3 
 
NPC vs Aksyon Demokratiko  3 
 
NPC vs Pwersa ng Massang Pilipino  0 
 
NPC vs PDP-LABAN 3 
 
NPC vs PDSP  0 
 
LDP vs Liberal Party 0 
 
LDP vs Partido para sa Demokratikong Reporma 0 
 
LDP vs Probinsya Muna Development Initiatives 0 
 
LDP vs Aksyon Demokratiko 0 
 
LDP vs Pwersa ng massang Pilippino 0 
 
LDP vs PDP- Laban  0 
 
LDP vs PDSP  0 
 
Liberal Party vs Partido para sa Demokratikong Reporma 3 
 
Liberal Party vs Probinsya Muna Development Initiatives 3 
 
Liberal Party vs Aksyon Demokratiko  3 
 
Liberal Party vs Pwersa ng Massang Pilipino  0 
 
Liberal Party vs PDP-Laban  0 
 
Liberal Party vs PDSP 0 
 




Partido para sa Demokratikong Reporma vs Aksyon Demokratico  3 
 




 Partido para sa Democratikong Reporma  vs PDP-Laban  0 
 
 Partido para sa Democratikong Reporma vs PDSP 0 
 
Probinsya Muna Development Initatives vs Aksyon Demokratiko  0 
 




Probinsya Muna Development Initiatives vs PDP-Laban 0 
 
Probinsya Muna Development Initiatives vs PDSP 0 
 
Aksyon Demokratiko vs Pwersa ng Massang Pilipino 0 
 
Aksyon Demokratiko vs PDP-Laban 0 
 
Aksyon Demokratiko vs PDSP 0 
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Pwersa ng Massang Pilipino vs PDP-Laban 0 
 
Pwersa ng Massang Pilipino vs PDSP  0 
 
PDP-Laban vs PDSP 0 




Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats- Partido Liberal ng 
Pilipinas (Liberal Party) 
12 
 
Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats- Laban ng 
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) 
6 
 




Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats- Aksyon Demokratiko 6 
 
Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats- Kabalikat ng 
Malayang Pilipino  (KAMPI) 
0 
 
Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats-Nacionalista Party  0 
 
Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats- Partido Demokratiko 
Pilipino- Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban) 
6 
 




Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats- Partido Demokratiko 
Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PDSP) 
3 
 
Lakas ng Tao-Chrsitian Muslim Democrats- Partido para sa 
Demokratikong Reporma Reporma-LM) 
0 
 
NPC vs Liberal Party 6 
 
NPC vs LDP  6 
 
NPC vs Pwersa ng Massang Pilipino  0 
 
NPC vs Aksyon Demokratiko  6 
 
NPC vs KAMPI 0 
 
NPC vs Nacionalista Party 0 
 
NPC vs PDP-LABAN 6 
 
NPC vs KBL 0 
 
NPC vs PDSP 3 
 
Liberal Party vs LDP 3 
 
Liberal Party vs Pwersa ng Massang Pilipino 3 
 
Liberal Party vs Aksyon Demokratiko 6 
 
Liberal Party vs KAMPI 0 
 
Liberal Party vs Nacionalista Party 0 
 
Liberal Party vs PDP-Laban  3 
 
Libeal Party vs KBL 0 
 
Liberal Party vs PDSP 3 
 
Liberal Party vs Reporma-LM 0 
 
LDP vs Pwersa ng Massang Pilipino  3 
 
LDP vs Aksyon Demokratiko  3 
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LDP vs KAMPI  0 
 
LDP vs Nacionalista Party  0 
 
LDP vs PDP-Laban 0 
 
LDP vs KBL 3 
 
LDP vs PDSP 3 
 
LDP vs Reporma-LM 0 
 
Pwersa ng Massang Pilipino vs Aksyon Demokratiko  3 
 
Pwersa ng Massang Pilipino vs KAMPI 0 
 
Pwersa ng Massang Pilipino vs Nacionalista Party  0 
 
Pwersa ng Massang Pilipino vs PDP-Laban 0 
 
Pwersa ng Massang Pilipino vs KBL 0 
 
Pwersa ng Massang Pilipino vs PDSP 0 
 
Pwersa ng Massang Pilipino vs Reporma-LM  0 
 
Aksyon Demokratiko vs KAMPI 0 
 
Aksyon Demokratiko vs Nacionalista Party 0 
 
Aksyon Demokratiko vs PDP-Laban 3 
 
Aksyon Demokratiko vs KBL 0 
 
Aksyon Demokratiko vs PDSP 3 
 
Aksyon Demokratiko vs Reporma-LM 0 
 
KAMPI vs Nacionalista Party 0 
 
KAMPI vs PDP-Laban 0 
 
KAMPI vs KBL 0 
 
KAMPI vs PDSP 0 
 
KAMPI vs Reporma-LM 0 
 
Nacionalista Party vs PDP-Laban 0 
 
Nacionalista Party vs KBL 0 
 
Nacionalista Party vs PDSP 0 
 
Nacionalista Party vs Reporma-LM 0 
 
PDP-Laban vs KBL 0 
 
PDP-Laban vs PDSP 3 
 
PDP-Laban vs Reporma-LM 0 
 
KBL vs PDSP 0 
 
KBL vs Reporma-LM  0 
 
PDSP vs Reporma-LM 0 
2007 Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats- Kabalikat ng 
Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) 
3 
 
Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats- Nationalist People's 




Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats- Partido Liberal ng 
Pilipinas (Liberal Party) 
15 
 
Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats - Nactionalista Party 0 
 
Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats - Laban ng 
Democrkatikong Pilipino (LDP) 
9 
 
Laska ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats - Partido Demokratiko 
Pilipino- Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban) 
9 
 




Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats - Partido Demokratiko 
Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PDSP) 
6 
 




Lakas ng Tao-Christian Muslim Democrats-Lingkod Taguig 0 
 
KAMPI vs NPC  3 
 
KAMPi vs Liberal Party  3 
 
KAMPI vs Nacionalista Party 3 
 
KAMPI vs LDP 3 
 
KAMPI vs PDP-LABAN  3 
 
KAMPI vs PMP 3 
 
KAMPI vs PDSP 3 
 
KAMPI vs KBL 3 
 
KAMPI vs Lingkod Taguig  0 
 
NPC vs Liberal Party 9 
 
NPC vs Nacionalista party 3 
 
NPC vs LDP 9 
 
NPC vs PDP-Laban  9 
 
NPC vs PMP 3 
 
NPC vs PDSP 6 
 
NPC vs KBL 3 
 
NPC vs Lingod Taguig 0 
 
Liberal Party vs Nacionalista Party 3 
 
Liberal Party vs LDP 6 
 
Liberal Party vs PDP-Laban 3 
 
Liberal Party vs PMP 6 
 
Liberal party vs PDSP 6 
 
Liberal party vs KBL  3 
 
Libeal party vs Lingod Taguig 0 
 
Nactionalista Party vs LDP  3 
 
Nacionalista Party vs PDP-Laban 3 
 
Nacionalista Party vs PMP 3 
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Nacionalista Party vs PDSP 3 
 
Nacionalista Party vs KBL 3 
 
Nactionalista Party vs Lingod Taguig 0 
 
LDP vs PDP-Laban 3 
 
LDP vs PMP 6 
 
LDP vs PDSP 6 
 
LDP vs KBL 6 
 
LDP vs Lingod Taguig 0 
 
PDP-Laban vs PMP 3 
 
PDP-Laban vs PDSP 3 
 
PDP-Laban vs KBL 3 
 
PDP-Laban vs Lingod Taguig  0 
 
PMP vs PDSP 3 
 
PMP vs KBL 3 
 
PMP vs Lingod Taguig 0 
 
PDSP vs KBL  3 
 
PDSP vs Linkgod Tauig 0 
 
KBL vs Linkgod Tauig 0 
2010 Lakas KAMIPI Christian Muslim Democrats - Kabalikat ng Bayan 
sa Kaunlaran (KABAKA) 
0 
 
Lakas KAMAPI Christain Muslim Democrats-  Partido Liberal ng 
Pilipinas (Liberal Party)  
0 
 
Lakas KAMAPI Christian Muslim Democrats- Nacionalista Party 0 
 




















Lakas  KAMAPI Christian Muslim Democrats- Partido 
Demokratiko Pilipino- Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban) 
0 
 
Lakas  KAMAPI Christian Muslim Democrats- Partido 
Democratiko Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PDSP) 
0 
 
Lakas KAMAPI Christain Muslim Democrats- Laban ng 
Democraktikong Pilipino (LDP) 
0 
 




Lakas  KAMAPI Christian muslim Democrats- Partido ng 
Manggagawa at Magsasaka (Lapiang Manggagawa) 
0 
 
KABAKA vs Liberal Party 0 
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KABAKA vs Nacionalista Party  0 
 
KABAKA vs PCM 0 
 
KABAKA vs PMP 0 
 
KABAKA vs Navoteno  0 
 
KABAKA vs Magdiwang  0 
 
KABAKA vs NPC  0 
 
KABAKA vs PDP-LABAN 0 
 
KABAKA vs PDSP  0 
 
KABAKA vs LDP  0 
 
KABAKA vs KBL 0 
 
KABAKA vs Lapiang Manggagawa  0 
 
Liberal Party vs Nacionalista Party 6 
 
Libeal Party vs PCM 0 
 
Liberal party vs PMP 9 
 
Liberal party vs Navoteno  0 
 
Liberal Party vs Magdiwang 0 
 
Liberal Party vs NPC 12 
 
Liberal Party vs PDP-Laban 6 
 
Liberal Party vs PDSP 9 
 
Liberal Party LDP  9 
 
Liberal Party vs KBL  6 
 
Liberal party vs Lapiang Manggawa 0 
 
Nacionalista Party vs PCM  0 
 
Nacionalista Party vs PMP 6 
 
Nacionalista Party vs Navoteno  0 
 
Nacionalista Party vs Magdiwang 0 
 
Nacionalista Party vs NPC 6 
 
Nacionalista Party vs PDP-Laban 12 
 
Nacionalista Party vs PDSP 6 
 
Nacionalista Party vs LDP 6 
 
Nacionalista Party vs KBL 6 
 
Nacionalista Paty vs Lapiang Manggawa  0 
 
PCM vs PMP 0 
 
PCM vs Navoteno 0 
 
PCM vs Magdiwng 0 
 
PCM vs NPC 0 
 
PCM vs PDP-Laban 0 
 235 
 
PCM vs PDSP 0 
 
PCM vs LDP  0 
 
PCM vs KBL  0 
 
PCM vs Lapiang Maggagawa  0 
 
PMP vs Navoteno  0 
 
PMP vs Magdiwag 0 
 
PMP vs NPC 6 
 
PMP vs PDP-Laban  6 
 
PMP vs PDSP  6 
 
PMP vs LDP 9 
 
PMP vs KBL  6 
 
PMP vs Lapiang Maggagawa 0 
 
Navoteno vs Magdiwang 0 
 
Navoteno vs NPC 0 
 
Navoteno vs PDP-Laban  0 
 
Navoteno vs PDSP 0 
 
Navoteno vs LDP  0 
 
Navoteno vs KBL 0 
 
Navoteno vs Lapiang Maggagawa 0 
 
Magdiwang vs NPC  0 
 
Magdiwang vs PDP-Laban  0 
 
Magdiwang vs PDSP 0 
 
Magdiwang vs LDP  0 
 
Magdiwang vs KBL  0 
 
Magdiwang vs Lapiang Maggagawa  0 
 
NPC vs PDP-Laban 12 
 
NPC vs PDSP 12 
 
NPC vs LDP 12 
 
NPC vs KBL 6 
 
NPC vs Lapiang Manggagawa  0 
 
PDP-Laban vs PDSP 6 
 
PDP-Laban vs LDP 6 
 
PDP-Laban vs KBL 6 
 
PDP-Laban vs Lapiang Manggagawa  0 
 
PDSP vs LDP  9 
 
PDSP vs KBL 6 
 
PDSP vs Lapiang Manggagawa  0 
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LDP vs KBL  9 
 
LDP vs Lapiang Magaggawa 0 
 
KBL vs Lapiang Maggagawa 0 
 
KBL vs Grand Alliance for Democracy 0 
2013 Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Bukidnon Paglaum  0 
 
Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Kusung Agusanon 0 
 








Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Kabalikat ng Bayan 
sa Kaunlaran (KABAKA) 
3 
 




Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Kambilan ning 
Memalen Kapampangan (Kamblian) 
0 
 
Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Unang Sigaw- 
Partido ng Pagbabago  
0 
 




Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Partidong Pagbabago 
ng Palawan (PPP) 
0 
 
Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Ompia Party  0 
 








Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Nacionalista Party 9 
 
Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Lakas KAMPI 
Christian Muslim Democrats (LAKAS) 
3 
 




Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Laban ng 
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) 
12 
 
Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Centrist Democratic 
Party of the Philippines (CDP) 
0 
 
Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Partido ng 
manggagawa at Magsasaka (Lapiang Manggagawa) 
3 
 
Bukidnon Paglaum vs Kusung Agusanon  0 
 
BuKidnon Paglaum vs Akbayan Citizen's Action (Akbayan)  0 
 
Bukidnon Paglaum vs United Nationalist Alliance (UNA) 0 
 
Bukidnon Paglaum vs KABAKA  0 
 
Bukidnon Pagluam vs Magdiwang  0 
 
Bukidnon Pagluam vs Kamblian  0 
 
Bukidnon Pagluam vs Unang Sigaw- Partido ng Pagbabago  0 
 
Bukidnon Pagluam vs United Negro Alliance  0 
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Bukidnon Pagluam vs PPP 0 
 
Bukidnon Pagluam vs Ompia Party  0 
 
Bukidnon Pagluam vs NPC  0 
 
Bukidnon Pagluam vs National Unity Party (NUP) 0 
 
Bukidnon Pagluam vs Nacioanlista party 0 
 
Bukidnon Paglaum vs LAKAS  0 
 
Bukidnon Pagluam vs Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL)  0 
 
Bukidnon Pagluam vs LDP 0 
 
Bukidnon Pagluam vs CDP 0 
 
Bukidnon Pagluam vs Lapiang Manggagawa  0 
 
Kusung Agusanon vs Akbayan  0 
 
Kusung Agusanon vs UNA 0 
 
Kusung Agusanon vs KABAKA 0 
 
Kusung Agusanon vs Magdiwang 0 
 
Kusung Agusanon vs Kamblian  0 
 
Kusung Agusanon vs Unang Sigaw- Partido ng Pagbabago 0 
 
Kusung Agusanon vs United Negro Alliance 0 
 
Kusung Agusanon vs PPP 0 
 
Kusung Agusanon vs Ompia Party 0 
 
Kusung Agusanon vs NPC 0 
 
Kusung Agusanon vs National Unity Party (NUP) 0 
 
Kusung Agusanon vs Nacionalista Party  0 
 
Kusung Agusanon vs LAKAS 0 
 
Kusung Agusanon vs KBL 0 
 
Kusung Agusanon vs LDP 0 
 
Kusung Agusanon vs CDP  0 
 
Akbyan vs UNA 0 
 
Akbayan vs PMP 0 
 
Akbayang vs Magdiwang  0 
 
Akbayang vs Kamblian 0 
 
Akbyayng vs Unang Sigaw-Partido ng Pangbabago 0 
 
Akbayang vs United Negro Alliance 0 
 
Akbayang vs PPP 0 
 
Akbayang vs Ompia Party 0 
 
Akbayang vs NPC 0 
 
Akbayang vs National Unity Party (NUP) 0 
 
Akbayang vs Nacionalista Party  0 
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Akbayang vs LAKAS 0 
 
Akbayang vs KBL 0 
 
Akbayang vs LDP 0 
 
Akbayang vs CDP 0 
 
UNA vs KABAKA 0 
 
UNA vs Magdiwang 0 
 
UNA vs Kambilan  0 
 
UNA vs Unang Sigaw-Partido ng Pangbabago 0 
 
UNA vs United Negro Allaince 0 
 
UNA vs PPP 0 
 
UNA vs Ompia Party  0 
 
UNA vs NPC  0 
 
UNA vs National Unity Party (NUP) 0 
 
UNA vs Nacionalista Party  0 
 
UNA vs Lakas  0 
 
UNA vs KBL  0 
 
UNA vs LDP 0 
 
UNA vs CDP 0 
 
KABAKA vs Magdiwang 0 
 
KABAKA vs Kamblian  0 
 
KABAKA vs Unang Sigwa-Partido Pambabago 0 
 
KABAKA vs United Negro Allaince 0 
 
KABAKA vs PPP 0 
 
KABAKA vs Ompia Party 0 
 
KABAKA vs NPC 0 
 
KABAKA vs National Unity Party (NUP) 0 
 
KABAKA vs Nacionalista Party  3 
 
KABAKA vs Lakas  0 
 
KABAKA vs KBL 3 
 
KABAKA vs LDP 3 
 
KABAKA vs CDP 0 
 
Magdiwang vs Kambilan  0 
 
Magdiwnag vs Uang Sigwa-Partido Pambbago 0 
 
Magdiwang vs United Negro Allaince 0 
 
Magdiwang vs PPP 0 
 
Magdiwang vs Ompia Party 0 
 
Magdiwang vs NPC 3 
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Magdiwang vs National Unity Party (NUP) 0 
 
Magdiwang vs Nacionalista Party  3 
 
Madiwang vs Lakas 3 
 
Magdiwang vs KBL 3 
 
Magdiwang vs LDP 3 
 
Magdiwang vs CDP 0 
 
One Cebu vs Kambilan  0 
 
One Cebu vs Usang Sigwa-Partido Pambbago 0 
 
One Cebu vs United Negro Alliance 0 
 
One Cebu vs PPP 0 
 
One Cebu vs Ompia Party 0 
 
One Cebu vs NPC 0 
 
One Cebu vs National Unity Party (NUP) 0 
 
One Cebu vs Nacaionlista Party 0 
 
One Cebu vs Lakas  0 
 
One Cebu vs KBL 0 
 
One Cebu vs LDP  0 
 
One Cebu vs CDP 0 
 
Kamblian vs Usang Sigwa-Partido Pambbago  0 
 
Kamblian vs United Negro Alliance  0 
 
Kamblian vs Hugpong  0 
 
Kamblian vs PPP 0 
 
Kamblian vs Ompia Party 0 
 
Kamblian vs NPC 0 
 
Kamblian vs National Unity Party (NUP) 0 
 
Kamblian vs Nacionalista Party 0 
 
Kamblian vs Lakas KAMPI CMD 0 
 
Kamblian vs KBL 0 
 
Kamblian vs LDP  0 
 
Kamblian vs CDP 0 
 
Usang Sigwa-Partido Pambbago vs United Negro alliance 0 
 
Usung Sigwa-Partido Pambbago vs PPP 0 
 
Usung Sigwa-Partido Pambbago vs Ompia Party 0 
 
Usung Sigwa-Partido Pambbago vs NPC  0 
 
Usung Sigwa-Partido Pambbago vs National Unity Party (NUP) 0 
 
Usung Sigwa-Partido Pambbago vs Nacionalista Party  0 
 
Usung Sigwa-Partido Pambbago vs Lakas KAMPI CMO 0 
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Usung Sigwa-Partido Pambbago vs KBL 0 
 
Usung Sigwa-Partido Pambbago vs LDP 0 
 
Usung Sigwa-Partido Pambbago vs CDP 0 
 
United Negro Alliance vs PPP 0 
 
United Negro Allaince vs Ompia Party 0 
 
United Negro Alliance vs NPC  0 
 
United Negro Allaince vsNational Unity Party (NUP) 0 
 
United Negro Allaince vs Nacionalista Party 0 
 
United Negro Alliance vs Lakas KAMPI CMD 0 
 
United Negro Alliance vs KBL 0 
 
United Negro Alliance vs LDP 0 
 
United Negro Allaince  vs CDP 0 
 
Hugpong vs PPP 0 
 
Hugpong vs Ompia Party  0 
 
Hugpong vs NPC  0 
 
Hugpong vs National Unity Party (NUP) 0 
 
Hugpong vs Nacionalista Party 0 
 
Hugpong vs Lakas KAMPI CMD 0 
 
Hugpong vs KBL 0 
 
Hugpong vs LDP 0 
 
Hugpong vs CDP 0 
 
PPP vs Ompia Party 0 
 
PPP vs NPC 0 
 
PPP vs NUP 0 
 
PPP vs Nacionalista Party 0 
 
PPP vs Lakas  0 
 
PPP vs KBL  0 
 
PPP vs LDP 0 
 
PPP vs CDP 0 
 
Ompia Party vs NPC 0 
 
Ompia Party vs NUP 0 
 
Ompia Party vs Nacionalista Party 0 
 
Ompia Party vs Lakas KAMPI CMD 0 
 
Ompia Party vs KBL 0 
 
Ompia Party vs LDP 0 
 
Ompia Party vs CDP 0 
 
NPC vs NUP  0 
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NPC vs Nacionalista Party 9 
 
NPC vs Lakas KAMPI CMD 3 
 
NPC vs KBL  9 
 
NPC vs LDP  15 
 
NPC vs CDP 9 
 
NUP vs Nacionalista Party 0 
 
NUP vs Lakas KAMPI CMD 0 
 
NUP vs KBL 0 
 
NUP vs LDP  0 
 
NUP vs CDP 0 
 
Nacionalista Party vs Lakas KAMPI CMD 3 
 
Nacionalista Party vs KBL 3 
 
Nacionalista Party vs LDP 3 
 
Nacionalista Party vs CDP 3 
 
Lakas KAMPI CMD  vs KBL  3 
 
Lakas KAMPI CMD vs LDP 3 
 
Lakas KAMPI CMD vs CDP  0 
 
KBL vs LDP 12 
 
KBL vs CDP 0 
 
KBL vs PLM 0 
 
LDP vs CDP 0 








Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Nacionalista Party  9 
 




Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Partido Demokratiko 
Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban)  
0 
 
Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Lakas KAMPI 
Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas) 
6 
 




Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Aseno Manileno  0 
 
Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Kusog Baryohanon 0 
 








Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Bukidnon Paglaum  3 
 
Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Lingap Lugud 0 
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Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas (Liberal Party) vs Kabalikat ng Bayan 
sa Kaunlaran (KABAKA) 
6 
 
NPC vs NUP 0 
 
NPC vs Nacionalista  12 
 
NPC vs UNA  3 
 
NPC vs PDP-LABAN  0 
 
NPC vs Lakas  6 
 
NPC vs Aksyon 0 
 
NPC vs Aseno Manileno  0 
 
NPC vs Kusog Baryohanon 0 
 
NPC vs Partido Tining ng Masa  0 
 
NPC vs People's Champ Movement (PCM)  0 
 
NPC vs Bukidnon Paglaum  3 
 
NPC vs Lingap Lugud  0 
 
NPC vs LDP 18 
 
NPC vs Arangkada San Joseno (ASJ) 0 
 
NPC vs KABAKA  3 
 
NUP vs Nacionalista  0 
 
NUP vs UNA 0 
 
NUP vs PDP-LABAN 0 
 
NUP vs Lakas  0 
 
NUP vs Aksyon  0 
 
NUP vs Aseno Manileno 0 
 
NUP vs Kusog Baryonhanon  0 
 
NUP vs Partido Tining ng Masa 0 
 
NUP vs People's Champ Movement (PCM) 0 
 
NUP vs Bukdnon Paglaum  0 
 
NUP vs Lingap Lugud  0 
 
NUP vs LDP  0 
 
NUP vs Arangkda San Joseno (ASJ) 0 
 
NUP vs KABAKA 0 
 
Nacionalista vs UNA 3 
 
Nacionalista vs PDP-Laban  0 
 
Nacionalista vs Lakas  6 
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Nacionalista vs Aksyon  0 
 
Nacionalista vs Aseno Manileno 0 
 
Nacionalista vs Kusog Baryonhanon  0 
 
Nacionalista vs Partido Tining ng Masa  0 
 
Nacionalista vs People's Champ Movement (PCM) 0 
 
Nacionalista vs Bukdnon Palgaum  3 
 
Nacionalista vs Lingap Lugud  0 
 
Nacionalista vs LDP  6 
 
Nacionalit vs Arangkda Sn Joseno (ASJ) 0 
 
Nacionalist vs KABAKA  6 
 
UNA vs PDP-Laban 0 
 
UNA vs Lakas 3 
 
UNA vs Aksyon  0 
 
UNA vs Aseno Manileno 0 
 
UNA vs Kusog Baryonhanon 0 
 
UNA vs Partido Tining ng Masa 0 
 
UNA vs PCM 0 
 
UNA vs Bukdnon Palgaum  0 
 
UNA vs Lingap Lugud 0 
 
UNA vs LDP  3 
 
UNA vs ASJ 0 
 
UNA vs KABAKA 0 
 
PDP-Laban vs Lakas  0 
 
PDP-Laban vs Aksyon 0 
 
PDP-Laban vs KBL 0 
 
PDP-Laban vs Aseno Manileno 0 
 
PDP-Laban vs Kusog Baryonhanon 0 
 
PDP-Laban vs Partido Tining ng Masa 0 
 
PDP-Laban vs PCM 0 
 
PDP-Laban vs Bukdnon Palgaum  0 
 
PDP-Laban vs Lingap Lugud  0  
PDP-Laban vs LDP 0 
 
PDP-Laban vs ASJ 0 
 
PDP-Laban vs KABAKA 0 
 
Lakas vs Aksyon  0 
 
Lakas vs Aseno Manileno 0 
 
Lakas vs Kusong Baryonhanon 0 
 
Lakas vs Partido Tining ng Masa 0 
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Lakas vs PCM 0 
 
Lakas vs Bukdnon Palguam 0 
 
Lakas vs Lingap Lugud  0 
 
Lakas vs LDP 6 
 
Lakas vs ASJ 0 
 
Lakas vs KABAKA  3 
 
Aksyon vs Aseno Manileno  0 
 
Aksyon vs Kusong Baryonhanon 0 
 
Aksyon vs Partido Tining ng Masa 0 
 
Aksyon vs PCM 0 
 
Aksyon vs Bukdnon Palguam  0 
 
Aksyon vs Lingap Lugud 0 
 
KBL vs Aseno Manileno 0 
 
KBL vs Kusong Baryonhanon 0 
 
KBL vs Partido Tining ng Masa 0 
 
KBL vs PCM  0 
 
KBL vs Bukdnon Palguam  3 
 
KBL vs Lingap Lugud 0 
 
KBL vs LDP  15 
 
KBL vs ASJ 0 
 
KBL vs KABAKA 6 
 
Aseno Malineno vs Kusong Baryonhanon  0 
 
Aseno Malineno vs partido Tining ng Masa 0 
 
Aseno Malineno vs PCM 0 
 
Aseno Malineno vs Bukdnon Palguam  0 
 
Aseno Malineno vs Lingap Lugud 0 
 
Aseno Malineno vs LDP  0 
 
Aseno Malineno vs ASJ 0 
 
Aseno Malineno vs KABAKA  0 
 
Kusong Baryonhanon vs Partido Tining ng Masa 0 
 
Kusong Baryonhanon vs PCM 0 
 
Kusong Baryonhanon vs Bukdnon Palguam  0 
 
Kusong Baryonhanon vs Lingap Lugud 0 
 
Kusong Baryonhanon vs LDP 0 
 
Kusong Baryonhanon vs ASJ 0 
 
Kusong Baryonhanon vs KABAKA  0 
 
Partido Tining ng Masa vs PCM 0 
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Partido Tining ng Masa vs Bukdnon Palguam  0 
 
Partido Tining ng Masa vs Lingap Lugud  0 
 
Partido Tining ng Masa vs LDP  0 
 
Partido Tining ng Masa vs ASJ 0 
 
Partido Tining ng Masa vs KABAKA 0 
 
PCM vs Bukdnon Palguam  0 
 
PCM vs Lingap Lugud 0 
 
PCM vs LDP  0 
 
PCM vs ASJ 0 
 
PCM vs KABAKA 0 
 
Bukdnon Palguam vs Lingap Lugud 0 
 
Bukdnon Palguam vs LDP 3 
 
Bukdnon Palguam vs ASJ 0 
 
Bukdnon Palguam vs KABAKA  3 
 
Lingap Lugud vs LDP 0 
 
Lingap Lugud vs ASJ 0 
 
Lingap Lugud vs KABAKA  0 
 
Padayon Pilipina vs LDP  0 
 
Padayon Pilipina vs ASJ 0 
 
Padayon Pilipina vs KABAKA 0 
 
One Cebu vs LDP 0 
 
One Cebu vs ASJ 0 
 
One Cebu vs KABKA  0 
 
LDP vs ASJ 0 
 
LDP vs KABAKA  6 
 













Election Years Party Dyad Year of 
Dyad 
1988 Democratic Justice Party  vs  Reuification Democratic Party 0 
 
Democratic Justice Party  vs Party for Peace and Democracy  0 
 
Democratic Justice Party vs New Democratic Republican Party 0 
 
Democratic Justice Party vs Hangyore Democratic Party 0 
 
Runification Democrtic Party vs Party for Peace and Democracy  0 
 




Reunification Democratic Party vs Hangyore Democratic Party 0 
 




Party for Peace and Democracy vs Hangyore Democratic Party  0 
 
New Democratic Repbulican Party vs Hangyore Democratic Party  0 
1992 Democratic Liberal Party vs Democratic Party 0 
 
Democratic Liberal Party vs United People's Party 0 
 
Democratic Liberal Party vs New Political Reform Party 0 
 
Democratic Party vs United People's Party  0 
 
Democratic Party vs New Political Reform Party 0 
 
United People's Party vs New Political Reform party 0 
1996 New Korea Party vs Natioanl Congress for New Politics  0 
 
New Korea Party vs United Liberal Democrats  0 
 
New Korea Party vs United Democratic Party  0 
 
National Congress for New Politics vs United Liberal Democrats 0 
 
National Congress for New Politics vs United Democratic Party 0 
 
United Liberal Democrats vs United Democratic Party 0 
 
United Liberal Democrats vs Great Korean Democratic Party 0 
2000 Grand National Party vs Millenium Democratic Party 0 
 
Grand National Party vs United Liberal Democrats  0 
 
Grand National Party vs Democratic People's Party  0 
 
Grand National Party vs New Korean Party of Hope 0 
 
Millenium Democratic Party vs United Liberal Democrats 0 
 
Millenium Democratic Party vs Democratic People's Party 0 
 
Millenium Democratic Party vs New Korean Party of Hope 0 
 
United Liberal Democrats vs Democratic People's Party 0 
 
United Liberal Democrats vs New Korean party of Hope 0 
 
Democratic People's Party vs New Korean Party of Hope 0 
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New Korea Party of Hope vs Republican Party  0 
2004 Uri Party vs Grand National Party  0 
 
Uri Party vs Democratic Labour Party 0 
 
Uri  Party vs Millenium Democratic Party  0 
 
Uri  Party vs United Liberal Democrats  0 
 
Grand National Party vs Democratic Labour Party 0 
 
Grand National Party vs Millenium Democratic Party 4 
 
Grand National Party vs United Liberal Democrats 4 
 
Democratic Labour Party vs Millenium Democratic Party 0 
 
Democratic Labour Party vs United Libeal Democrats  0 
 
Millenium Democratic Party vs United Liberal Democrats  4 
2008 Grand National Party vs United Democratic Party  4 
 
Grand National Party vs Liberty Forward Party 0 
 
Grand National Party vs Pro-Park Coalition 0 
 
Grand National Party vs Democratic Labour Party 4 
 
Grand National Party vs Creative Korea Party  0 
 
United Democratic Party vs Liberty Forward Party 0 
 
United Democratic Party vs Pro-Park Coalition 0 
 
United Democratic Party vs Democratic Labour Party 0 
 
United Democratic Party vs Creative Korea Party 0 
 
Liberty Forward Party vs Pro-Park Coalition 0 
 
Liberty Forward party vs Democratic Labour Party 0 
 
Liberty Forward Party vs Creative Korea Party 0 
 
Pro-Park Coalition vs Democratic Labour Party 0 
 
Pro-Park Coalition vs Creative Korea Party 0 
 
Democratic Labour Party vs Creative Korea Party  0 
2012 Saenuri Party vs Democratic United Party  0 
 
Saenuri Party vs Unified Progressive Party  0 
 
Saenuri Party vs Liberty Forward Party  0 
 
Democratic United Party vs Unified Progressive Party 0 
 
Democratic United Party vs Liberty Forward Party 0 
 
Unified Progressive Party vs Liberty Forward Party 0 
2016 The Minjoo Party vs Saenuri Party 0 
 
The Minjoo Party vs People's Party 0 
 
The Minjoo Party vs Justice Party  0 
 
Seanuri Party vs People's Party  0 
 
Seanuri Party vs Justice Party 0 
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Appendix B: Party Systems Development chart for Japan, Taiwan, 
Philippines, and South Korea 
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Appendix C: Freedom House Scores for Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, 




Freedom in the World: Japan (1998-2016) 
  Political Rights Civil Liberties  Freedom 
1998 1 2 1.5 
1999 1 2 1.5 
2000 1 2 1.5 
2001 1 2 1.5 
2002 1 2 1.5 
2003 1 2 1.5 
2004 1 2 1.5 
2005 1 2 1.5 
2006 1 2 1.5 
2007 1 2 1.5 
2008 1 2 1.5 
2009 1 2 1.5 
2010 1 2 1.5 
2011 1 2 1.5 
2012 1 2 1.5 
2013 1 2 1.5 
2014 1 2 1.5 
2015 1 1 1 


















Freedom in the World: Taiwan (1999-2016) 
  Political Rights Civil Liberties  Freedom Rating 
1999 2 2 2 
2001 1 2 1.5 
2002 1 2 1.5 
2003 2 2 2 
2004 2 2 2 
2005 2 2 1.5 
2006 1 1 1 
2007 2 1 1.5 
2008 2 1 1.5 
2009 2 1 1.5 
2010 1 2 1.5 
2011 1 2 1.5 
2012 1 2 1.5 
2013 1 2 1.5 
2014 1 2 1.5 
2015 1 2 1.5 























The Philippines  
 
Freedom in the World: Philippines (1999-2016) 
  Political Right Civil Liberty Freedom Rating 
1999 2 3 2.5 
2001 2 3 2.5 
2002 2 3 2.5 
2003 2 3 2.5 
2004 2 3 2.5 
2005 2 3 2.5 
2006 3 3 2.5 
2007 3 3 3 
2008 4 3 3 
2009 4 3 3.5 
2010 4 3 3.5 
2011 3 3 3.5 
2012 3 3 3 
2013 3 3 3 
2014 3 3 3 
2015 3 3 3 

























Freedom in the World: South Korea (1998-2016) 
  Political Right Civil Liberty Freedom Rating 
1998 2 2 2 
1999 2 2 2 
2001 2 2 2 
2002 2 2 2 
2003 2 2 2 
2004 2 2 2 
2005 1 2 1.5 
2006 1 2 1.5 
2007 1 2 1.5 
2008 1 2 1.5 
2009 1 2 1.5 
2010 1 2 1.5 
2011 1 2 1.5 
2012 1 2 1.5 
2013 1 2 1.5 
2014 2 2 2 
2015 2 2 2 





















Appendix D: Electoral Volatility in Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, and 




























































































































































































































































43.01 27.79 31.855 
 
Democratic 
































































Political Parties Constituency 
Votes 
Volatility 
1986 Kuomintang 0 
 
 





1989 Kuomintang 0 
 
 
Chinese Youth Party  0 
 
 





1992 Kuomintang  53 
 
 
Democratic Progressive Party  31 
 
 





Independents  14 
 
1995 Kuomintang 51.83 13.73 
 
Democratic Progressive Party  32.93 
 
 
New Party  12.8 
 
 
Independents  2.44 
 
1998 Kuomintang 54.67 9.825 
 
Democratic Progressive Party  31.11 
 
 
New Party  4.89 
 
 
Democratic Union of Taiwan 1.78 
 
 
New Nation Alliance 0.44 
 
 








Independents  5.53 
 





People First Party  20.44 
 
 
Taiwan Solidarity Union 5.78 
 
2004 Kuomintang 35.11 2.445 
 
People First Party  15.11 
 
 
Democratic Progressive Party  39.56 
 
 
Taiwan Solidarity Union 5.53 
 
2008 Kuomintang 71.68 33.235 
 
People First Party  0.88 
 
 
Democratic Progressive Party  23.89 
 
 262 
2012 Kuomintang 56.64 14.16 
 
People First Party  2.65 
 
 
Democratic Progressive Party  35.4 
 














































Year Parties  Constituency 
Votes (%) 
Volatility  
















Kilusang Bangong Lipunan (KBL) 4.1 
 
 
Grand Alliance for Democracy (GAD) 1.34 
 
 
Partido ng Bayan  1.63 
 
1992 Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino 33.73 42.84 
 





Naationalist People's Coalition (NPC)  18.66 
 
 
Koalisyong Pambansa (National Coalition)  8.82 
 
 
Nacionalista (Nationalist Party ) 3.92 
 
1995 Lakas-CMD 40.66 29.615 
 






Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) 12.19 
 
1998 Laksa-CMD  49.01 28.37 
 





Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC)  4.08 
 
 
Liberal Party  7.25 
 
 









2001 Lakas-CMD 35.6 20.49 
 
Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) 19.5 
 
 
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) 10.2 
 
 
Liberal Party  9.2 
 
2004 Lakas-CMD  37.2 5.15 
 
Naationalist People's Coalition (NPC)  21.5 
 
 
Liberal Party 11.8 
 
 
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) 6.1 
 
2007 Lakas-CMD 33.1 19.45 
 




Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) 10.4 
 
 





2010 Lakas-CMD  37.41 17.15 
 
Liberal Party 0.53 
 
 







2013 Liberal Party  38.31 53.695 
 























































Political Parties Constituency Votes 
(%) 
Volatility 
1988 Democratic Justice Party (DJP) 33.96 22.19 
 
Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) 19.26 
 
 
Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) 23.83 
 
 




1992 Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) 38.5 42.55 
 
Democratic Party (DP) 29.2 
 
 
Unification National Party (UNP) 17.4 
 
1996 New Korea Party (NKP) 34.5 17.25 
 





United Liberal Democrats (ULD) 16.2 
 
 
United Democratic Party (UDP) 11.2 
 
2000 Grand National Party  39 42.395 
 
Millenium Democratic Party (MDP) 35.99 
 
 
United Liberal Democrats (ULD) 9.8 
 
2004 Uri Party  38.3 47.1 
 
Grand National Party  35.8 
 
 
Demoratic Labour Party 13 
 
 
Millennium Democratic Party  7.1 
 
2008 Grand National Party  43.45 18.24 
 
United Democratic Party (UDP) 28.92 
 
 
Liberty Forward Party (LFP) 5.72 
 
 
Pro-Park Coalition  3.7 
 
 
Democratic Labour Party 3.39 
 
 
Creative Korea Party  0.42 
 
2012 Saenuri Party (New Froentier Party) 43.28 30.86 
 
Democratic United Party (DUP) 37.85 
 
 
United Progressive  5.99 
 
 
Liberty Forward Party (LFP) 2.2 
 
2016 Minjoo Party of Korea 37 29.245 
 
Saenuri Party  38.3 
 
 
People's Party  14.9 
 
 
Justice Party 1.61 
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